Passenger Cabin Loading
From SKYbrary Wiki
- 1 Description
- 2 Passenger Weights and Seat Occupancy
- 3 Cabin Crew Observation and Reporting
- 4 Cabin Baggage
- 5 Cabin Crew validation of total passengers on board
- 6 Cabin Crew checking of boarding passengers
- 7 Passenger Cabin Loading Risks
- 8 Accidents and Incidents
- 9 Related Articles
- 10 Further Reading
This article is concerned with the loading of aircraft with cabins configured for passenger use.
Some passenger aircraft cabins can be re-configured to carry cargo by removal of all, or some, of their seats. Loading of the main cabin in such circumstances raises similar issues of operational safety, and appropriate procedure, as a dedicated freighter version of the same aircraft model and is not considered here.
Passenger Weights and Seat Occupancy
Standard Passenger weights are usually used for load and trim sheet purposes and are often prescribed by the Regulatory Authority which has issued the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) under which the flight is being made. Longitudinal effects of passenger load may be allowed for by dividing the cabin into sections and using standard loading index variations, pre-calculated for each of these compartments. Departure control systems (DCS), may, however, be programmed to use a different index correction for each seat row. The accuracy of this calculation will rely on passengers sitting in the seats assigned at check-in or, if free (unassigned) seating is used, the ground crew or cabin crew will need to record the actual seating occupied, either by cabin section, or, exceptionally, by seat row. In practice, low cost airlines, which routinely offer free seating, also operate the majority of their flights with a high load factor, so that identifying any unoccupied seats will be a fairly simple matter. Where the load factor is medium or low, cabin crew may sometimes be instructed to restrict free seating to the centre of the cabin in order to keep the centre of gravity within limits.
Cabin Crew Observation and Reporting
Senior cabin crew can assist operational safety by using their discretion to report what they perceive to be abnormal seated passenger distribution prior to take-off, especially if free seating is available. This is a particularly important point in the case of flights which make an en route or ‘transit’ stop, at which passengers either leave or join the flight, and where some through passengers remain on board. This scenario has often led in the past to ground staff preparing an incorrect load and trim sheet based on unchecked (and undisclosed) assumptions about passenger seat occupancy when an aircraft will be departing with only a part load. Either the seats occupied by passengers remaining on board at the transit stop are not established, or the seats chosen by the boarding passengers are not known, or both. Random assumptions are then made for load and trim sheet purposes, which may not reflect the actual longitudinal trim of the aircraft as actually loaded. This may result in a take off with the aircraft trim outside the envelope for permitted safe flight, or the pitch trim setting made by the flight crew may be incorrect to a degree which then affects normal aircraft control at and after the initiation of rotation.
Standard passenger weights also include an allowance for permitted cabin baggage. Restrictions on the maximum number of pieces, their maximum weight and/or their maximum dimensions are likely to be imposed by both the aircraft operator and the airport security screening process. This usually means that available stowage in overhead lockers or on the floor underneath the seat in front of that occupied will be sufficient. Any outsize items should only be permitted on board if they can be safely stowed using special wardrobe or locker space and by prior agreement of the senior cabin crew who may seek the authority of the aircraft commander if in doubt as to acceptance.
Emergency Evacuation rules usually require that during take off and landing, passengers are not permitted to have items in their laps; additionally, items of baggage may not be placed under the seat in front of them if seated immediately to the rear of a fixed bulkhead or at an emergency exit row.
Cabin Crew validation of total passengers on board
Routine ‘head counts’ of boarded passengers by cabin crew before every departure will, if reported to the aircraft commander prior to their acceptance of the final load sheet, ensure that a flight always departs with the same number of passengers on board as has been recorded on the load and trim sheet.
Cabin Crew checking of boarding passengers
Routine checks by cabin crew of the boarding cards of joining passengers as they arrive at the aircraft, to check that they are getting on the correct aircraft, can provide an extra check on the correct release of passengers by ground crew at the boarding gate. Whilst computerised seat assignment and passenger on-load validation built into many DCS systems has eliminated a lot of errors made in the older manual processing systems, a new type of error is now prevalent which occurs when ground staff manually override the automatic system to accommodate late changes or other specific problems.
