If you wish to contribute or participate in the discussions about articles you are invited to join SKYbrary as a registered user

 Actions

B737 Series

From SKYbrary Wiki

Article Information
Category: Aircraft Family Aircraft Family
Content source: SKYbrary About SKYbrary
Content control: EUROCONTROL EUROCONTROL


Description

Short to medium range narrow body airliner. The Boeing 737 series includes the following variants:

Aircraft Family Members
ICAO Type Designator Name Length (m)
BOEING 737-100 BOEING 737-100 28.63 m
BOEING 737-200 BOEING 737-200 30.53 m
BOEING 737-300 BOEING 737-300 33.44 m
BOEING 737-400 BOEING 737-400 36.48 m
BOEING 737-500 BOEING 737-500 31.06 m
BOEING 737-600 BOEING 737-600 31.27 m
BOEING 737-700 BOEING 737-700 33.65 m
BOEING 737-800 BOEING 737-800 39.5 m
BOEING 737-900 BOEING 737-900 41.94 m

Specification

Aircraft 737-100 737-200 737-300 737-400 737-500 737-600 737-700 737-800 737-900
Overall Length 28.63 m93.93 ft
30.53 m100.164 ft
33.44 m109.711 ft
36.48 m119.685 ft
31.06 m101.903 ft
31.27 m102.592 ft
33.65 m110.4 ft
39.5 m129.593 ft
41.94 m137.598 ft
Wing Span 28.35 m93.012 ft
28.35 m93.012 ft
28.9 m94.816 ft
28.9 m94.816 ft
28.8 m94.488 ft
34.3 m112.533 ft
34.3 m112.533 ft
34.32 m112.598 ft
34.3 m112.533 ft
Engines 2 x P&W JT8D-7 (62.3 kN) turbofans. 2 x P&W JT8D-9A (64.5 kN) or

2 x P&W JT8D-15A (68.9 kN) or
2 x P&W JT8D-17 (71.2 kN) or
2 x P&W JT8D-17R (77.4 kN) turbofans.
Optional with Hush-Kits for noise reduction.

2 x CFM56-3B1 (90 kN) or

2 x CFM56-3B2 (99 kN) turbofans.

2 x CFM56-3B2 (97.9 kN) or
2 x CFM56-3C (105 kN) turbofans.
2 x CFM56-3B4 (82 kN) or
2 x CFM56-3B1 (89 kN) turbofans,
optional derated to 82.3 kN.
2 x CFM56-7B (97,9 kN) turbofans. 2 x CFM56-7 (89 kN) or
2 x CFM56-7HGW (107 kN) turbofans.
2 x CFM56-7B (117 kN) turbofans. 2 x CFM56-7B (116,5 kN) turbofans.
Passengers (2 class config.) 85 102 128 146 108 108 128 160 174
Max. Range 1,500 nm2,778,000 m
2,778 km
9,114,173.235 ft
1,200 nm2,222,400 m
2,222.4 km
7,291,338.588 ft
1,600 nm2,963,200 m
2,963.2 km
9,721,784.784 ft
2,100 nm3,889,200 m
3,889.2 km
12,759,842.529 ft
1,600 nm2,963,200 m
2,963.2 km
9,721,784.784 ft
3,200 nm5,926,400 m
5,926.4 km
19,443,569.568 ft
2,500 nm4,630,000 m
4,630 km
15,190,288.725 ft
2,000 nm3,704,000 m
3,704 km
12,152,230.98 ft
2,745 nm5,083,740 m
5,083.74 km
16,678,937.02 ft
Maximum takeoff weight 49.95 tonnes49,950 kg
52.39 tonnes52,390 kg
56.47 tonnes56,470 kg
62.82 tonnes62,820 kg
52.39 tonnes52,390 kg
56.24 tonnes56,240 kg
66.32 tonnes66,320 kg
70.53 tonnes70,530 kg
79.015 tonnes79,015 kg

Notes

  • The long range corporate jet developed on the basis of Boeing 737-700, B737-800 and B737-900 are designated by Boeing as BBJ1, BBJ2 and BBJ3 respectively. ICAO does not define specific designators for these particular Boeing 737 modifications.
  • The Boeing 737-200, -300, -400 and -500 are often referred to as 'Classic' variants and the Boeing 737-600, -700, -800 and -900 as 'NG' (New Generation) variants.

