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DH8B /
Revision as of 14:16, 11 September 2010 by Timo.Kouwenhoven (talk | contribs)
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Name Dash 8 Q200
Manufacturer BOMBARDIER
Body Narrow
Wing Fixed Wing
WTC Medium
Type code L2T
Engine Turboprop
Engine count Multi
Mass group 3

Manufacturered as:





Series 100 airframe with more powerful Pratt & Whitney Canada PW123 engines (rated at 2,150 shp or 1,600 kW) for improved performance also capable of carrying 37 to 39 passengers. DH8B is a member of the Bombardier Dash 8 Series.

Technical Data

Wing span 25.89 m84.941 ft <br />
Length 22.25 m72.999 ft <br />
Height 7.49 m24.573 ft <br />
Powerplant 2 x Pratt & Whitney Canada PW123 engines (rated at 2,150 shp or 1,600 kW).
Engine model Pratt & Whitney Canada PW100

Performance Data

Take-Off Initial Climb
(to 5000 ft)
Initial Climb
(to FL150)
Initial Climb
(to FL240)
MACH Climb Cruise Initial Descent
(to FL240)
(to FL100)
Descent (FL100
& below)
V2 (IAS) kts IAS kts IAS kts IAS kts MACH TAS 270 kts MACH IAS kts IAS kts Vapp (IAS) kts
Distance 1000 m ROC ft/min ROC ft/min ROC ft/min ROC ft/min MACH ROD ft/min ROD ft/min MCS kts Distance 908 m
MTOW 1640016,400 kg <br />16.4 tonnes <br /> kg Ceiling FL250 ROD ft/min APC B
WTC M Range 11001,100 nm <br />2,037,200 m <br />2,037.2 km <br />6,683,727.039 ft <br /> NM

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving DH8B

  • DH8B / BN2P, Horn Island QLD Australia, 2016 (On 12 October 2016, a BN2 Islander and a Bombardier DHC8-200 were involved in a near miss after the DHC8 took off from a runway which intersected with the runway on which the BN2 was about to land. The BN2 broke off its approach just before touchdown when the DHC8 was observed accelerating towards the runway intersection on its take-off roll. The Investigation noted that the aerodrome involved relied on visual separation and use of a CTAF and found that although both aircraft were aware of each other, the DHC8 crew failed to fully utilise visual lookout.)
  • DH8B, Kangerlussuaq Greenland, 2017 (On 2 March 2017, a DHC8-200 took off from Kangerlussuaq in normal day visibility without clearance and almost immediately overflew three snow clearance vehicles on the runway. The Investigation identified a number of likely contributory factors including a one hour departure delay which the crew were keen to reduce in order to remain within their maximum allowable duty period and their inability to initially see the vehicles because of the runway down slope. No evidence of crew fatigue was found; it was noted that the vehicles involved had been in contact with TWR on a separate frequency using the local language.)
  • DH8B, Nuuk Greenland, 2019 (On 30 May 2019, a DHC8-200 departing from Nuuk could not be rotated at the calculated speed even using full aft back pressure and the takeoff was rejected with the aircraft coming to a stop with 50 metres of the 950 metre long dry runway remaining. The initial Investigation focus was on a potential airworthiness cause associated with the flight control system but it was eventually found that the actual weights of both passengers and cabin baggage exceeded standard weight assumptions with the excess also resulting in the aircraft centre of gravity being outside the range certified for safe flight.)
  • DH8B, en route, southwest of Windsor Locks CT USA, 2015 (On 5 June 2015, a DHC8-200 descending towards Bradley experienced an in-flight fire which originated at a windshield terminal block. Attempts to extinguish the fire were unsuccessful with the electrical power still selected to the circuit. However, the fire eventually stopped and only smoke remained. An emergency evacuation was carried out after landing. The Investigation was unable to establish the way in which the malfunction that caused the fire arose but noted the continuing occurrence of similar events on the aircraft type and five Safety Recommendations were made to Bombardier to address the continuing risk.)
  • DH8B, en-route, west northwest of Port Moresby Papua New Guinea, 2017 (On 4 August 2017, a de Havilland DHC8-200 was climbing through 20,000 feet after departing Port Moresby when a sudden loud bang occurred and the aircraft shuddered. Apart from a caution indicating an open main landing gear door, no other impediments to normal flight were detected. After a return to the point of departure, one of the main gear tyres was found to have exploded causing substantial damage to the associated engine structure and releasing debris. The Investigation concluded that tyre failure was attributable to FOD damage during an earlier landing on an inadequately maintained but approved compacted gravel runway.)
  • E145 / DH8B, Cleveland USA, 2009 (On 26 June 2009 a Bombardier DHC8-200 being operated by Commutair on a scheduled Continental Express passenger flight from Cleveland to Port Columbus was cleared for take off when an Embraer 145 being operated by Jetlink on another scheduled Continental Express passenger flight from Cleveland to Kansas City was about to cross the same runway in accordance with its ATC clearance in normal daylight visibility. The conflicting clearances were resolved by flight crew awareness and action rather than ATC intervention and once satisfied that the 145 was holding position clear of the runway, the DHC8 took off as already cleared.)