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Flight Control Laws
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Revision as of 21:43, 16 August 2012 by Editor2
Modern large commercial transport aircraft designs rely on sophisticated flight computers to aid and protect the aircraft in flight. These are governed by computational laws which assign flight control modes during flight.
Aircraft with fly-by-wire flight controls require computer controlled flight control modes that are capable of determining the operational mode (computational law) of the aircraft. A reduction of electronic flight control can be caused by the failure of a computational device, such as the flight control computer or an information providing device, such as the Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU). Electronic flight control systems (EFCS) also provide augmentation in normal flight, such as increased protection of the aircraft from overstress or providing a more comfortable flight for passengers by recognizing and correcting for turbulence and providing yaw damping.
Two aircraft manufacturers produce commercial passenger aircraft with primary flight computers that can perform under different flight control modes (or laws). The most well-known are the Normal, Alternate and Direct Laws plus Mechanical Backup of the Airbus A320-A380. Boeing's fly-by-wire system is used in the Boeing 777. Boeing also has two other, recently in-service, commercial aircraft, the 787 and the 747-8, which use fly-by-wire controls. These newer generation of aircraft use the lighter weight electronic systems to increase safety and performance while lowering aircraft weight. Since these systems can also protect the aircraft from overstress situations, the designers can therefore reduce over-engineered components, further reducing weight.
Aircraft designers have created a set of flight control modes that include redundant electronics to safeguard against system failures. Failures can occur singly or combined to render systems inoperable. Pilots must be able to control the aircraft with some, or even none, of the computational electronics functioning. In the case of Airbus the back-ups are the direct and mechanical modes. Boeing's direct mode removes many of the computational 'limitations'. In older aircraft, control is through the pilot's control column, rudder pedals, trim wheel or throttles that mechanically move cables, pulleys or hydraulic servo valves. These then move control surfaces or change engine settings.
Many newer aircraft replace these mechanical controls with fly-by-wire systems. These aircraft have flight control computers which operate control surfaces, inform the pilot and provide performance information. In older aircraft the pilot's mechanical controls are resisted by the forces acting on the control surface, but nothing prevents the aircraft from stalling, over-speeding or an excessive bank angle at high speed. Fly-by-wire systems limit control surface movements to ensure that aircraft limits are not exceeded.
Another function of flight control laws is to assess the performance of the aircraft under various conditions, such as takeoff, landing or normal cruise when flight control computers partially or completely fail. Designers build in the ability to by-pass the computers or for the standby systems to operate without the computers.
Flight Control Laws (Airbus)
Airbus aircraft designs subsequent to the A300/A310 are almost exclusively controlled by fly-by-wire equipment. These newer aircraft, including the AIRBUS A-320, A330 Family, A340 Family, A350 and AIRBUS A-380-800 operate under Airbus flight control laws. There are some differences in the electrical architecture, the number and the naming of the flight control computers between types. As an example, the A320 has a total of seven flight control computers - two ELACs (Elevator Aileron Computer), three SECs (Spoilers Elevator Computer) and two FACs (Flight Augmentation Computers) - whereas the A330 has a total of five computers - three PRIMs (Flight Control Primary Computer) and two SECs (Flight Control Secondary Computer). On both aircraft, a single flight control computer is capable of providing complete aircraft control in the most basic of Airbus control laws, Direct Law. Mechanical Back Up is incorporated into the system design to allow limited control of the aircraft while recovering from a temporary total electrical failure.
The flight controls on Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft are all electronically controlled and hydraulically activated. Some surfaces, such as the rudder and the horizontal stabilizer, can also be mechanically controlled. While in normal flight the computers act to prevent excessive forces in the pitch and roll axes. The following discussion is based on the A330 but much of the information also applies to other Airbus types.
Information from numerous sources including pilot sidesticks and rudder pedals, the Air Data Inertial Reference Units (ADIRUs), the Landing Gear Control Interface Units (LGCIU), the Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCC), the Flight Management Guidance Computers (FMGC) and the accelerometer is sent to the five flight control computers. There, dependent upon the active control law, the aircraft speed, altitude, configuration, attitude, phase of flight and numerous other parameters, the sidestick and rudder pedal or autopilot commands are interpreted and the appropriate control deflection signals are sent to the control actuators. Two Flight Control Data Concentrators (FCDC) also acquire data from the Primary and Secondary Flight Control Computers and send it to the Electronic Instrument System (EIS) to feed pilot displays and to the Central Maintenence Computer (CMC).