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving B737 Series

  • AT72 / B732, vicinity Queenstown New Zealand, 1999 (On 26 July 1999, an ATR 72-200 being operated by Mount Cook Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Christchurch to Queenstown entered the destination CTR without the required ATC clearance after earlier cancelling IFR and in marginal day VMC due to snow showers, separation was then lost against a Boeing 737-200 being operated IFR by Air New Zealand on a scheduled passenger flight from Auckland to Queenstown which was manoeuvring visually (circling) after making an offset VOR/DME approach in accordance with a valid ATC clearance.)
  • B732 / A321, Manchester UK, 2004 (On 29 February 2004, a Boeing 737-200 crossed an active runway in normal daylight visibility ahead of a departing Airbus A321, the crew of which made a high speed rejected take off upon sighting the other aircraft after hearing its crossing clearance being confirmed. Both aircraft were found to have been operating in accordance with their acknowledged ATC clearances issued by the same controller. An alert was generated by the TWR conflict detection system but it was only visually annunciated and had not been noticed. Related ATC procedures were subsequently reviewed and improved.)
  • B732, London Gatwick UK, 1993 (On 20 October 1993, a Boeing 737-200 being operated by Air Malta on a scheduled passenger flight from Malta to London Gatwick landed at destination on the taxiway parallel to the runway for which landing clearance had been given in good visibility at night after a Surveillance Radar Approach (SRA) terminating at 2 miles from touchdown had been conducted in VMC. There was no damage to the aircraft or injury to the occupants and the aircraft taxied to the allocated gate after the landing.)
  • B732, Manchester UK, 1985 (On 22nd August 1985, a B737-200 being operated by British Airtours, a wholly-owned subsidiary of British Airways, suffered an uncontained engine failure, with consequent damage from ejected debris enabling the initiation of a fuel-fed fire which spread to the fuselage during the rejected take off and continued to be fuel-fed after the aircraft stopped, leading to rapid destruction of the aircraft before many of the occupants had evacuated.)
  • B732, Medan Indonesia, 2005 (On 5 September 2005, a Boeing 737-200 being operated by Mandala Airlines on a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Medan, Indonesia to Jakarta failed to become properly airborne during the attempted take off from from runway 23 in day VMC and, after failing to remain airborne, overran the end of the runway at speed finally coming to a stop outside the airport perimeter. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a subsequent fire and 100 of the 117 occupants were killed and 15 seriously injured. The aircraft collided with residential property, vehicles and various other obstructions and as a result a further 49 people on the ground were killed and a further 26 seriously injured.)
  • B732, Pekanbaru Indonesia, 2002 (On 14 January 2002, a Boeing 737-200, operated by Lion Air, attempted to complete a daylight take off from Pekanbaru, Indonesia without flaps set after a failure to complete the before take off checks. The rejected take off was not initiated promptly and the aircraft overran the runway. The take off configuration warning failed to sound because the associated circuit breaker was so worn that it had previously auto-tripped and this had not been noticed.)
  • B732, Seattle WA USA, 2006 (On 30 October 2006, at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington a Boeing 737-200 operated by Alaska Airlines, took off in daylight from a runway parallel to that which had been cleared with no actual adverse consequences.)
  • B732, en-route, Maui Hawaii, 1988 (On 28 April 1988, a Boeing 737-200, operated by Aloha Airlines experienced an explosive depressurisation and structural failure at FL 240. Approximately 5.5 metres (or 18 feet) of cabin covering and structure was detached from the aircraft during flight. As result of the depressurisation, a member of the cabin crew was fatally injured. The flight crew performed an emergency descent, landing at Kahului Airport on the Island of Maui, Hawaii.)
  • B732, vicinity Abuja Nigeria, 2006 (On 29 October 2006, an ADC Airlines’ Boeing 737-200 encountered wind shear almost immediately taking off from Abuja into adverse weather associated with a very rapidly developing convective storm. Unseen from the apron or ATC TWR it stalled, crashed and burned after just over one minute airborne killing 96 of the 105 occupants. The Investigation concluded that loss of control during the wind shear encounter was not inevitable but was a consequence of inappropriate crew response. Concerns about the quality of crew training and competency validation were also raised.)
  • B732, vicinity Islamabad Pakistan, 2012 (On 20 April 2012, the crew of a Boeing 737-200 encountered negative wind shear during an ILS final approach at night in lMC and failed to respond with the appropriate recovery actions. The aircraft impacted the ground approximately 4 nm from the threshold of the intended landing runway. The Investigation attributed the accident to the decision to continue to destination in the presence of adverse convective weather and generally ineffective flight deck management and noted that neither pilot had received training specific to the semi-automated variant of the 200 series 737 being flown and had no comparable prior experience.)
  • B732, vicinity Resolute Bay Canada, 2011 (On 20 August 2011, a First Air Boeing 737-200 making an ILS approach to Resolute Bay struck a hill east of the designated landing runway in IMC and was destroyed. An off-track approach was attributed to the aircraft commander’s failure to recognise the effects of his inadvertent interference with the AP ILS capture mode and the subsequent loss of shared situational awareness on the flight deck. The approach was also continued when unstabilised and the Investigation concluded that the poor CRM and SOP compliance demonstrated on the accident flight were representative of a wider problem at the operator.)
  • B732, vicinity Tamanrassat Algeria, 2003 (On 6 March 2003, a Boeing 737-200 being operated by Air Algerie had just become airborne during a daylight departure when the left hand engine suddenly failed just after the PF had called for “gear up”. Shortly afterwards, the aircraft commander, who had been PNF for the departure, took control but the normal pitch attitude was not reduced to ensure that a minimum airspeed of V2 was maintained and landing gear was not retracted. The aircraft lost airspeed, stalled and impacted the ground approximately 1nm from the point at which it had become airborne. A severe post crash fire occurred and the aircraft was destroyed and all on board except one passenger, were killed.)
  • B732, vicinity Washington National DC USA, 1982 (On 13 January 1982, an Air Florida Boeing 737-200 took off in daylight from runway 36 at Washington National in moderate snow but then stalled before hitting a bridge and vehicles and continuing into the river below after just one minute of flight killing most of the occupants and some people on the ground. The accident was attributed entirely to a combination of the actions and inactions of the crew in relation to the prevailing adverse weather conditions and, crucially, to the failure to select engine anti ice on which led to over reading of actual engine thrust.)
  • A319/B733, en-route, near Moutiers France, 2010 (On 8 July 2010 an Easyjet Airbus A319 on which line training was being conducted mis-set a descent level despite correctly reading it back and, after subsequently failing to notice an ATC re-iteration of the same cleared level, continued descent to 1000 feet below it in day VMC and into conflict with crossing traffic at that level, a Boeing 737. The 737 received and actioned a TCAS RA ‘CLIMB’ and the A319, which received only a TCAS TA, was given an emergency turn by ATC. The recorded CPA was 2.2 nm and 125 feet.)
  • AT45 / B733, Munich Germany, 2004 (During the hours of darkness at Munich on 3 May 2004, an ATR42-500 was given a conditional line up clearance for Runway 08R but contrary to this clearance then taxied onto that runway as a Boeing 737-300 was landing on it. The landing aircraft missed the right wingtip of the ATR-42, which continued taxing onto the runway as it approached, by “a few metres”.)
  • B733 / B744, Chicago IL USA, 2006 (On 23 July 2006, a Boeing B737-300 operated by United Airlines executed an early rotation during a night take off when a Boeing 747 operated by Atlas Air was observed on a landing roll on an intersecting runway at Chicago O’Hare Airport. The occurrence is attributed to ATC error.)
  • B733 / DH8D, Fort McMurray Canada, 2014 (On 4 August 2014, a Boeing 737-300 making a day visual approach at Fort McMurray after receiving an ILS/DME clearance lined up on a recently-constructed parallel taxiway and its crew were only alerted to their error shortly before touchdown by the crew of a DHC8-400 which was taxiing along the same taxiway in the opposite direction. This resulted in a go around being commenced from 46 feet agl. The Investigation noted that both pilots had been looking out during the final stages of the approach and had ignored important SOPs including that for a mandatory go around from an unstable approach.)
  • B733 / SW4, Los Angeles CA USA, 1991 (On 1 February 1991, a Boeing 737-300 had just made a normal visibility night touchdown on Los Angeles runway 24L in accordance with its clearance when its crew saw another aircraft stationary ahead of them on the same runway. Avoidance was impossible in the time available and a high speed collision and post-impact fire destroyed both aircraft and killed 34 of their 101 occupants and injured 30 others. The other aircraft was subsequently found to have been a Fairchild Metroliner cleared to line up and wait by the same controller who had then cleared the 737 to land.)
  • B733 / vehicle, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2010 (On 18 December 2010, the ATC Runway Controller responsible for runway 24 at Amsterdam gave a daylight take off clearance in normal visibility to a Norwegian Boeing 737-300 whilst a bird control vehicle which they had earlier given clearance to enter the runway was still on it. The departing aircraft overflew the vehicle without noticing it. The subsequent investigation highlighted significant differences between the procedures for active runway access at Amsterdam and corresponding international practice as well as finding that integrated safety investigation and overall safety management at the airport were systemically ineffective.)
  • B733, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2010 (On 10 February 2010 a KLM Boeing 737-300 unintentionally made a night take off from Amsterdam in good visibility from the taxiway parallel to the runway for which take off clearance had been given. Because of the available distance and the absence of obstructions, the take off was otherwise uneventful. The Investigation noted the familiarity of the crew with the airport and identified apparent complacency.)
  • B733, Birmingham UK, 2009 (On 6 February 2009, the crew of a Boeing 737-300 departing Birmingham successfully rejected take off from well above V1 when it became clear to the First Officer as handling pilot, that it was impossible to rotate. The Investigation found that cause of the rotation difficulty was that the crew had failed to set the stabiliser trim to the appropriate position for take off after delaying this action beyond the normal point in pre flight preparations because ground de icing was in progress and not subsequently noticing.)
  • B733, Birmingham UK, 2012 (On 21 September 2012, an Aurela Boeing 737-300 lost directional control and left the paved surface when attempting to turn off the landing runway at Birmingham expeditiously to avoid the following aircraft having to go around. The Investigation noted that the range of the approaching aircraft - still 2.5nm as the incident aircraft began to clear the runway - had not been communicated and concluded that the speed of the aircraft had been inappropriate for the prevailing wet surface conditions as well as unnecessary to prevent a go around by the following aircraft.)
  • B733, Burbank CA USA, 2000 (On 5 March 2000, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by Southwest Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Las Vegas to Burbank overran the landing destination runway in normal day visibility after a steep visual approach had been flown at an abnormally high speed. The aircraft exited the airport perimeter and came to a stop on a city street near a gas station. An emergency evacuation of the 142 occupants led to 2 serious injuries and 42 minor injuries and the aircraft was extensively damaged.)
