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DIAMOND DV-20 Katana

From SKYbrary Wiki

Name DV-20 Katana
Manufacturer DIAMOND
Body Narrow
Wing Fixed Wing
WTC Light
Type code L1P
Engine Piston
Engine count Single
Mass group 1

Manufacturered as:

DIAMOND Katana (DA-20/DV-20)
DIAMOND Speed Katana
DIAMOND DA-20 Eclipse
DIAMOND DA-20 Evolution
DIAMOND DA-20 Falcon
DIAMOND DA-20 Katana
DIAMOND DA-22 Speed Katana
DIAMOND DV-20 Katana
DIAMOND Evolution
HOAC DV-20 Katana
HOAC Katana

DIAMOND DV-20 Katana

DIAMOND DV-20 Katana DIAMOND DV-20 Katana 3D


The Diamond DA20 is a two-seat tricycle gear general aviation aircraft designed for flight training. In addition to its role as a civil and military training aircraft, it is also used for personal flying by pilot-owners.

Technical Data

Wing span 10.87 m35.663 ft <br />
Length 7.16 m23.491 ft <br />
Height 2.18 m7.152 ft <br />
Powerplant 1 x Continental IO-240-B
Engine model Continental O-240

Performance Data

Take-Off Initial Climb
(to 5000 ft)
Initial Climb
(to FL150)
Initial Climb
(to FL240)
MACH Climb Cruise Initial Descent
(to FL240)
(to FL100)
Descent (FL100
& below)
V2 (IAS) kts IAS kts IAS kts IAS kts MACH TAS 120 kts MACH IAS kts IAS kts Vapp (IAS) kts
Distance 490 m ROC ft/min ROC ft/min ROC ft/min ROC ft/min MACH ROD ft/min ROD ft/min MCS kts Distance 460 m
MTOW 700700 kg <br />0.7 tonnes <br /> kg Ceiling FL140 ROD ft/min APC A
WTC L Range 520520 nm <br />963,040 m <br />963.04 km <br />3,159,580.055 ft <br /> NM

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving DV20

  • B738 / DV20, vicinity Reus Spain, 2019 (On 12 May 2019, a Boeing 737-800 making its second procedural ILS approach to runway 25 at Reus came into conflict with an opposite direction light aircraft as the latter approached one of the designated VFR entry points having been instructed to remain well above the altitude which normally ensures separation of IFR and VFR traffic. The collision risk was resolved by TCAS RA promptly followed by the 737. The Investigation concluded that limiting the TWR radar display to the ATZ for controller training purposes had resulted in neither the trainee controller nor their supervisor being aware of the risk.)