There are three primary flight control laws - Normal Law, Alternate Law and Direct Law. Alternate Law is further subdivided into Alternate Law 1 and Alternate Law 2. The degradation to one or the other of the Alternate Law options is dependent upon the type of failure. Each of the three laws has different sub modes inclusive of ground mode, flight mode and flare mode. Mechanical Back Up is designed to allow the pilots to maintain control of the aircraft while restoring flight control computers after a complete power interuption.
Flight control Normal Law provides three axis control, flight envelope protection and manoeuver load alleviaiton. Normal Law operates in differenct modes depending on the stage of flight. These modes include:
- Ground Mode
- Flight Mode
- Flare Mode
Ground mode is active whilst the aircraft is on the ground. The autotrim feature is turned off and there is a direct relationship between sidestick deflection and elevator response. The horizontal stabilizer is automatically set to 4° up but manual settings (e.g. for center of gravity) override this setting. Immediately after the wheels leave the ground, flight mode progressively takes over from ground mode. The reverse occurs after touch down during the landing phanse.
The flight mode of Normal Law provides five types of protection: pitch attitude, load factor limitations, high speed, high-AOA and bank angle. Normal Law flight mode is operational from take-off and remains active until 100 feet above the ground during the landing phase. Failure of certain systems or multiple failures will result in degradation of Normal Law to Alternate Law (ALT 1 or ALT2).
Unlike conventional controls, in Normal Law flight mode the sidestick provides a load factor proportional to stick deflection which is independent of aircraft speed. When the sidestick is neutral in manual flight, the system will maintain a 1g load factor and the aircraft will remain in level flight with no requirement for the pilot to change the elevator trim, even during a speed or configuration change. For manual turns up to 33° bank, no sidestick back pressure is required as the system automatically trims the aircraft to maintain level flight. The system freezes the auto-trim when the angle of attack becomes excessive, the load factor exceeds 1.3g or when the bank angle exceeds 33°. If these situations occur as the result of a deliberate manoeuvre, the pilot must apply back pressure on the sidestick to maintain the selected attitude. In all cases, Load Factor Protection automatically limits the control inputs so that the aircraft remains within AOM "g" limitations and Pitch Attitude Protection limits the aircraft attitude to a maximum of 30° nose up or 15° nose down.
High Angle of Attack Protection, which protects against stalling and the effects of windshear has priority over all other protection functions. The protection engages when the angle of attack is between α-Prot and α-Max and limits the angle of attack commanded by the pilot's sidestick to α-Max even with full sidestick deflection. If the autopilot is engaged, it is automatically disengaged with activation of High Angle of Attack Protection. α-Floor (automatic application of TOGA thrust) may be activated by the autothrust system if engagement parameters are met.
High Speed Protection will engage to automatically recover from high speed upset. There are two speed limitations for high altitude aircraft, VMO (Velocity Maximum Operational) and MMO (Mach Maximum Operational). The two speeds are the same at approximately 31,000 feet, below which overspeed is determined by VMO and above 31,000 feet by MMO. Activation of High Speed Protection results in reducing the positive spiral static stability of the aircraft from its normal 33° to 0° which means that if the pilot releases the sidestick, the aircraft will roll to a wings level attitutde. It also reduces the sidestick nose down authority and applies a permanent nose up order to help reduce speed and recovery to normal flight. Activation of High Speed Protection results in automatic autopilot disengagement. Once the speed has decreased below VMO/MMO, Normal Law is restored and the autopilot can be re-engaged.
Bank Angle Protection limits the maximum bank angle of the aircraft. Within the normal flight envelope, if the sidestick is released when bank angle is above 33°, the bank angle is automatically reduced to 33°. With full sidestick deflection, the maximum acheiveable bank angle is 67°. If either Angle of Attack or High Speed Protection are active, full sidestick deflection will result in a maximum bank angle of 45°. With High Speed Protection active, release of the sidestick will cause the aircraft to return to a wings level attitude.
Low Energy Protection is also available while in Normal Law when the aircraft is between 100' and 2000' with flaps set at config 2 or greater. The low energy warning is computed by the PRIMs using parameters of configuration, airspeed deceleration rate and flight pth angle. The aural warning "Speed Speed Speed" indicates to the pilot that aircraft energy has become too low and that power must be added to recover a positive flight path angle. α-Floor protection is available.