  • B733, Chambery France, 2012 (On 14 April 2012, a Titan Airways Boeing 737-300 attempted to take off from Chambery with incorrect reference speeds taken from the EFB used for performance calculations. As a consequence, the pressure hull was damaged by a tail strike during take off, although not sufficiently to affect cabin pressure during the subsequent flight. The Investigation concluded that the accident raised regulatory issues in respect of the general design and use of EFB computers to calculate performance data.)
  • B733, Nottingham East Midlands, UK 2006 (On 15 June 2006 a TNT Belgium-operated Boeing 737-300 on diversion to East Midlands because of poor destination weather made an unintended ground contact 90 metres to one side of the intended landing runway whilst attempting to initiate a go around after a mis-flown daylight Cat 3A ILS approach. The RH MLG assembly broke off before the aircraft left the ground again and climbed away after which it was then flown to nearby Birmingham for a successful emergency landing. The subsequent investigation attributed the poor aircraft management which led to the accident to pilot distraction.)
  • B733, Paris CDG France, 2011 (On 23 July 2011, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by Jet2.com on a passenger flight from Leeds/Bradford to Paris CDG experienced violent vibration from the main landing gear at touch down in normal day visibility on runway 27R at a normal speed off a stabilised approach. This vibration was accompanied by lateral acceleration that made directional control difficult but the aircraft was kept on the runway and at a speed of 75 knots, the vibrations abruptly stopped. Once clear of the runway, the aircraft was stopped and the engines shutdown prior to a tow to the gate. None of the 133 occupants were injured.)
  • B733, Tabing Padang Indonesia, 2012 (On 13 October 2012, the crew of a Boeing 737-300 destined for the new Padang airport at Minangkabau inadvertently landed their aircraft on runway 34 at the old Padang Airport at Tabing which has a similarly-aligned runway. The Investigation found that the Captain disregarded ILS indications for the correct approach after visually acquiring the similarly aligned runway when the correct runway was not also in sight. Since the chosen runway was some 6 miles ahead of the intended one, a high descent rate achieved through sideslip, followed with this unstable approach, continued to an otherwise uneventful landing.)
  • B733, Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2011 (On 20 December 2011, the experienced Captain of a Sriwijaya Air Boeing 737-300 flew an unstabilised non-precision approach to a touchdown at Yogyakarta at excessive speed whilst accompanied by a very inexperienced First Officer. The aircraft overran the end of the 2200 metre-long wet runway by 75 metres . During the approach, the Captain 'noticed' several GPWS PULL UP Warnings but no action was taken. The Investigation attributed the accident entirely to the actions of the flight crew and found that there had been no alert calls from the First Officer in respect of the way the approach was flown.)
  • B733, en-route, Santa Barbara CA USA, 1999 (On 2 September 1999, a United Airlines Boeing Boeing 737-300 in the cruise at FL240, experienced severe turbulence due to an encounter with the wake vortex from a preceding MD11 on a similar track which had climbed through the level of the B737 with minimum lateral separation, 1.5 minutes earlier.)
  • B733, en-route, north of Antalya Turkey, 2009 (On 2 May 2009, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by French airline Europe Airpost on a passenger charter flight from Marseille to Antalya, Turkey was descending in day VMC towards destination when a sudden and severe turbulence encounter led to a temporary loss of control and stall. Recovery was achieved and none of the 115 occupants was injured and the aircraft was undamaged.)
  • B733, en-route, north of Yuma AZ USA, 2011 (On 1 April 2011, a Southwest Boeing 737-300 climbing through FL340 experienced a sudden loss of pressurisation as a section of fuselage crown skin ruptured. A successful emergency descent was made with a diversion to Yuma, where the aircraft landed half an hour later. Investigation found that the cause of the failure was an undetected manufacturing fault in the 15 year-old aircraft. One member of the cabin crew and an off duty staff member who tried to assist him became temporarily unconscious after disregarding training predicated on the time of useful consciousness after sudden depressurisation.)
  • B733, en-route, northwest of Athens Greece, 2005 (On 14 August 2005, a Boeing 737-300 was released to service with the cabin pressurisation set to manual. This abnormal setting was not detected by the flight crew involved during standard checks. They took no corrective action after take-off when a cabin high altitude warning occurred. The crew lost consciousness as the aircraft climbed on autopilot and after eventual fuel exhaustion, the aircraft departed controlled flight and impacted terrain. The Investigation found that inadequate crew performance had occurred within a context of systemic organisational safety deficiencies at the Operator compounded by inadequate regulatory oversight.)
  • B733, vicinity Belfast Aldergrove UK, 2006 (On 18 July 2006, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by a Spanish Airline commenced a daylight non precision approach with a 12 degree offset FAT towards Belfast Aldergrove but then made an unstable descent to 200 feet agl towards an unlicensed runway at a different airport before being told by ATC radar to go around. A further also unstable approach to the correct airport/runway followed. The Investigation noted that there were multiple cues indicating that an approach to the wrong airport was being made and was not able to establish any reason why two successive unstable approaches were not discontinued)
  • B733, vicinity Bournemouth UK, 2007 (On 23 September 2007, the pilots of a Thomsonfly Boeing 737-300 almost lost control of their aircraft after initiating a go around from an unstable low airspeed and low thrust condition reached progressively but unnoticed during an approach to Bournemouth at night. Mismanagement of the aircraft during the go around was attributed to a lack of adequate understanding of the aircraft pitch control system and led to extreme pitch and an aerodynamic stall but the crew subsequently recovered control of the aircraft and an uneventful second approach and normal landing followed.)
  • B733, vicinity Chambery France, 2010 (On 7 February 2010, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by Jet2 on a scheduled passenger flight from Leeds/Bradford UK to Chambery France was making an ILS approach to runway 18 at destination in day IMC when a Mode 2 EGPWS ‘Terrain, Pull Up’ Warning occurred. A climb was immediately initiated to VMC on top and a second ILS approach was then made uneventfully. Despite extreme pitch during the early stages of the pull up climb, none if the 109 occupants, all secured for landing, were injured.)
  • B733, vicinity Helsinki Finland, 2008 (On 26 March 2008, a Ukraine International Airlines’ Boeing 737-300 being vectored by ATC to the ILS at destination Helsinki in IMC descended below its cleared altitude and came close to a telecommunications mast. ATC noticed the deviation and instructed a climb. The investigation attributed the non-compliance with the accepted descent clearance to the failure of the flight crew to operate in accordance with SOPs. It was also noted that the way in which ATC safety systems were installed and configured at the time of the occurrence had precluded earlier ATC awareness of the hazard caused by the altitude deviation.)
  • B733, vicinity Kosrae Micronesia, 2015 (On 12 June 2015, a Boeing 737-300 crew forgot to set QNH before commencing a night non-precision approach to Kosrae which was then flown using an over-reading altimeter. EGPWS Alerts occurred due to this mis-setting but were initially assessed as false. The third of these occurred when the eventual go-around was initially misflown and descent to within 200 feet of the sea occurred before climbing. The Investigation noted failure to action the approach checklist, the absence of ATC support and the step-down profile promulgated for the NDB/DME procedure flown as well as the potential effect of fatigue on the Captain.)
  • B733, vicinity Manchester UK, 1997 (On 1 August 1997, an Air Malta B737, descending for an approach into Manchester UK in poor weather, descended significantly below the cleared and correctly acknowledged altitude, below MSA.)
  • B733, vicinity Montpelier, France 2011 (On 10 January 2011, a Europe Airpost Boeing 737-300 taking off from Montpelier after repainting had just rotated for take off when the leading edge slats extended from the Intermediate position to the Fully Extended position and the left stick shaker was activated as a consequence of the reduced stalling angle of attack. Initial climb was sustained and soon afterwards, the slats returned to their previous position and the stick shaker activation stopped. The unexpected configuration change was attributed to paint contamination of the left angle of attack sensor, the context for which was inadequate task guidance.)
  • B733, vicinity Pittsburg PA USA, 1994 (On 8 September 1994, a US Air Boeing 737-300 crashed near Pittsburg USA following loss of control attributed to a rudder malfunction.)
  • B733, vicinity Sharm El-Sheikh Egypt, 2004 (On 3 January 3 2004, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by Flash Airlines on a passenger charter flight from Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt to Cairo for a refuelling stop en route to Paris CDG crashed into the sea 2½ minutes after a night take off into VMC and was destroyed and all 148 occupants killed. The Investigation was unable to establish a Probable Cause but found evidence of AP status confusion and the possibility of distraction leading to insufficient attention being paid to flight path control.)
  • B735/B733, Dallas-Fort Worth TX USA, 2001 (On 16 August 2001, a Continental Boeing 737-500 which had just landed on runway 18R at Dallas-Fort-Worth crossed runway 18L in daylight in front of a Delta Boeing 737-300 which had originally been believed to be holding position but was then seen to be taking off from the same runway. The Delta aircraft rotated early and sharply to overfly the crossing aircraft and suffered a tail strike in doing so. Clearance was estimated to have been about 100 feet. Both aircraft were being operated in accordance with valid ATC clearances issued by the same controller.)
  • B738, Knock Ireland, 2009 (On 19 October 2009, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by British Midland subsidiary bmibaby on a scheduled passenger flight from Knock (also more recently known as ‘Ireland West’) to Manchester encountered a large flock of medium-sized birds during rotation for take off in normal day visibility and engine malfunction followed. Increasing engine vibration during the climb led to the decision to divert to Shannon, which was completed without further event. There were no injuries to the 133 occupants or anyone on the ground.)
  • B773, Dubai UAE, 2016 (On 3 August 2016 the crew of a Boeing 777-300 rejected a landing at Dubai after a touchdown beyond the TDZ was followed by an automated 'LONG LANDING' Advisory Callout. Four seconds later, the aircraft became airborne again but with the thrust at Idle, it reached approximately 85 feet above the runway before sinking back onto it and impacting rear fuselage first at 900 fpm. The right engine-pylon assembly detached and an intense fuel-fed fire started as the aircraft came to a stop and it was quickly destroyed by impact and fire. All 300 occupants escaped, 23 with minor injuries.)
  • A320/B734, vicinity London Gatwick UK, 2012 (On 4 August 2012 an Easyjet Airbus A320 on approach to London Gatwick was given landing clearance in IMC for a runway occupied by a Boeing 737-400 waiting for take off which heard this transmission. Despite normal ground visibility and an unrestricted view of the runway, ATC failed to recognise their error and, after two unsuccessful attempts to advise them of it, the commander of the 737 instructed the A320 to go around which it did. Only upon hearing this did the controller realise what had happened.)
  • A321 / B734, Barcelona Spain, 2015 (On 25 November 2015, an Airbus A321 taxiing for departure at Barcelona was cleared across an active runway in front of an approaching Boeing 737 with landing clearance on the same runway by a Ground Controller unaware that the runway was active. On reaching the lit stop bar protecting the runway, the crew queried their clearance and were told to hold position. Noting that the event had occurred at the time of a routine twice-daily runway configuration change and two previous very similar events in 2012 and 2014, further safety recommendations on risk management of runway configuration change were made.)
