If you wish to contribute or participate in the discussions about articles you are invited to join SKYbrary as a registered user

 Actions

B732, Seattle WA USA, 2006

From SKYbrary Wiki

Summary
On 30 October 2006, at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington a Boeing 737-200 operated by Alaska Airlines, took off in daylight from a runway parallel to that which had been cleared with no actual adverse consequences.
Event Details
When October 2006
Actual or Potential
Event Type
Human Factors, Runway Incursion
Day/Night Day
Flight Conditions On Ground - Normal Visibility
Flight Details
Aircraft BOEING 737-200
Operator Alaska Airlines
Domicile United States
Type of Flight Public Transport (Passenger)
Origin Seattle-Tacoma
Intended Destination Juneau
Take off Commenced Yes
Flight Airborne Yes
Flight Completed Yes
Flight Phase Take Off
TOF
Location - Airport
Airport Seattle-Tacoma
HF
Tag(s) Distraction,
Ineffective Monitoring,
Spatial Disorientation
RI
Tag(s) Wrong Runway"Wrong Runway" is not in the list (ATC error, Accepted ATC Clearance not followed, Incursion pre Take off, Incursion after Landing, Runway Crossing, Intersecting Runways, Intersecting extended centrelines, Towed aircraft involved, Near Miss, Ground Collision, ...) of allowed values for the "RI" property.
Outcome
Damage or injury No
Causal Factor Group(s)
Group(s) Aircraft Operation
Safety Recommendation(s)
Group(s) None Made
Investigation Type
Type Independent

Description

On 30 October 2006, at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington a Boeing 737-200 operated by Alaska Airlines, took off in daylight from a runway parallel to that which had been cleared with no actual adverse consequences.

Synopsis

The official National Transportation Safety Board (USA) (NTSB) Report on the Serious Incident states:

"According to the captain of the flight, there was a short delay at the gate because of "a cargo issue." As a result, the flight crew had to correct the flight paperwork and obtain an amended release from dispatch. While at the gate, the first officer (FO) of the flight obtained the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information "Golf" and received the flight's air traffic control clearance via the aircraft communications addressing and reporting system. ATIS "Golf" indicated that both full-length and taxiway Q intersection takeoff operations were being conducted from runway 34R.

According to the flight crewmembers, during the delay at the gate, they performed a taxi briefing, which included a departure briefing from for runway 34R. After pushback from the gate, the ground controller instructed the flight to follow another airplane to runway 34R at taxiway Q.

The captain stated that he was taxiing slowly to allow time for dispatch to send the amended release. During the "short taxi," the captain handled the radios, and the FO worked with dispatch to complete the flight paperwork. As the flight approached taxiway Q, the FO received the amended release. The captain then switched over to the tower frequency and heard the local controller (LC) instruct the flight to taxi the airplane into position and hold on runway 34C. The captain stated that, even though he read back "34 center" to the controller, he was still thinking that the airplane would be taking off from runway 34R. During this time, the FO was completing the preflight activities.

The LC then issued the flight takeoff clearance from runway 34C and indicated that there was traffic on short final. The captain stated that he "was sure the tower controller said runway 34C" and "read back what he heard" but that he "was thinking runway 34R." As the airplane taxied onto the centerline, the captain conducted a compass check and then transferred control of the airplane to the FO. The airplane departed uneventfully from runway 34R. The flight crew stated that the first indication that the airplane had departed from the wrong runway was when the controller informed them after takeoff.

The Investigation

The NTSB determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

  • the flight crew's failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the incident was the flight crew's self-induced pressure to heed the takeoff clearance during a period of increased workload.

No Safety Recommendations are made in the Report.

Related Articles

Runway Excursion

Human Factors

Further Reading