This mode is automatically engaged when the radar altimeter indicates 100 feet above ground and provides for a direct sidestick to elevator relationship. At 50 feet the aircraft trims the nose slightly down requiring the pilot to progressively move the sidestick rearward emulating a conventional control input for landing.
There are three basic reconfiguration modes for the Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft, Alternate Law, Direct Law and Mechanical Back Up. Alternate Law is subdivided into two somewhat different configurations dependent upon the specific failure(s). The ground mode and flare modes for Alternate Law are identical to those modes for Normal Law.
Alternate Law 1 (ALT1) combines Normal Law lateral mode with Alternate Law pitch modes. Low Energy Protection is replaced by Low Speed Stability meaning that the aircraft no longer has automatic stall protection. At low speed, a nose down demand is introduced based on IAS (instead of AOA) and Alternate Law changes to Direct Law. In addition, an audio "STALL" warning is introduced. α-Floor protection is not available so conventional pilot stall recovery action is required.
Load Factor and Bank Angle Protections are retained. High Speed and High Angle of Attack Protections enter Alternate Law mode. Pitch Attitude Protection is lost.
ALT1 control law degradation will result from some faults in the horizontal stabilizer, a single elevator fault, loss of a yaw-damper actuator, loss of slat or flap position sensors or a single air data reference fault. Dependent upon the failure, autopilot may not be available.
In Alternate Law 2 (ALT2), Normal Law lateral mode is lost and is replaced by roll direct law and yaw alternate law. Pitch mode is in Alternate Law. Load factor protection is retained. In addition to those protections lost in ALT1 (Pitch Attitude and Low Energy Protection), Bank Angle Protection is also lost. In some failure cases, High Angle of Attack and High Speed Protections will also be lost.
As is the case with ALT1, some failure cases that result in ALT2 will also cause the autopilot to disconnecnt. ALT2 is entered when both engines flame out, with faults in two inertial or two air-data reference units, with faults to all spoilers, certain aileron faults or with a pedal transducers fault.
Direct mode (DIR) loses normal lateral mode and all protections, the aircraft assumes Alternate Law yaw mode and Direct Law roll mode. Automatic elevator trim is inoperative and must be adjusted manually by the pilot. Control surface motion is directly related to the sidestick and rudder pedal motion. DIR is entered if there is failure of three inertial reference units or the primary flight computers, faults in two elevators, flame out in two engines (on a two engine aircraft) or when the captain's primary flight computer is inoperable.
Mechanical Back Up
In the Mechanical Back Up mode, pitch is controlled by the mechanical horizontal stab trim system and lateral direction is controlled by the rudder pedals operating the rudder mechanically. This mode is intended to allow the pilots to maintain level flight while resetting flight control computers after a temporary total loss of power.
Boeing 777 Primary Flight Control System
The fly-by-wire electronic flight control system of the Boeing 777 differs from the Airbus EFCS. The design principle is to provide a system that responds similarly to a mechanically controlled system. Because the system is controlled electronically the flight control system can provide flight envelope protection. The electronic system is subdivided between 2 levels, the 4 actuator control electronics (ACE) and the 3 primary flight computers (PFC). The ACEs control actuators (from those on pilot controls to control surface controls and the PFC). The role of the PFC is to calculate the control laws and provide feedback forces, pilot information and warnings.
Standard Protections and augmentations
The flight control system on the 777 is designed to restrict control authority beyond certain range by increasing the back pressure once the desired limit is reached. This is done via electronically controlled backdrive actuators (controlled by ACE). The protections and augmentations are: bank angle protection, turn compensation, stall protection, over-speed protection, pitch control, stability augmentation and thrust asymmetry compensation. The design philosophy is: "to inform the pilot that the command being given would put the aircraft outside of its normal operating envelope, but the ability to do so is not precluded."
Normal mode In Normal mode the PFCs transmit actuator commands to the ACEs, which convert them into analog servo commands. Full functionality is provided, including all enhanced performance, envelope protection and ride quality features.
Secondary mode Boeing Secondary mode is comparable to the Airbus Alternate Law, with the PFCs supplying commands to the ACEs. However, EFCS functionality is reduced, including loss of flight envelope protection. Like the Airbus system, this state is entered when a number of failures occur in the EFCS or interfacing systems (e.g. ADIRU or SAARU).
Direct mode In Direct mode each ACE decodes pilot commands directly from the pilot controller transducers. This mode can be entered automatically or manually. Automatic entry occurs when all PFCs fail, all ACEs fail, or a control data bus is lost.