  • AS32 / B734, Aberdeen UK, 2000 (For reasons that were not established, a Super Puma helicopter being air tested and in the hover at about 30 feet agl near the active runway at Aberdeen assumed that the departure clearance given by GND was a take off clearance and moved into the hover over the opposite end of the runway at the same time as a Boeing 737 was taking off. The 737 saw the helicopter ahead and made a high speed rejected take off, stopping approximately 100 metres before reaching the position of the helicopter which had by then moved off the runway still hovering.)
  • B734 / C172, vicinity Girona Spain, 2016 (On 28 September 2016, a Boeing 737-400 and a Cessna 172 both on IFR Flight Plans came into close proximity when about to turn final on the same non-precision approach at Girona from different initial joining routes. The Investigation found that two ACC sector controllers had issued conflicting approach clearances after losing situational awareness following a routine sector split due to an area ATC flow configuration change. The detection of the consequences of their error had then been hindered by a temporary area low level radar outage but helped by timely visual acquisition by both aircraft and a TCAS RA.)
  • B734 / MD81, en-route, Romford UK, 1996 (On 12 November 1996, a B737-400 descended below its assigned level in one of the holding patterns at London Heathrow in day IMC to within 100 feet vertically and between 680 and 820 metres horizontally of a MD-81 at its correct level, 1000 feet below. STCA prompted ATC to intervene and the 737 climbed back to its cleared level. Neither aircraft was fitted with TCAS 2 or saw the other visually.)
  • B734, Aberdeen UK, 2005 (Significant damage was caused to the tailplane and elevator of a Boeing 737-400 after the pavement beneath them broke up when take off thrust was applied for a standing start from the full length of the runway at Aberdeen. Although in this case neither outcome applied, the Investigation noted that control difficulties consequent upon such damage could lead to an overrun following a high speed rejected takeoff or to compromised flight path control airborne. Safety Recommendations on appropriate regulatory guidance for marking and construction of blast pads and on aircraft performance, rolling take offs and lead-on line marking were made.)
  • B734, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2010 (1) (On 6 June 2010, a Boeing 737-400 being operated by Atlas Blue, a wholly owned subsidiary of Royal Air Maroc, on a passenger flight from Amsterdam to Nador, Morocco encountered a flock of geese just after becoming airborne from runway 18L in day VMC close to sunset and lost most of the thrust on the left engine following bird ingestion. A MAYDAY was declared and a minimal single engine climb out was followed by very low level visual manoeuvring not consistently in accordance with ATC radar headings before the aircraft landed back on runway 18R just over 9 minutes later.)
  • B734, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2010 (2) (On 2 October 2010 a Boeing 737-400 being operated by Turkish operator Corendon Airlines on a passenger flight from Dalaman to Amsterdam made a late touchdown on landing runway 22 at destination in normal daylight visibility conditions and failed to stop before the end of the runway. The overrun occurred at low speed and there were no injuries to the 173 occupants and only minor damage to the aircraft.)
  • B734, Barcelona Spain, 2004 (On 28 November 2004, a KLM B737-400 departed laterally from the runway on landing at Barcelona due to the effects on the nosewheel steering of a bird strike which had occured as the aircraft took off from Amsterdam.)
  • B734, Brisbane Australia, 2001 (On 18th January 2001, a Qantas Boeing 737-400 encountered a Microburst while conducting a go-around at Brisbane Australia.)
  • B734, Kabul Afghanistan, 2016 (On 10 December 2016, a Boeing 737-400 main gear leg collapsed on landing after an approach at excessive speed was followed by a prolonged float prior to touchdown on the high-altitude Kabul runway. The Investigation found that the collapse had followed a severe but very brief wheel shimmy episode in the presence of a number of factors conducive to this risk which the aircraft operator’s pilots had not been trained to avoid. It was also found that although the aircraft operator regularly undertook wet lease contract flying, their pilot training policy did not include any route or aerodrome competency training.)
  • B734, Lahore Pakistan, 2015 (On 3 November 2015, a Boeing 737-400 continued an unstabilised day approach to Lahore. When only the First Officer could see the runway at MDA, he took over from the Captain but the Captain took it back when subsequently sighting it. Finally, the First Officer took over again and landed after recognising that the aircraft was inappropriately positioned. Both main gear assemblies collapsed as the aircraft veered off the runway. The Investigation attributed the first collapse to the likely effect of excessive shimmy damper play and the second collapse to the effects of the first aggravated by leaving the runway.)
  • B734, Palembang Indonesia, 2008 (On 2 October 2008, a Boeing 737-400 being used for flight crew command upgrade line training unintentionally landed off a non precision approach at Palembang in daylight on a taxiway parallel to the landing runway. Neither pilot realised their error until the aircraft was already on the ground when they saw a barrier ahead and were able to brake hard to stop only 700 metres from touchdown. It was found that the taxiway involved had served as a temporary runway five years earlier and that previously obliterated markings from that use had become visible.)
  • B734, Sharjah UAE, 2015 (On 24 September 2015, a Boeing 737-400 cleared for a night take-off from Sharjah took off from the parallel taxiway. The controller decided that since the taxiway was sterile and the aircraft speed was unknown, the safest option was to allow the take-off to continue. The Investigation noted that the taxiway used had until a year previously been the runway, becoming a parallel taxiway only when a new runway had been opened alongside it. It was noted that the controller had "lost visual watch" on the aircraft and regained it only once the aircraft was already at speed.)
  • B734, Timbuktu Mali, 2017 (On 5 May 2017, a Boeing 737-400 made a visual approach to Timbuktu and slightly overran the end of the 2,170 metre-long runway into soft ground causing one of the engines to ingest significant quantities of damaging debris. The Investigation found that the landing had been made with a significantly greater than permitted tailwind component but that nevertheless had the maximum braking briefed been used, the unfactored landing distance required would have been well within that available. The preceding approach was found to have been comprehensively unstable throughout with no call for or intent to make a go around.)
  • B734, Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2007 (On 7 March 2007, a Boeing 737-400 being operated by Garuda landed on a scheduled passenger flight from Jakarta to Yogyakarta overran the end of the destination runway at speed in normal daylight visibility after a late and high speed landing attempt ending up 252 metres beyond the end of the runway surface in a rice paddy field. There was a severe and prolonged fire which destroyed the aircraft (see the illustration below taken from the Investigation Report) and 21 of the 140 occupants were killed, 12 seriously injured, 100 suffered minor injuries and 7 were uninjured.)
  • B734, Zurich Switzerland, 2013 (On 11 October 2013, the commander of a Boeing 737-400 taxiing on wet taxiways at night after landing at Zurich became uncertain of his position in relation to the clearance received and when he attempted to manoeuvre the aircraft off the taxiway centreline onto what was believed to be adjacent paved surface, it became bogged down in soft ground. The Investigation considered the direct cause of the taxiway excursion was not following the green centreline lights but it recommended improvements in the provision of clear and consistent taxi instructions and in taxiway designations in the area of the event.)
  • B734, en-route, Daventry UK, 1995 (On 23 February 1995, a British Midland Boeing 737-400 made an emergency landing at Luton airport UK after losing most of the oil from both engines during initial climb out from East Midlands airport UK, attributed to failures in the quality of maintenance work and procedures during routine inspections of both engines prior to the flight.)
  • B734, en-route, New South Wales Australia, 2007 (On 11 August 2007, a Qantas Boeing 737-400 on a scheduled passenger service from Perth, WA to Sydney, NSW was about three quarters of the way there in day VMC when the master caution light illuminated associated with low output pressure of both main tank fuel pumps. The flight crew then observed that the centre tank fuel pump switches on the forward overhead panel were selected to the OFF position and he immediately selected them to the ON position. The flight was completed without further event.)
  • B734, en-route, Sulawesi Indonesia, 2007 (On 1 January 2007, a B737-400 crashed into the sea off Sulawesi, Indonesia, after the crew lost control of the aircraft having become distracted by a minor technical problem.)
  • B734, en-route, east northeast of Tanegashima Japan, 2015 (On 30 June 2015, both bleed air supplies on a Boeing 737-400 at FL370 failed in quick succession resulting in the loss of all pressurisation and, after making an emergency descent to 10,000 feet QNH, the flight was continued to the planned destination, Kansai. The Investigation found that both systems failed due to malfunctioning pre-cooler control valves and that these malfunctions were due to a previously identified risk of premature deterioration in service which had been addressed by an optional but “recommended” Service Bulletin which had not been taken up by the operator of the aircraft involved.)
  • B734, vicinity East Midlands UK, 1989 (On 8 January 1989, the crew of a British Midland Boeing 737-400 lost control of their aircraft due to lack of engine thrust shortly before reaching a planned en route diversion being made after an engine malfunction and it was destroyed by terrain impact with fatal or serious injuries sustained by almost all the occupants. The crew response to the malfunction had been followed by their shutdown of the serviceable rather the malfunctioning engine. The Investigation concluded that the accident was entirely the consequence of inappropriate crew response to a non-critical loss of powerplant airworthiness.)
  • B734, vicinity Lyon France, 2010 (On 7 September 2010, a Turkish operated Boeing 737-400 flew a non precision approach at Lyon Saint-Exupéry in IMC significantly below the procedure vertical profile throughout and only made a go around when instructed to do so by ATC following an MSAW activation. The minimum recorded radio height was 250 feet at 1.4nm from the runway threshold.)
  • B738/B734, Johannesburg South Africa, 2010 (On 27 July 2010, a South African Airways Boeing 737-800 on take from Runway 21R was instructed to reject that take off when already at high speed because a Boeing 737-400 was crossing the same runway ahead. The rejected take off was successful. The Investigation found that both aircraft had been operated in accordance with clearances issued by the responsible position in TWR ATC where OJT was in progress.)
  • A319 / B735, vicinity Prague Czech Republic, 2012 (On 7 September 2012, the crew of an Air France Airbus A319 failed to follow their arrival clearance at destination and turned directly towards the ILS FAF and thereby into conflict with a Boeing 737-500 on an ILS approach. When instructed to turn left (and clear of the ILS) by the controller, the crew replied that they were "following standard arrival" which was not the case. As the separation between the two aircraft reduced, the controller repeated the instruction to the A319 to turn left and this was acknowledged. Minimum lateral separation was 1.7nm, sufficient to activate STCA.)
  • B735, Denver USA, 2008 (Runway Side Excursion During Attempted Take-off in Strong and Gusty Crosswind Conditions.)
  • B735, Jos Nigeria, 2010 (On 24 August 2010, a Boeing 737-500 made an uncontrolled touchdown on a wet runway at Jos in daylight after the approach was continued despite not being stabilised. A lateral runway excursion onto the grass occurred before the aircraft regained the runway centreline and stopped two-thirds of the way along the 3000 metre-long runway. Substantial damage was caused to the aircraft but none of the occupants were injured. The aircraft commander was the Operator's 737 Fleet Captain and the Investigation concluded that the length of time he had been on duty had led to fatigue which had impaired his performance.)
  • B735, Newark NJ USA, 2006 (On 21 August 2006, a Boeing 737-500 suffered a nose landing gear collapse during towing at the Newark Liberty International Airport. A technical crew was repositioning the aircraft in visual meteorological conditions during the occurrence. No persons were injured and minor aircraft damage occurred.)
  • B735, en-route, North East of London UK, 1996 (On 5 September 1996, a Boeing 737-500 operated by British Midland, encountered severe wake turbulence whilst in the hold over London. The wake was attributed to a B767 some 6 nm ahead.)
  • B735, en-route, SE of Kushimoto Wakayama Japan, 2006 (On 5 July 2006, during daytime, a Boeing 737-500, operated by Air Nippon Co., Ltd. took off from Fukuoka Airport as All Nippon Airways scheduled flight 2142. At about 08:10, while flying at 37,000 ft approximately 60 nm southeast of Kushimoto VORTAC, a cabin depressurization warning was displayed and the oxygen masks in the cabin were automatically deployed. The aircraft made an emergency descent and, at 09:09, landed on Chubu International Airport.)
  • B735, vicinity Billund Denmark, 1999 (On 3rd December 1999, a Boeing 737-500 being operated by Maersk Air on a scheduled passenger flight from Birmingham to Copenhagen made a successful diversion to Billund in conditions of poor weather across the whole of the destination area after a go around at the intended destination but but landed with less than Final Reserve Fuel.)
  • B735, vicinity Kazan Russia, 2013 (On 17 November 2013, the crew of a Boeing 737-500 failed to establish on the ILS at Kazan after not following the promulgated intermediate approach track due to late awareness of LNAV map shift. A go around was eventually initiated from the unstabilised approach but the crew appeared not to recognise that the autopilot used to fly the approach would automatically disconnect. Non-control followed by inappropriate control led to a high speed descent into terrain less than a minute after go around commencement. The Investigation found that the pilots had not received appropriate training for all-engine go arounds or upset recovery.)
  • B735, vicinity London Heathrow UK, 2007 (On 7 June 2007, a Boeing 737-500 operated by LOT Polish Airlines, after daylight takeoff from London Heathrow Airport lost most of the information displayed on Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS). The information in both Electronic Attitude Director Indicator (EADI) and Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicators (EHSI) disappeared because the flight crew inadvertently mismanaged the Flight Management System (FMS). Subsequently the crew had difficulties both in maintaining the aircraft control manually using the mechanical standby instruments and communicating adequately with ATC due to insufficient language proficiency. Although an emergency situation was not declared, the ATC realized the seriousness of the circumstances and provided discrete frequency and a safe return after 27 minutes of flight was achieved.)
  • B735, vicinity Perm Russian Federation, 2008 (On September 13 2008, at night and in good visual conditions*, a Boeing 737-500 operated by Aeroflot-Nord executed an unstabilised approach to Runway 21 at Bolshoye Savino Airport (Perm) which subsequently resulted in loss of control and terrain impact.)
  • B735/B733, Dallas-Fort Worth TX USA, 2001 (On 16 August 2001, a Continental Boeing 737-500 which had just landed on runway 18R at Dallas-Fort-Worth crossed runway 18L in daylight in front of a Delta Boeing 737-300 which had originally been believed to be holding position but was then seen to be taking off from the same runway. The Delta aircraft rotated early and sharply to overfly the crossing aircraft and suffered a tail strike in doing so. Clearance was estimated to have been about 100 feet. Both aircraft were being operated in accordance with valid ATC clearances issued by the same controller.)
  • DH8D / B735, Exeter UK, 2009 (On 30 October 2009, a Bombardier DHC8-400 departing Exeter at night failed to stop as cleared at the runway 08 holding point and continued onto the runway on which a Boeing 737-500 had just touched down on in the opposite direction. The Investigation attributed the DHC8-400 crew error to distraction arising from failure to follows SOPs and poor monitoring of the Captain taxiing the aircraft by the First Officer. The failure of the DHC8 crew to immediately report the occurrence to Flybe, which had resulted in non-availability of relevant CVR data to the Investigation was also noted.)
  • A310 / B736, en-route, Southern Norway, 2001 (On 21 February 2001, a level bust 10 nm north of Oslo Airport by a climbing PIA A310 led to loss of separation with an SAS B736 in which response to a TCAS RA by the A310 not being in accordance with its likely activation (descend). The B736 received and correctly actioned a Climb RA.)
  • B736, Montréal QC Canada, 2015 (On 5 June 2015, a Boeing 737-600 landed long on a wet runway at Montréal and the crew then misjudged their intentionally-delayed deceleration because of an instruction to clear the relatively long runway at its far end and were then unable to avoid an overrun. The Investigation concluded that use of available deceleration devices had been inappropriate and that deceleration as quickly as possible to normal taxi speed before maintaining this to the intended runway exit was a universally preferable strategy. It was concluded that viscous hydroplaning had probably reduced the effectiveness of maximum braking as the runway end approached.)
  • A319 / B737, Zurich Switzerland, 2002 (On 23 November 2002, an A319, landing on Rwy16 at Zurich Switzerland, narrowly missed collision with a B737 cleared for take off on an intersecting runway.)
  • B190 / B737, Calgary Canada, 2014 (On 29 March 2014, a Beech 1900D being taxied by maintenance personnel at Calgary entered the active runway without clearance in good visibility at night as a Boeing 737-700 was taking off. The 737 passed safely overhead. The Investigation found that the taxiing aircraft had taken a route completely contrary to the accepted clearance and that the engineer on control of the aircraft had not received any relevant training. Although the airport had ASDE in operation, a transponder code was not issued to the taxiing aircraft as required and stop bar crossing detection was not enabled at the time.)
  • B737 / A320, Los Angeles CA USA, 2007 (On 16 August 2007, a Westjet Boeing 737-700 which had just landed began to cross a runway in normal daylight visibility from which an Airbus A320 was taking off because the crew had received a clearance to do so after an ambiguous position report given following a non-instructed frequency change. When the other aircraft was seen, the 737 was stopped partly on the runway and the A320 passed close by at high speed with an 11 metre clearance. The AMASS activated, but not until it was too late to inform a useful controller response.)
  • B737 / F100, vicinity Geneva Switzerland, 2006 (On 29 December 2006, Geneva ATC saw the potential for runway 23 conflict between a departing 737 and an inbound F100 and instructed them to respectively reject take off and go around respectively. Although still at a relatively slow speed, the 737 continued its take off and subsequently lost separation in night IMC against the F100. The Investigation noted that take off clearance for the 737 had been delayed by a slow post-landing runway clearance by a business jet and that the 737 had not begun take off after clearance to do so until instructed to do so immediately.)
  • B737 en-route, Glen Innes NSW Australia, 2007 (On 17 November 2007 a Boeing 737-700 made an emergency descent after the air conditioning and pressurisation system failed in the climb out of Coolangatta at FL318 due to loss of all bleed air. A diversion to Brisbane followed. The Investigation found that the first bleed supply had failed at low speed on take off but that continued take off had been continued contrary to SOP. It was also found that the actions taken by the crew in response to the fault after completing the take off had also been also contrary to those prescribed.)
  • B737, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2003 (n 22 December 2003, a Boeing 737-700 being operated by UK Operator Easyjet on a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to London Gatwick was taxiing for departure at night in normal visibility and took a different route to that instructed by ATC. The alternative route was, unknown to the flight crew, covered with ice and as a consequence, an attempt to maintain directional control during a turn was unsuccessful and the aircraft left wing collided with a lamp-post. The collision seriously damaged the aircraft and the lamp post. One passenger sustained slight injuries because of the impact. The diagram below taken from the official investigation report shows the area where the collision occurred.)
  • B737, Chicago Midway IL, USA 2011 (On 26 April 2011 a Southwest Boeing 737-700 was assessed as likely not to stop before the end of landing runway 13C at alternate Chicago Midway in daylight and was intentionally steered to the grass to the left of the runway near the end, despite the presence of a EMAS. The subsequent investigation determined that the poor deceleration was a direct consequence of a delay in the deployment of both speed brakes and thrust reverser. It was noted that the crew had failed to execute the ‘Before Landing’ Checklist which includes verification of speed brake arming.)
  • B737, Chicago Midway USA, 2005 (On 8 December 2005, a delay in deploying the thrust reversers after a Boeing 737-700 touchdown at night on the slippery surface of the 1176 metre-long runway at Chicago Midway with a significant tailwind component led to it running off the end, subsequently departing the airport perimeter and hitting a car before coming to a stop. The Investigation concluded that pilots’ lack of familiarity with the autobrake system on the new 737 variant had distracted them from promptly deploying the reversers and that inadequate pilot training provision and the ATC failure to provide adequate braking action information had contributed.)
  • B737, Fort Nelson BC Canada, 2012 (On 9 January 2012, an Enerjet Boeing 737-700 overran the landing runway 03 at Fort Nelson by approximately 70 metres after the newly promoted Captain continued an unstabilised approach to a mis-managed late-touchdown landing. The subsequent Investigation attributed the accident to poor crew performance in the presence of a fatigued aircraft commander.)
  • B737, Gran Canaria Spain, 2016 (On 7 January 2016, a Boeing 737-700 was inadvertently cleared by ATC to take off on a closed runway. The take-off was commenced with a vehicle visible ahead at the runway edge. When ATC realised the situation, a 'stop' instruction was issued and the aircraft did so after travelling approximately 740 metres. Investigation attributed the controller error to "lost situational awareness". It also noted prior pilot and controller awareness that the runway used was closed and that the pilots had, on the basis of the take-off clearance crossed a lit red stop bar to enter the runway without explicit permission.)
  • B737, New York La Guardia USA, 2013 (On 22 July 2013 the Captain of a Boeing 737-700 failed to go around when the aircraft was not stabilised on final approach at La Guardia and then took control from the First Officer three seconds before touchdown and made a very hard nose first touchdown which substantially damaged the aircraft. The Investigation concluded that the accident had been a consequence of the continued approach and the attempt to recover with a very late transfer of control instead of a go around as prescribed by the Operator. The aircraft was "substantially damaged".)
  • B737, New York La Guardia USA, 2016 (On 27 October 2016, a Boeing 737-700 crew made a late touchdown on the runway at La Guardia and did not then stop before reaching the end of the runway and entered - and exited the side of - the EMAS before stopping. The Investigation concluded that the overrun was the consequence of a failure to go around when this was clearly necessary after a mishandled touchdown and that the Captain's lack of command authority and a lack of appropriate crew training provided by the Operator to support flight crew decision making had contributed to the failure to go around.)
  • B737, Southend UK, 2010 (On 21 Nov 2010, a Boeing 737-700 being operated by Arik Air on a non revenue positioning flight from Southend to Lagos with only the two pilots on board carried out a successful take off in daylight and normal ground visibility from runway 06 but became airborne only just before the end of the runway.)
  • B737, en-route, northwest of Philadelphia PA USA, 2018 (On 14 April 2018, a sudden uncontained left engine failure occurred to a CFM56-7B powered Boeing 737-70 as it climbed through approximately FL 320 abeam Philadelphia. Ejected debris broke a cabin window causing rapid decompression and the death of a passenger seated nearby. Diversion to Philadelphia followed without further significant event. The same day, the Investigation, which is continuing, found that the failure was due to metal fatigue in a single fan blade causing it to shear from the hub. The engine manufacturer subsequently issued inspection requirements for similar engines and Airworthiness Directives based on this were immediately issued.)
  • B737, vicinity Branson MO USA, 2014 (On 12 January 2014, a Boeing 737-700 making a night visual approach to Branson advised 'field in sight' approximately 20 miles out and was transferred to TWR and given landing clearance at approximately 6,000 feet. However, the crew had misidentified the airport and subsequently landed on a similarly-orientated runway at a different airport. The Investigation found that required flight crew procedures for such an approach had not been followed and also that applicable ATC procedures for approval of visual approaches by IFR flights were conducive to pilot error in the event that airports were located in close proximity.)
  • B737/C212 en-route/manoeuvring, near Richmond NSW Australia, 2011 (On 5 November 2011, ATC cleared a Virgin Australia Boeing 737-700 to climb without speed restriction through an active parachute Drop Zone contrary to prevailing ATC procedures. As a result, prescribed separation from the drop zone was not maintained, but an avoiding action turn initiated by the 737 crew in VMC upon recognising the conflict eliminated any actual risk of collision with either the drop aircraft or its already-departed free-fall parachutists. The incident was attributed to a combination of inadequate controller training and inadequate ATC operational procedures.)
  • B737/LJ45, Chicago Midway, USA 2011 (On 1 December 2011 a Southwest Boeing 737-700 was cleared to taxi in after landing on a route which included crossing another active runway before contacting GND and the controller who had issued that clearance then inadvertently issued a take off clearance to a Gama Charters Learjet 45 for the runway to be crossed. One of the 737 pilots saw the approaching Learjet and warned the PF to stop as the runway crossing was about to begin. The departing aircraft then overflew the stationary 737 by 62 feet after rotating shortly before the crossing point without seeing it.)
  • DH8D / B737, Winnipeg Canada, 2014 (On 4 August 2014, the crew of a DHC8-400 departing Winnipeg continued beyond the holding point to which they had been cleared to taxi as a B737 was about to land. ATC observed the daylight incursion visually and instructed the approaching aircraft to go around as the DHC8 stopped within the runway protected area but clear of the actual runway. The Investigation found that the surface marking of the holding point which had been crossed was "significantly degraded" and noted the daily airport inspections had failed to identify this.)
  • Vehicles / B737, Toronto Canada, 2008 (On 29 July 2008, a Boeing 737-700 taking off from Toronto in accordance with its TWR clearance was about a third of the way down the runway when three vehicles, which had previously been cleared to enter the same runway by a GND controller were seen. The aircraft became airborne approximately 760 metres from the vehicles.)
  • A318 / B738, en-route, Trasadingen Switzerland, 2009 (On 8 June 2009, an Airbus A318-100 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Belgrade, Serbia to Paris CDG in day VMC came into conflict with a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Ryanair on a scheduled passenger flight from Nottingham East Midlands UK to Bergamo Italy. The conflict was resolved mainly by TCAS RA response and there were no injuries to any occupants during the avoidance manoeuvres carried out by both aircraft.)
  • A318/B738, Nantes France, 2010 (On 25 May 2010 an Air France Airbus A318 making an automatic landing off an ILS Cat 2 approach at Nantes experienced interference with the ILS LOC signal caused by a Boeing 737-800 which was departing from the same runway but early disconnection of the AP removed any risk of un-correctable directional control problems during the landing roll. Both aircraft were operating in accordance with their ATC clearances. Investigation attributed the conflict to the decision of TWR not to instruct the A318 to go around and because of diminished situational awareness.)
  • A319 / B738 / B738, en-route, near Lausanne Switzerland, 2013 (On 26 May 2013, an A319 in Swiss Class 'C' airspace received a TCAS 'Level Off' RA against a 737 above after being inadvertently given an incorrect climb clearance by ATC. The opposing higher-altitude 737 began a coordinated RA climb from level flight and this triggered a second conflict with another 737 also in the cruise 1000 feet above which resulted in coordinated TCAS RAs for both these aircraft. Correct response to all RAs resulted in resolution of both conflicts after prescribed minimum separations had been breached to as low as 1.5nm when 675 feet apart vertically.)
  • A320 / B738 Barcelona Spain, 2012 (On 27 May 2012, an Airbus A320 departing Barcelona was cleared by GND to taxi across an active runway on which a Boeing 737-800 was about to land. Whilst still moving but before entering the runway, the A320 crew, aware of the aircraft on approach, queried their crossing clearance but the instruction to stop was given too late to stop before crossing the unlit stop bar. The 737 was instructed to go around and there was no actual risk of collision. The Investigation attributed the controller error to lack of familiarisation with the routine runway configuration change in progress.)
  • A320 / B738, en-route, near Córdoba Spain, 2014 (On 30 October 2014, a descending Airbus A320 came close to a Boeing 737-800 at around FL 220 after the A320 crew significantly exceeded a previously-instructed 2,000 fpm maximum rate of descent assuming it no longer applied when not reiterated during re-clearance to a lower altitude. Their response to a TCAS RA requiring descent at not above 1,000 fpm was to further increase it from 3,200 fpm. Lack of notification delayed the start of an independent Investigation but it eventually found that although the A320 TCAS equipment had been serviceable, its crew denied failing to correctly follow their initial RA.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Dubai UAE, 2012 (On 22 April 2012, an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737 came into close proximity near Dubai whilst on the same ATC frequency and correctly following their ATC clearances shortly after they had departed at night from Sharjah and Dubai respectively. The Investigation found that correct response by both aircraft to coordinated TCAS RAs eliminated any risk of collision. The fact that the controller involved had only just taken over the radar position involved and was only working the two aircraft in conflict was noted, as was the absence of STCA at the unit due to set up difficulties.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Launceston Australia, 2008 (On 1 May 2008 an Airbus A320-200 being operated by JetStar on a scheduled passenger flight from Melbourne to Launceston, Tasmania was making a missed approach from runway 32L when it came into close proximity in night VMC with a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Virgin Blue and also inbound to Launceston from Melbourne which was manoeuvring about 5nm north west of the airport after carrying out a similar missed approach. Minimum separation was 3 nm at the same altitude and the situation was fully resolved by the A320 climbing to 4000 feet.)
  • A320/B738, vicinity Delhi India, 2013 (On 2 September 2013, a B737 crew were not instructed to go around from their approach by ATC as it became increasingly obvious that an A320 departing the same runway would not be airborne in time for a landing clearance to be issued. They initiated a go around over the threshold and then twice came into conflict with the A320 as both climbed on similar tracks without ATC de-confliction, initially below the height where TCAS RAs are functional. Investigation attributed the conflict to ATC but the failure to effectively deal with the consequences jointly to ATC and both aircraft crews.)
  • A321 / B738, Dublin Ireland, 2011 (On 21 May 2011, a Monarch Airlines A321 taxiing for departure at Dublin inadvertently taxied onto an active runway after failing to follow its taxi clearance. The incursion was not noticed by ATC but the crew of a Boeing 737 taking off from the same runway did see the other aircraft and initiated a very high speed rejected take off stopping 360 metres from it. The incursion occurred in a complex manoeuvring area to a crew unfamiliar with the airport at a location which was not a designated hot spot. Various mitigations against incursions at this position have since been implemented.)
  • A321 / B738, en-route, south eastern Bulgaria, 2016 (On 8 September 2016, an Airbus A321 en route in Bulgarian airspace at FL 350 was given and acknowledged a descent but then climbed and came within 1.2nm of a descending Boeing 737. The Investigation found that the inexperienced A321 First Officer had been temporarily alone when the instruction was given and had insufficient understanding of how to control the aircraft. It was also found that despite an STCA activation of the collision risk, the controller, influenced by a Mode ‘S’ downlink of the correctly-set A321 cleared altitude, had then added to the risk by instructing the 737 to descend.)
  • A332/B738, vicinity Amsterdam Netherlands, 2012 (On 13 November 2012, a Garuda Airbus A330 and a KLM Boeing 737 lost separation against each other whilst correctly following radar vectors to parallel approaches at Amsterdam but there was no actual risk of collision as each aircraft had the other in sight and no TCAS RA occurred. The Investigation found that one of the controllers involved had used permitted discretion to override normal procedures during a short period of quiet traffic but had failed to restore normal procedures when it became necessary to do so, thus creating the conflict and the ANSP was recommended to review their procedures.)
  • B737, Mildura VIC Australia, 2013 (On 18 June 2013, a Boeing 737-800 crew en route to Adelaide learned that un-forecast below-minima weather had developed there and decided to divert to their designated alternate, Mildura, approximately 220nm away where both the weather report and forecast were much better. However, on arrival at Mildura, an un-forecast rapid deterioration to thick fog had occurred with insufficient fuel to divert elsewhere. The only available approach was flown to a successful landing achieved after exceeding the minimum altitude by 240 feet to gain sight of the runway. An observation immediately afterwards gave visibility 900 metres in fog with cloudbase 100 feet.)
  • B738 / A319, Dublin Ireland, 2010 (On 16 October 2010, in day VMC, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Turkish Airlines on a passenger flight from Dublin to Istanbul entered runway 28 at Dublin whilst an Airbus A319 being operated by Germanwings on a scheduled passenger flight from Koln to Dublin was about 0.5nm from touchdown on the same runway. The Airbus immediately initiated a missed approach from approximately 200 ft aal simultaneously with an ATC call to do so.)
  • B738 / AS25, en-route, near Frankfurt Hahn Germany, 2013 (On 25 April 2013, the experienced pilot of an en-route motor glider which was not under power at the time and therefore not transponding observed a potentially conflicting aircraft in Class 'E' airspace near Frankfurt Hahn and commenced avoiding action. Although the glider was within their field of view, neither of the pilots of the other aircraft, a Boeing 737 in a descent, was aware of the proximity of the glider until it passed them on an almost parallel opposite-direction track 161 feet below them at a range of 350 metres as their aircraft was passing approximately 6,500 feet QNH.)
  • B738 / AT46, Jakarta Halim Indonesia, 2016 (On 4 April 2016, a Boeing 737-800 crew taking off in normal night visibility from Jakarta Halim were unable to avoid an ATR 42-600 under tow which had entered their runway after ambiguity in its clearance. Both aircraft sustained substantial damage and caught fire but all those involved escaped uninjured. The Investigation concluded that contributory to the accident had been failure to use a single runway occupancy frequency, towing of a poorly lit aircraft, the potential effect on pilot detection of an obstruction of embedded approach lighting ahead of the displaced landing threshold and issues affecting controller traffic monitoring effectiveness.)
  • B738 / B738, Dublin Ireland, 2014 (On 7 October 2014, a locally-based Boeing 737-800 taxiing for departure from runway 34 at Dublin as cleared in normal night visibility collided with another 737-800 stationary in a queue awaiting departure from runway 28. Whilst accepting that pilots have sole responsible for collision avoidance, the Investigation found that relevant restrictions on taxi clearances were being routinely ignored by ATC. It also noted that visual judgement of wingtip clearance beyond 10 metres was problematic and that a subsequent very similar event at Dublin involving two 737-800s of the same Operator was the subject of a separate investigation.)
  • B738 / B738, Seville Spain, 2012 (On 13 April 2012 a Boeing 737-800 being taxied off its parking stand for a night departure by the aircraft commander failed to follow the clearly and correctly marked taxi centrelines on the well-lit apron and instead took a short cut towards the taxiway centreline which resulted in the left winglet striking the left horizontal stabiliser and elevator of another Ryanair aircraft correctly parked on the adjacent stand causing damage which rendered both aircraft unfit for flight. The pilot involved was familiar with the airport and had gained almost all his flying experience on the accident aircraft type.)
  • B738 / B738, Toronto Canada, 2018 (On 5 January 2018, an out of service Boeing 737-800 was pushed back at night into collision with an in-service Boeing 737-800 waiting on the taxiway for a marshaller to arrive and direct it onto the adjacent terminal gate. The first aircraft’s tail collided with the second aircraft’s right wing and a fire started. The evacuation of the second aircraft was delayed by non-availability of cabin emergency lighting. The Investigation attributed the collision to failure of the apron controller and pushback crew to follow documented procedures or take reasonable care to ensure that it was safe to begin the pushback.)
  • B738 / B744, Los Angeles USA, 2004 (On 19 August 2004, a Boeing 747-400 operated by Asiana Airlines, was given a landing clearance for runway 24L at Los Angeles (LAX). At the same time, a Boeing 737-800 operated by Southwest Airlines was given line up and wait instruction for the same runway. The B744 initiated a go-around as the crew spotted the B738 on the runway.)
  • B738 / C172, en route, near Falsterbo Sweden, 2014 (On 20 July 2014, the pilot of a VFR Cessna 172 became distracted and entered the Class 'C' controlled airspace of two successive TMAs without clearance. In the second one he was overtaken by a Boeing 738 inbound to Copenhagen with less than 90 metres separation. The 738 crew reported a late sighting of the 172 and "seemingly" assessed that avoiding action was unnecessary. Although the 172 had a Mode C-capable transponder, it was not transmitting altitude prior to the incident and the Investigation noted that this had invalidated preventive ATC and TCAS safety barriers and compromised flight safety.)
  • B738 / CRJ1, New York La Guardia USA, 2007 (On 5 July 2007, in daylight and good visibility, a Comair CRJ100 on an outbound scheduled service flight was cleared by a GND Controller to taxi across active runway 22 on which a Delta AL Boeing 737-800 also operating a scheduled service flight had already been cleared to land by the (TWR) local controller. The crossing to be made did not allow the CRJ100 crew to see up the runway towards the landing threshold until they had almost completed the crossing. When they did see the by then landed B738 coming towards them, they immediately increased thrust on the single operating engine to accelerate clear.)
  • B738 / E135, en-route, Mato Grosso Brazil, 2006 (On 29 September 2006, a Boeing 737-800 level at FL370 collided with an opposite direction Embraer Legacy at the same level. Control of the 737 was lost and it crashed, killing all 154 occupants. The Legacy's crew kept control and successfully diverted to the nearest suitable airport. The Investigation found that ATC had not instructed the Legacy to descend to FL360 when the flight plan indicated this and soon afterwards, its crew had inadvertently switched off their transponder. After the consequent disappearance of altitude from all radar displays, ATC assumed but did not confirm the aircraft had descended.)
  • B738 / F100, Geneva Switzerland, 2014 (On 31 March 2014, a Geneva TWR controller believed it was possible to clear a light aircraft for an intersection take off ahead of a Fokker 100 already lining up on the same runway at full length and gave that clearance with a Boeing 737-800 6nm from touchdown on the same runway. Concluding that intervention was not necessary despite the activation of loss of separation alerts, the controller allowed the 737 to continue, issuing a landing clearance whilst the F100 was still on the runway. Sixteen seconds later, the 737 touched down three seconds after the F100 had become airborne.)
  • B738 vicinity Canberra Australia 2014 (On 9 May 2014, the crew of a Boeing 737-800 found that rotation during take off required significantly more back pressure on the control column than would be expected. It was found that a party of 87 primary school children all seated together at the rear of the cabin had been checked in as adults so that the aircraft had been up to 5 tonnes lighter and with a significantly different trim requirement than the certified and accepted loadsheet stated. The error was attributed to the inadequate group check arrangements of the airline involved.)
  • B738, Alicante Spain, 2013 (On 27 March 2013, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 was mis-handled during take off and a minor tailstrike occurred. The crew were slow to respond and continued an uninterrupted climb to FL220 before deciding to return to land and beginning the corresponding QRH drill. When the cabin pressurisation outflow valve was fully opened at FL130, the cabin depressurised almost instantly and the crew temporarily donned oxygen masks. The Investigation noted the absence of any caution on the altitude at which the QRH drill should be used but also noted clear guidance that the procedure should be actioned without delay.)
  • B738, Auckland New Zealand, 2013 (On 7 June 2013, stabiliser trim control cable, pulley and drum damage were discovered on a Boeing 737-800 undergoing scheduled maintenance at Auckland. The Investigation found the damage to have been due to a rag which was found trapped in the forward cable drum windings and concluded that the integrity of the system which provided for stabiliser trim system manual control by pilots had been compromised over an extended period. The rag was traced to a specific Australian maintenance facility which was run by the Operator's parent company and which was the only user of the particular type of rag.)
  • B738, Barcelona Spain, 2015 (On 12 December 2015, whilst a Boeing 737-800 was beginning disembarkation of passengers via an air bridge which had just been attached on arrival at Barcelona, the bridge malfunctioned, raising the aircraft nose gear approximately 2 metres off the ground. The door attached to the bridge then failed and the aircraft dropped abruptly. Prompt cabin crew intervention prevented all but two minor injuries. The Investigation found that the occurrence had been made possible by the failure to recognise new functional risks created by a programme of partial renovation being carried out on the air bridges at the Terminal involved.)
  • B738, Belfast International UK, 2017 (On 21 July 2017, a Boeing 737-800 taking off from Belfast was only airborne near the runway end of the runway and then only climbed at a very shallow angle until additional thrust was eventually added. The Investigation found that the thrust set had been based on an incorrectly input surface temperature of -52°C, the expected top of climb temperature, instead of the actual surface temperature. Although inadequate acceleration had been detected before V1, the crew did not intervene. It was noted that neither the installed FMC software nor the EFBs in use were conducive to detection of the data input error.)
  • B738, Christchurch New Zealand, 2015 (On 11 May 2015, a Boeing 737-800 crew making a night landing at Christchurch had to react quickly when braking action deteriorated and only just succeeded in preventing an overrun. The Investigation found that a damp rather than wet runway had been assumed despite recent rain and that the aircraft operator had recently changed their procedures so that a damp runway should be considered as dry rather than wet for runway performance purposes. The questionable determination of the crew that the runway was likely to be damp, not wet, was attributed to a relatively high workload prior to final approach.)
  • B738, Delhi India, 2014 (On 5 January 2014, a Boeing 737-800 operating a domestic flight into Dehli diverted to Jaipur due to destination visibility being below approach minima but had to break off the approach there when the aircraft ahead was "substantially damaged" during landing, blocking the only runway. There was just enough fuel to return to Dehli as a MAYDAY flight and successfully land below applicable minima and with minimal fuel remaining. The Investigation found that a different alternate with better weather conditions would have been more appropriate and that the aircraft operator had failed to provide sufficient ground-based support to the flight.)
  • B738, Djalaluddin Indonesia, 2013 (On 6 August 2013, a Boeing 737-800 encountered cows ahead on the runway after landing normally in daylight following an uneventful approach and was unable to avoid colliding with them at high speed and as a result departed the runway to the left. Parts of the airport perimeter fencing were found to have been either missing or inadequately maintained for a significant period prior to the accident despite the existence of an airport bird and animal hazard management plan. Corrective action was taken following the accident.)
  • B738, Dubai UAE, 2013 (On 6 December 2013, a Boeing 737-800 passenger aircraft was flown from Amman to Dubai out of revenue service with a quantity of 'live' boxed chemical oxygen generators on board as cargo without the awareness of the aircraft commander. The subsequent Investigation found that this was possible because of a wholesale failure of the aircraft operator to effectively oversee operational risk implicit in sub contracting heavy maintenance. As a result of the investigation, a previously unreported flight by the same operator in revenue service which had also carried live oxygen generators was disclosed.)
  • B738, Eindhoven Netherlands, 2010 (On 4 June 2010, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Ryanair and departing on a scheduled passenger flight from Eindhoven to Faro, Portugal carried out a daytime rejected take off on runway 04 from above V1 in normal visibility because the handling pilot perceived that the aircraft status was abnormal. The aircraft was stopped 500m before the end of the 3000m runway, none of the occupants were injured and the aircraft suffered only hot brakes.)
  • B738, Eindhoven Netherlands, 2012 (On 11 October 2012, the crew of a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 did not change frequency to TWR when instructed to do so by GND whilst already backtracking the departure runway and then made a 180° turn and took off without clearance still on GND frequency. Whilst no actual loss of ground or airborne safety resulted, the Investigation found that when the Captain had queried the receipt of a take off clearance with the First Officer, he had received and accepted a hesitant confirmation. Crew non-compliance with related AIP ground manoeuvring restrictions replicated in their airport briefing was also noted.)
  • B738, Georgetown Guyana, 2011 (On 30 July 2011, a Boeing 737-800 overran the wet landing runway at Georgetown after a night non-precision approach, exited the airport perimeter and descended down an earth embankment. There were no fatalities but the aircraft sustained substantial damage and was subsequently declared a hull loss. The Investigation attributed the overrun to a touchdown almost two thirds of the way down the runway and failure to utilise the aircraft’s full deceleration capability. Loss of situational awareness and indecision as to the advisability of a go-around after a late touchdown became inevitable was also cited as contributory to the outcome.)
  • B738, Glasgow UK, 2012 (On 19 October 2012, a Jet2-operated Boeing 737-800 departing Glasgow made a high speed rejected take off when a strange smell became apparent in the flight deck and the senior cabin crew reported what appeared to be smoke in the cabin. The subsequent emergency evacuation resulted in one serious passenger injury. The Investigation was unable to conclusively identify a cause of the smoke and the also- detected burning smells but excess moisture in the air conditioning system was considered likely to have been a factor and the Operator subsequently made changes to its maintenance procedures.)