Passenger Cabin Loading Risks
- A partly-full cabin with passengers distributed differently to the load and trim sheet presented to the aircraft commander - a particular possibility when departing from an intermediate stop on a multi-stop flight.
- Total number of passengers on board substantially different to the number recorded on the load and trim sheet and the discrepancy not detected by cabin crew head counting.
- Where there are financial disincentives to check baggage into the hold, there is a risk that excessive cabin baggage will be brought on board. This can be controlled by strict regulation of permitted size, weight and number of items but if this does not occur, overloading of overhead locker in respect of capacity or placarded maximum weight may occur.
Accidents and Incidents
This section contains occurrences where passenger cabin loading has been considered to be a relevant factor.
- B190, vicinity Charlotte NC USA, 2003 (On 8 January 2003, a B190, operated by Air Midwest, crashed shortly after take off from Charlotte, NC, USA, following loss of pitch control during takeoff. The accident was attributed to incorrect rigging of the elevator control system compounded by the airplane being outside load and balance limitations.)
- B722, Cotonou Benin, 2003 (On 25 December 2003, a Boeing 727-200 being operated by UTA (Guinea) on a scheduled passenger flight from Cotonou to Beirut with a planned stopover at Kufra, Libya, failed to get properly airborne in day VMC from the 2400 metre departure runway and hit a small building 2.45 metres high situated on the extended centreline 118 metres beyond the end of the runway. The right main landing gear broke off and ripped off a part of the trailing edge flaps on the right wing. The airplane then banked slightly to the right and crashed onto the beach where it broke into several pieces and ended up in the sea where the depth of water varied between three and ten metres. Of the estimated 163 occupants, 141 were killed and the remainder seriously injured.)
- B738, Goteborg Sweden, 2003 (On 7 December 2003, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by SAS on a passenger charter flight from Salzburg, Austria to Stockholm Arlanda with an intermediate stop at Goteborg made a high speed rejected take off during the departure from Goteborg because of an un-commanded premature rotation. There were no injuries to any occupants and no damage to the aircraft which taxied back to the gate.)
- B738, Rotterdam Netherlands, 2003 (On 12 January 2003, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Dutch airline Transavia on a passenger charter flight initially going from Rotterdam to Maastrict-Aachen was obliged to reject its take off on Runway 24 at Rotterdam after it pitched nose-up just after take-off thrust had been selected. The pitch up movement only stopped when the aft fuselage and the tailskid assembly contacted the runway and only when the flight crew rejected the take-off did the aircraft nose gear regain ground contact. The aircraft was damaged and unfit for flight but able to taxi back to the terminal to allow the uninjured passengers to disembark.)
- B738, Stuttgart Germany, 2005 (On 23 April 2005, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Turkish charter airline Sky Air on a passenger flight from Stuttgart to Dusseldorf tipped onto its tail when take off thrust was applied for the intended departure from Runway 25 in normal day visibility. The attempt to take off was immediately abandoned and the aircraft towed back to the gate for the 100 passengers to disembark. One of the cabin crew was slightly injured and the aircraft was ‘severely damaged’.)
- B773, Paris CDG France, 2013 (On 28 July 2013, with passengers still boarding an Air France Boeing 777-300, an abnormal 'burnt' smell was detected by the crew and then thin smoke appeared in the cabin. A MAYDAY was declared and the Captain made a PA telling the cabin crew to "evacuate the passengers via the doors, only via the doors". The resulting evacuation process was confused but eventually completed. The Investigation attributed the confused evacuation to the way it had been ordered and established that a fault in the APU had caused the smoke and fumes which had the potential to be toxic.)
- ATSB Report: An Analysis of In-flight Passenger Injuries and Medical Conditions
- UK CAA CAP 1008 Last minute changes (LMC) - Guidance document, February 2014
- UK CAP 1009 Gross error checks - Guidance document, February 2014
- UK CAA CAP 1010 Ramp/ Aircraft Loading Operations Checklist, February 2014
- In-flight Seat Belt Requirements, 03/07/2013
- ISAGO Standards Manual 5th Edition, March 2016
- Cabin Operations Safety: Best Practices Guide 3rd Edition by IATA, 2017