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Non-Standard Phraseology

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Category: Air Ground Communication Air Ground Communication
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Description

Of the many factors involved in the process of communication, phraseology is perhaps the most important because it enables us to communicate quickly and effectively despite differences in language and reduces the opportunity for misunderstanding.

Standard phraseology reduces the risk that a message will be misunderstood and aids the read-back/hear-back process so that any error is quickly detected. Ambiguous or non-standard phraseology is a frequent causal or contributory factor in aircraft accidents and incidents.

International standards of phraseology are laid down in ICAO Annex 10 Volume II Chapter 5, ICAO Doc 4444 PANS-ATM Chapter 12 and in ICAO Doc 9432 - Manual of Radiotelephony. Many national authorities also publish radiotelephony manuals which amplify ICAO provisions, and in some cases modify them to suit local conditions.

This article deals with non-standard phraseology, which is sometimes adopted unilaterally by national or local air traffic services in an attempt to alleviate problems; however, standard phraseology minimises the potential for misunderstanding.

Effects

Where non-standard phraseology is introduced after careful consideration to address a particular problem, it can make a positive contribution to flight safety; however, this must be balanced with the possibility of confusion for pilots or ATCOs not familiar with the phraseology used.

Non-standard phraseology in Europe

European Union

Regulation 2016/1185 introduces some deviations from the standard ICAO phraseology at EU level:

  • Flight levels which are whole hundreds (e.g. FL 100, FL 200, FL 300, etc.) are to be pronounced as "Flight level (number) hundred".
  • Altimeter setting of 1000 hPa is to be pronounced as "One thousand".
  • Transponder codes containing whole thousands are to be pronounced as "(number) thousand".
  • For transfers of communication within one ATS unit, the call sign of the ATS unit may be omitted, when so authorised by the competent authority.

United Kingdom

The UK CAA has adopted certain non-standard phraseology designed to reduce the chance of mishearing or misunderstanding RTF communications. This phraseology is not in accordance with ICAO but is based on careful study of the breakdown of pilot/controller communications. Some other European countries have also adopted similar non-standard phraseology.

The following paragraphs taken from the UK Manual of Radiotelephony summarise the main differences.

  • The word ‘to’ is to be omitted from messages relating to FLIGHT LEVELS.
  • All messages relating to an aircraft’s climb or descent to a HEIGHT or ALTITUDE employ the word ‘to’ followed immediately by the word HEIGHT or ALTITUDE. Furthermore, the initial message in any such RTF exchange will also include the appropriate QFE or QNH.
  • When transmitting messages containing flight levels each digit shall be transmitted separately. However, in an endeavour to reduce ‘level busts’ caused by the confusion between some levels (100/110, 200/220 etc.), levels which are whole hundreds e.g. FL 100, 200, 300 shall be spoken as “Flight level (number) HUNDRED”. The word hundred must not be used for headings.
  • Examples of the above are:
    • “RUSHAIR G-BC climb flight level wun too zero.”
    • “RUSHAIR G-BC descend to altitude tree tousand feet QNH 1014.”
    • “RUSHAIR G-BC climb flight level wun hundred.”
    • “RUSHAIR G-BC turn right heading wun wun zero.”

Non-standard North American phraseology

A particular example of non-standard phraseology which is in regular use in North America is the instruction “taxi into position and hold”, (which has the same meaning as the ICAO standard phrase “line up and wait”).This can be confused with the old ICAO phraseology “taxi to holding position” (which means taxi to, and hold at, a point clear of the runway).

Use of this non-ICAO standard phraseology is fail-safe in North America, but in Europe can lead to an aircraft taxiing onto the runway when not cleared to do so. To overcome this problem ICAO has amended its phraseology to "taxi to holding POINT".

Non-standard Phraseology in Abnormal/Emergency Situations

It is often necessary for pilots and controllers to revert to non-standard phraseology in abnormal and emergency situations. The extent to which this occurs, and leads to effective communication, will depend upon the quality of the both speech delivery and language proficiency of those involved.

Neither Standard, Nor Approved

Sometimes controllers and pilots use phraseology that is neither standard, nor approved by a national civil aviation authority. The reasons for this may be various, e.g. poor knowledge or training, phrase that is rarely used, personal experience or preference, etc. The main difference between approved and non-approved phraseology is that the latter has not undergone any safety impact assessment.

