If you wish to contribute or participate in the discussions about articles you are invited to join SKYbrary as a registered user


BOEING 787-9 Dreamliner

From SKYbrary Wiki

Name 787-9 Dreamliner
Manufacturer BOEING
Body Wide
Wing Fixed Wing
Position Low wing
Tail Regular tail (Dihedral)
WTC Heavy
Type code L2J
Aerodrome Reference Code 4E
RFF Category 9
Engine Jet
Engine count Multi
Position Underwing mounted
Landing gear Tricycle retractable
Mass group 4

Manufacturered as:

BOEING Dreamliner (Srs.9)
BOEING 787-9 Dreamliner

BOEING 787-9 Dreamliner

BOEING 787-9 Dreamliner BOEING 787-9 Dreamliner 3D


In development, early production aircraft manufactured by Boeing. The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is a long range, mid-sized, wide-body, twin-engine jet airliner. The B789 is a member of the B787 series of aircraft.

Technical Data

Wing span 60.1 m197.178 ft <br />
Length 62.8 m206.037 ft <br />
Height 16.9 m55.446 ft <br />
Powerplant 2 x GEnx-1B (320 kN) or
2 x R-R Trent 1000 (320 kN) turbofans.
Engine model General Electric GEnx, Rolls-Royce Trent 1000

Performance Data

Take-Off Initial Climb
(to 5000 ft)
Initial Climb
(to FL150)
Initial Climb
(to FL240)
MACH Climb Cruise Initial Descent
(to FL240)
(to FL100)
Descent (FL100
& below)
V2 (IAS) kts IAS kts IAS kts IAS kts MACH TAS 490 kts MACH IAS kts IAS kts Vapp (IAS) kts
Distance m ROC ft/min ROC ft/min ROC ft/min ROC ft/min MACH 0.85 ROD ft/min ROD ft/min MCS kts Distance m
MTOW 253000253,000 kg <br />253 tonnes <br /> kg Ceiling FL430 ROD ft/min APC C
WTC H Range 83008,300 nm <br />15,371,600 m <br />15,371.6 km <br />50,431,758.567 ft <br /> NM

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving B789

  • A320 / B789 / A343, San Francisco CA USA, 2017 (On 7 July 2017 the crew of an Airbus A320, cleared for an approach and landing on runway 28R at San Francisco in night VMC, lined up for the visual approach for which it had been cleared on the occupied parallel taxiway instead of the runway extended centreline and only commenced a go-around at the very last minute, having descended to about 60 feet agl whilst flying over two of the four aircraft on the taxiway. The Investigation determined that the sole direct cause of the event was the poor performance of the A320 flight crew.)
  • B789 / A388, Singapore, 2017 (On 30 March 2017, a Boeing 787 taxiing for departure at night at Singapore was involved in a minor collision with a stationary Airbus A380 which had just been pushed back from its gate and was also due to depart. The Investigation found that the conflict occurred because of poor GND controlling by a supervised trainee and had occurred because the 787 crew had exercised insufficient prudence when faced with a potential conflict with the A380. Safety Recommendations made were predominantly related to ATC procedures where it was considered that there was room for improvement in risk management.)
  • B789 / B773, Delhi India, 2017 (On 7 October 2017, an arriving Boeing 787-9 and a departing Boeing 777-300 lost separation during intended use of runway 29 at Delhi when the 787-9 commenced a go around from overhead the runway because the departing 777-300 was still on the runway and came within 0.2 nm laterally and 200 feet vertically after ATC had failed to ensure that separation appropriate to mixed mode use was applied using speed control. The conflict was attributed to failure of the TWR controller to adhere to prevailing standard operating procedures.)
  • B789 / C172, en-route, northwest of Madrid Spain, 2017 (On 8 August 2017, a Boeing 787-9 climbing through FL109 after departing Madrid received and promptly followed a TCAS RA ‘DESCEND’ against crossing traffic at FL110 and this action quickly resolved the conflict. The Investigation found that both aircraft involved were following their IFR clearances and attributed the conflict to the controller involved who forgot to resolve a previously-identified potential conflict whilst resolving another potential conflict elsewhere in the sector. It was also found that the corresponding STCA activation had not been noticed and in any event had occurred too late to be of use.)
  • B789, London Gatwick UK, 2018 (On 28 March 2018, a Boeing 787-9 crew inadvertently commenced takeoff from the displaced threshold of the departure runway at Gatwick instead of the full length which was required for the rated thrust used. The Investigation found that the runway involved was a secondary one which the crew were unfamiliar with and to which access was gained by continuing along a taxiway which followed its extended centreline. It was noted that at least four other similar incidents had occurred during the previous six months and that various risk reduction actions had since been taken by the airport operator / ANSP.)
  • B789, Oslo Norway, 2018 (On 18 December 2018, a Boeing 787-9 was instructed to taxi to a specified remote de-icing platform for de-icing prior to takeoff from Oslo. The aircraft collided with a lighting mast on the de-icing platform causing significant damage to both aircraft and mast. The Investigation found that in the absence of any published information about restricted aircraft use of particular de-icing platforms and any markings, lights, signage or other technical barriers to indicate to the crew that they had been assigned an incorrect platform, they had visually assessed the clearance as adequate. Relevant Safety Recommendations were made.)
  • B789, Tel Aviv Israel, 2018 (On 29 March 2018, an augmented Boeing 787-9 crew completed an uneventful takeoff from Tel Aviv on a type conversion line check flight for one of the First Officers in the crew. After getting airborne, the crew found that all performance calculations including that for takeoff had been made on the basis of a Zero Fuel Weight which was 40 tonnes below the actual figure of 169 tonnes. The Investigation found that it was highly probable that automatic reduction in commanded pitch-up when rotation was attempted at too low a speed had prevented an accident during or soon after liftoff.)
  • B789, en-route, eastern Belgium, 2017 (On 29 April 2017, a Boeing 787-9 which had just reached cruise altitude after despatch with only one main ECS available began to lose cabin pressure. A precautionary descent and PAN was upgraded to a rapid descent and MAYDAY as cabin altitude rose above 10,000 feet. The Investigation found that aircraft release to service had not been preceded by a thorough enough validation of the likely reliability of the remaining ECS system. The inaudibility of the automated announcement accompanying the cabin oxygen mask drop and ongoing issues with the quality of CVR readout from 787 crash-protected recorders was also highlighted.)