E145, Hannover Germany, 2005
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|On 14 August 2005, a British Airways Regional Embraer 145 overran Runway 27L at Hannover by 160 metes after flying a stable approach in daylight but then making a soft and late touchdown on a water covered runway. Dynamic aquaplaning began and this was followed by reverted rubber aquaplaning towards the end of the paved surface when the emergency brake was applied. The aircraft suffered only minor damage and only one of the 49 occupants was slightly injured.|
|Actual or Potential
|Human Factors, Runway Excursion, Weather|
|Flight Conditions||On Ground - Normal Visibility|
|Operator||British Airways Regional|
|Type of Flight||Public Transport (Passenger)|
|Origin||Birmingham International Airport|
|Take off Commenced||Yes|
|Location - Airport|
|Tag(s)||Flight / Cabin Crew Co-operation,|
Inappropriate crew response - skills deficiency,
Procedural non compliance
|Tag(s)||Overrun on Landing,|
Excess Water Depth"Excess Water Depth" is not in the list (Overrun on Take Off, Overrun on Landing, Directional Control, Excessive Airspeed, RTO decision after V1, High Speed RTO (V above 80 but not above V1), Unable to rotate at VR, Collision Avoidance Action, Parallel Approach Operations, Late Touchdown, ...) of allowed values for the "RE" property.,
Thrust Reversers not fitted,
Landing Performance Assessment
|Damage or injury||Yes|
|Causal Factor Group(s)|
On 14 August 2005, an Embraer 145 being operated by British Airways Regional on a scheduled passenger flight from Birmingham to Hannover overran the wet landing runway by 160 m524.934 ft
in normal visibility after flying a daylight ILS approach with the approach lights visible from about 4 nm7,408 m
. There was no fire and only one of the 49 occupants received minor injuries. The aircraft suffered only minor damage.
An Investigation was carried out by the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation, the Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung (Germany) (BFU). This found that the aircraft commander had been PF and that when offered either Runway 27L or the longer 27R for landing, he had been influenced in his choice by the more convenient taxi route to the usual parking gate after landing from 27L. The aircraft was operating at close to MLW and it was noted that thrust reversers were not fitted.
The Investigation found that the ILS approach had been stable at 500 feet aal and that the autopilot had been disconnected at 180 ft54.864 m
aal, after which the aircraft had remained above the ILS GS. The landing runway threshold was over-flown at a height 62 ft18.898 m
at a speed of 140 KIAS compared to the target height of 50 feet and an applicable Reference Speed (Vref) of 138 KIAS. The subsequent touchdown occurred at 122 KIAS and was estimated to have taken place about 850 metres after the runway threshold. Automatic ground spoiler deployment occurred but there was no significant deceleration as a result of brake application.
Towards the end of the runway when the aircraft was still at a speed of 68 knots and it was clear than at overrun was likely, the aircraft commander selected the emergency / parking brake which is designed for use only in the event of brake failure. No beneficial effect on deceleration resulted, as the wheels locked and the ground spoilers auto retracted. Evidence of reverted rubber aquaplaning was found from this point until the aircraft left the end of the paved surface at a speed of 58 knots. After a further 11 seconds and an overrun totalling approximately 160 metres across flat ground with relatively minor obstructions, the aircraft came to a stop.
Findings of the Investigation included:
- That, in theory, Runway 27L would have been long enough had all parameters used for the calculation been adhered to. However, the aircraft touched down 849 m after the threshold which resulted in the fact the LDA was theoretically and practically insufficient given the prevailing conditions.
- Based on the slow deceleration, the BFU is of the opinion that dynamic aquaplaning occurred shortly after touchdown in the middle part of the runway. A soft landing on a runway contaminated with water aided aquaplaning.
- The aerodrome operator did not provide the Tower Controller with required information on runway conditions necessary for a safe conduct of flight operations.
- A continuous observation and assessment of the runway conditions through the aerodrome operator which the quickly changing weather situation would have made necessary did not occur.
Causal Factors of the Accident were detailed by the Investigation as:
- The decision to land on the shorter runway which was aided by insufficient information regarding the real runway condition.
- The late touchdown which was caused by insufficient situational awareness, light tailwind and increased landing speed.
- The missing braking action which was caused by aquaplaning. The use of the emergency brake which aided aquaplaning.
The Investigation noted that three Safety Recommendations had been made as a result of the Operator’s own internal Accident Investigation:
- A review of the way in which pilots on the EMB-145 might be reacquainted with the importance of using the correct landing technique on wet runways should be made.
- A review of guidance provided to flight crew for circumstances where braking effectiveness during landing is not sufficient should be undertaken.
- A review should be made of the circumstances under which aquaplaning can occur on wet runways so as to better inform the management of this risk.
The BFU decided that “based on the described actions (of the Operator) the BFU will abstain from Safety Recommendations.”
The Final Report of the Investigation was published in January 2007 and may be seen in full at SKYbrary bookshelf: BFU - Investigation Report EX006-0/05