  • B738, Goteborg Sweden, 2003 (On 7 December 2003, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by SAS on a passenger charter flight from Salzburg, Austria to Stockholm Arlanda with an intermediate stop at Goteborg made a high speed rejected take off during the departure from Goteborg because of an un-commanded premature rotation. There were no injuries to any occupants and no damage to the aircraft which taxied back to the gate.)
  • B738, Hobart Australia, 2010 (On 24 November 2010, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Virgin Blue Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Melbourne, Victoria to Hobart, Tasmania marginally overran the destination runway after aquaplaning during the daylight landing roll in normal ground visibility.)
  • B738, Katowice Poland, 2007 (On 28 October 2007, a Boeing 737-800 under the command of a Training Captain occupying the supernumerary crew seat touched down off an ILS Cat 1 approach 870 metres short of the runway at Katowice in fog at night with the AP still engaged. The somewhat protracted investigation did not lead to a Final Report until over 10 years later. This attributed the accident to crew failure to discontinue an obviously unstable approach and it being flown with RVR below the applicable minima. The fact that the commander was not seated at the controls was noted with concern.)
  • B738, Kingston Jamaica, 2009 (On 22 December 2009, the flight crew of an American Airlines’ Boeing 737-800 made a long landing at Kingston at night in heavy rain and with a significant tailwind component and their aircraft overran the end of the runway at speed and was destroyed beyond repair. There was no post-crash fire and no fatalities, but serious injuries were sustained by 14 of the 154 occupants. The accident was attributed almost entirely to various actions and inactions of the crew. Damage to the aircraft after the overrun was exacerbated by the absence of a RESA.)
  • B738, Limoges France, 2008 (On 21 March 2008, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Ryanair on a scheduled passenger flight from Charleroi, Belgium to Limoges carried out a daylight approach at destination followed by a landing in normal ground visibility but during heavy rain and with a strong crosswind which ended with a 50 metre overrun into mud. None of the 181 occupants were injured but both engines were damaged by ingestion of debris.)
  • B738, London Stansted UK, 2008 (On 13 November 2008, a Boeing 737-800 with an unserviceable APU was being operated by Ryanair on a passenger flight at night was in collision with a tug after a cross-bleed engine start procedure was initiated prior to the completion of a complex aircraft pushback in rain. As the power was increased on the No 1 engine in preparation for the No 2 engine start, the resulting increase in thrust was greater than the counter-force provided by the tug and the aircraft started to move forwards. The towbar attachment failed and subsequently the aircraft’s No 1 engine impacted the side of the tug, prior to the aircraft brakes being applied.)
  • B738, Lyon France, 2009 (On 29 August 2009, an Air Algérie Boeing B737-800 departed the side of the runway during take off but then regained the paved surface after sustaining damage from obstructions, completed the take off without further event and continued to destination. Damage to one of the engines, to tyres and to two lights was discovered at the destination. ATC remained unaware of the excursion until the Operator asked its representative at Lyon to ask the airport to carry out a runway inspection.)
  • B738, Manchester UK, 2003 (On 16 July 2003, a Boeing 737-800, being operated by Excel Airlines on a passenger flight from Manchester to Kos began take off on Runway 06L without the flight crew being aware of work in progress at far end of the runway. The take off calculations, based on the full runway length resulted in the aircraft passing within 56 ft of a 14 ft high vehicle just after take off.)
  • B738, Mangalore India, 2010 (On 22 May 2010, an Air India Express Boeing 737-800 overran the landing runway at Mangalore when attempting a go around after thrust reverser deployment following a fast and late touchdown off an unstable approach. Almost all of the 166 occupants were killed when control was lost and the aircraft crashed into a ravine off the end of the runway. It was noted a relevant factor in respect of the approach, landing and failed go around attempt was probably the effect of ‘sleep inertia’ on the Captain’s performance and judgement after a prolonged sleep en-route)
  • B738, Mangalore India, 2012 (On 14 August 2012, a Boeing 737-800 crew continued a previously stable ILS Cat 1 approach below the prescribed MDA without having acquired the prescribed visual reference. The aircraft was then damaged by a high rate of descent at the initial touchdown in the undershoot in fog. The occurrence was not reported by either the crew or the attending licensed engineer who discovered consequent damage to the aircraft. Dense fog had prevented ATC visual awareness. The Investigation attributed the undershoot to violation of minima and to both pilots looking out for visual reference leaving the flight instruments unmonitored.)
  • B738, Mildura VIC Australia, 2013 (On 18 June 2013, a Boeing 737-800 crew en route to Adelaide encountered un-forecast below-minima weather conditions on arrival there and decided to divert to their designated alternate, Mildura, approximately 220nm away where both the weather report and forecast were much better. However, on arrival there, an un-forecast rapid deterioration to thick fog had occurred with insufficient fuel to go anywhere else. The only available approach was flown, but despite exceeding the minimum altitude by 260 feet, no visual reference was obtained. A further approach with the reported overcast 100 feet agl and visibility 200 metres was continued to a landing.)
  • B738, Naha Japan, 2007 (On 20 August 2007, as a Boeing 737-800 being operated by China Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight arrived on the designated nose-in parking stand at destination Naha, Japan in daylight and normal visibility, fuel began to leak from the right wing near to the engine pod and ignited. An evacuation was quickly initiated and all 165 occupants including 8 crew members were able to leave the aircraft before it was engulfed by the fire, which spread rapidly and led to the destruction of the aircraft and major damage to the apron surface. As the stand was not adjacent to the terminal and not served by an air bridge, there was no damage to structures. All occupants had left the aircraft before the Airport RFFS arrived at the scene.)
  • B738, Newcastle UK, 2010 (On 25 November 2010, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Thompson Airways on a passenger fight from Arrecife, Lanzarote to Newcastle UK marginally overran Runway 07 at destination onto the paved stopway during a night landing in normal ground visibility. None of the 197 occupants were injured and the aircraft was undamaged. Passengers were disembarked to buses for transport to the terminal. An acceptable disposition of frozen deposits had been advised as present on the runway prior to the approach after a sweeping operation had been conducted following a discontinued approach ten minutes earlier because of advice from ATC that the runway was contaminated with wet snow.)
  • B738, Nuremburg Germany, 2010 (On 8 January 2010, an Air Berlin Boeing 737-800 attempted to commence a rolling take off at Nuremburg on a runway pre-advised as having only ‘medium’ braking action. Whilst attempting to position the aircraft on the runway centreline, directional control was lost and the aircraft exited the paved surface onto soft ground at low speed before the flight crew were able to stop it. The event was attributed to the inappropriately high taxi speed onto the runway and subsequent attempt to conduct a rolling take off. Relevant Company standard operating procedures were found to be deficient.)
  • A318/B739, vicinity Amsterdam Netherlands, 2007 (On 6 December 2007 an Airbus A318 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Lyon to Amsterdam carried out missed approach from runway 18C at destination and lost separation in night VMC against a Boeing 737-900 being operated by KLM on a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to London Heathrow which had just departed from runway 24. The conflict was resolved by correct responses to the respective coordinated TCAS RAs after which the A318 passed close behind the 737. There were no abrupt manoeuvres and none of the 104 and 195 occupants respectively on board were injured.)
  • A320 / B739, Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2013 (On 20 November 2013, an A320 misunderstood its taxi out clearance at Yogyakarta and began to enter the same runway on which a Boeing 737, which had a valid landing clearance but was not on TWR frequency, was about to touch down from an approach in the other direction of use. On seeing the A320, which had stopped with the nose of the aircraft protruding onto the runway, the 737 applied maximum manual braking and stopped just before reaching the A320. The Investigation faulted ATC and airport procedures as well as the A320 crew for contributing to the risk created.)
  • AT75 / B739, Medan Indonesia, 2017 (On 3 August 2017, a Boeing 737-900ER landing at Medan was in wing-to-wing collision as it touched down with an ATR 72-500 which had entered the same runway to depart at an intermediate point. Substantial damage was caused but both aircraft could be taxied clear. The Investigation concluded that the ATR 72 had entered the runway at an opposite direction without clearance after its incomplete readback had gone unchallenged by ATC. Controllers appeared not to have realized that a collision had occurred despite warnings of runway debris and the runway was not closed until other aircraft also reported debris.)
  • B739, Akita Japan, 2007 (On 6 January 2007, a Boeing B737-900 operated by Korean Airlines landed at Akita Airport on a taxiway parallel to the in-use runway after a daylight non-precision approach (NPA) using a head-up display (HUD). The crew realised their error during the landing roll.)
  • B739, Pekanbaru Indonesia, 2011 (On 14 February 2011, a Lion Air Boeing 737-900 making a night landing at Pekanbaru overran the end of the 2240 metre long runway onto the stopway after initially normal deceleration largely attributable to the thrust reversers was followed by a poor response to applied maximum braking in the final 300 metres. Whilst performance calculations showed that a stop on the runway should have been possible, it was concluded that a combination of water patches with heavy rubber contamination had reduced the friction properties of the surface towards the end of the runway and hence the effectiveness of brake application.)
  • B739, Singapore, 2013 (On 26 May 2013, about 20 minutes after arrival at Singapore for a turn round expected to last about an hour and with crew members on board, a Boeing 737-900 was suddenly rotated approximately 30 degrees about its main gear by a relatively modest wind gust and damaged by consequent impacts. The Investigation concluded that the movement had been due to the failure to follow manufacturer's guidance on both adequate chocking of the aircraft wheels and the order of hold loading. It was found that the Operator had not ensured that its ground handling agent at Singapore was properly instructed.)
  • B739, Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2015 (On 6 November 2015, a Boeing 737-900 overran the 2,200 metre-long landing runway at Yogyakarta after a tailwind approach with airspeed significantly above the applicable Vref followed by a long landing on a wet runway without optimum use of deceleration devices. The flight crew management of the situation once the aircraft had come to a stop was contrary to procedures in a number of important respects. The aircraft operator took extensive action to improve crew performance following the event. The Investigation found significant fault with the airport operator's awareness of runway surface condition and an absence of related significant risk management.)
  • B739, en-route, east of Denver CO USA, 2012 (On 31 July 2012, a Boeing 737-900 struck a single large bird whilst descending to land at Denver in day VMC and passing approximately 6000 feet aal, sustaining damage to the radome, one pitot head and the vertical stabiliser. The flight crew declared an emergency and continued the approach with ATC assistance to an uneventful landing. The bird involved was subsequently identified as a White Faced Ibis, a species which normally has a weight around 500 gm but can exceptionally reach a weight of 700 gm. The hole made in the radome was 60 cm x 30 cm.)