SKYbrary Wiki

{{Infobox Loss of Separation
|source            = EUROCONTROL
|source_image      = EUROCONTROL
|source_caption    = EUROCONTROL
|control           = EUROCONTROL
|control_image     = EUROCONTROL
|control_caption   = EUROCONTROL
|publication_date  =
|editor            =
}}

==Background==

Pursuant to EU [[Regulation_(EU)_No_970/2014_amending_Regulation_(EU)_No_677/2011_laying_down_detailed_rules_for_the_implementation_of_ATM_network_functions|Regulation No 970/2014]] the [[Decision_on_the_Nomination_of_the_Network_Manager_for_the_ATM_Network_Functions|Network Manager]] shall identify operational safety hazards at European ATM network level and assess the associated network safety risk. To discharge this obligation the Network Manager implemented dedicated risk identification and monitoring process.

==Operational Safety Hazard Identification Process==

The process supports aviation service providers (ANSPs, Aircraft Operators and Airport Operators) in their proactive risk management. It is a cyclic process and includes the following steps:
*collection of accident and serious incident (severity A and B) data reported to and investigated by the service providers;
*data coding and analysis by means of a comprehensive set of barrier models – Safety Functions Maps (SAFMAPs);
*conduct of targeted in-depth risk analysis and surveys on specific topics;
*identification and prioritisation of the ATM operational risks;
*monitoring, analysis and update of the risk priorities, as appropriate.

The collaborative process for identification of operational safety hazards is run by the EUROCONTROL Safety Improvement Sub-Group (SISG) and supervised by the EUROCONTROL Safety Team and the Network Management Board.

== ATM Top 5 Operational Safety Priorities==

The current ATM Top 5 operational risk priorities identified in 2017 are:
*Blind spot (conflict between aircraft in close proximity no detected by air traffic controller);
*TCAS RA not followed;
*Flight without a transponder or with a dysfunctional one;
*Detection of potential runway conflict by air traffic controllers; 
*Sudden, high energy runway conflict.

==ATM Operational Safety Studies==

The operational safety studies are targeted risk studies and surveys carried out to support the analysis of the Network Manager Top 5 operational risks. Every operational safety study focuses on a particular issue and examines in detail the incident scenarios and associated safety risk, available or potential prevention barriers and their effectiveness.

All operational safety studies carried out over the years can be viewed here:
* [http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3284.pdf Landing without ATC clearance]
* [http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3394.pdf Detection of maneuvering area conflicts by air traffic controllers]
* [https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4191.pdf High energy runway conflicts]
* [https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4192.pdf Airside vehicle drivers impact on runway safety]
* [http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4070.pdf Aerodrome hot spot identification on aerodrome charts]
* [http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3305.pdf Risk of operation without transponder or with a dysfunctional one]
* [http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3392.pdf Blind spot – inefficient detection of conflict with aircraft in close proximity]
* [https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3372.pdf Detection of conflicts at the interface to adjacent ATC sectors]

[[Category:Loss of Separation]]
[[Category:Runway Incursion]]
[[Category:Operational Issues]]