There are several major risks associated with such phraseology:

  • The other party may not hear the message correctly. When standard phraseology was developed, special attention was given to choosing words and phrases that sound distinctly different and therefore cannot be confused under any readability circumstances. When replacing standard phraseology with their own people do not perform thorough research as to whether their custom phrase may sound similarly to another one.
  • The other party may not understand the message. This may be due to e.g. using phrasal verbs or other words that are not commonly known. The different levels of knowledge of the English language contributes to this as well.
  • The message may be ambiguous, i.e. the transmitting person may mean one thing and the other one may understand something else, as was the case with the vehicle incursion at Perth in 2012 or in an incident at Toronto in 2016.

Examples of unofficial "phraseology" (the list is not exclusive):

  • Ten/eleven thousand (instead of one zero thousand or one one thousand). This was considered by the investigation to be the cause of an incident in 2011
  • Read you five by five (or any other X by Y combination) instead of Read you (number)
  • ARL10 pronounced as Airline ten (instead of Airline one zero)
  • Light chops, smooth ride, what's the ride, instead of phrases containing the word turbulence
  • Affirmative instead of affirm (note that affirmative may, under certain low-readability circumstances, be confused with negative due to having the same ending)
  • Double and triple (instead of pronouncing each digit separately)
  • Keep heading, speed, etc. (instead of continue or maintain)
  • Up and down instead of climb and descend
  • Pronouncing 9 as nine instead of niner which may lead to confusion with 5
  • Amending clearance staring with While we wait (which can be understood as line up and wait), which was considered as a contributor in a runway incursion event
  • Using take-off instead of departure in situations where no take-off clearance is issued or cancelled. This has caused a number of occurrences, e.g. an accident in 1977 and an incident in 2008
  • A description of an ACAS manoeuvre instead of the standard TCAS RA. Such a description may be lengthy, unstructured, incorrect or incomplete, and therefore the controller may request a repetition or clarification

Note that in all the above cases there is a standard alternative to the words and phrases used.

Accidents and Incidents

The following events include "Phraseology" as a contributing factor:

  • AT72 / B732, vicinity Queenstown New Zealand, 1999 (On 26 July 1999, an ATR 72-200 being operated by Mount Cook Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Christchurch to Queenstown entered the destination CTR without the required ATC clearance after earlier cancelling IFR and in marginal day VMC due to snow showers, separation was then lost against a Boeing 737-200 being operated IFR by Air New Zealand on a scheduled passenger flight from Auckland to Queenstown which was manoeuvring visually (circling) after making an offset VOR/DME approach in accordance with a valid ATC clearance.)
  • A343, Changi Singapore, 2007 (On 30 May 2007, at about 0555 hours local time, the crew of an Airbus A340-300 had to apply (Take-off Go Around) power and rotate abruptly at a high rate to become airborne while taking off from Runway 20C at Singapore Changi Airport, when they noticed the centreline lights were indicating the impending end of the available runway. The crew had calculated the take-off performance based on the full TORA (Take-off Run Available) of 4,000 m because they were unaware of the temporary shortening of Runway 20C to 2,500 m due to resurfacing works.)
  • B763, Halifax NS Canada, 2019 (On 4 March 2019, a Boeing 767-300 crew lost directional control of their aircraft as speed reduced following their touchdown at Halifax and were unable to prevent it being rotated 180° on the icy surface before coming to a stop facing the runway landing threshold. The Investigation found that the management of the runway safety risk by the airport authority had been systemically inadequate and that the communication of what was known by ATC about the runway surface condition had been incomplete. A number of subsequent corrective actions taken by the airport authority were noted.)
  • BN2P / B763, vicinity Kagoshima Japan, 2015 (On 10 October 2015, a Britten-Norman BN2 instructed to join final behind a Boeing 767 instead joined in front of it which obliged the 767 crew to make a go around. The Investigation was unable to establish why the BN2 pilot failed to follow their conditional clearance but noted that the 'follow' clearance given onto final approach had not been accompanied by a sequence number, and when giving the aircraft type to be followed so that its sighting could be reported, the controller had not challenged the incomplete readback or repeated the aircraft type when subsequently issuing the clearance.)
  • A319/A332, vicinity Barcelona Spain, 2012 (On 8 February 2012, a TCAS RA occurred between an Airbus A330 and an Airbus A319 both under ATC control for landing on runway 25R at Barcelona as a result of an inappropriate plan to change the sequence. The opposite direction aircraft both followed their respective RAs and minimum separation was 1.4 nm horizontally and 400 feet vertically. The Investigation noted that the use of Spanish to communicate with one aircraft and English to communicate with the other had compromised situational awareness of the crew of the latter who had also not had visual contact with the other aircraft.)

Further Reading

AGC Safety Letters:

EUROCONTROL Action Plan for Air-Ground Communications Safety: