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Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool (ASMT)
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The ASMT (Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool) is the unique EUROCONTROL tool for the detection, storage and analysis of ATM related events with a potential relevance for safety. For each detected event, that can be ATM related safety occurrence in a defined airspace, ASMT records multiple data on a dedicated server, from which it is possible to extract and review them, through radar tracks radar tracks, flight plans and safety nets data. When, according to criteria (parameters) that have been set in advance, a safety event occurs, data about the involved flights are recorded and stored in a database. The ASMT Human Machine Interface (HMI) can then be used to retrieve and replay the occurrence information, including flight plans and radar track data of involved aircraft. The ASMT also offers a module for simple statistical analyses. However, data can be queried and exported into formats that allow the use of third-party statistical tools, in case more advanced analysis should be needed. Data can be de-identified in order to keep identity of involved personnel undisclosed.
ASMT development started in the 1990 decade. Since then, several versions of the tool have been developed and detection modules added (see ASMT Factsheet, 2020)
Nowadays several ANSPs throughout the whole of Europe are using ASMT for different purposes.
High-level objectives of use
The key reason for the introduction of ASMT is to monitor safety related indicators, in order to improve the current safety performance.
Possible uses of the ASMT include:
- Safety monitoring and safety performance;
- Analysis of technical issues;
- Analysis of undesired events;
- Training support;
- Support to validation of operational concepts.
Safety monitoring and Safety performance
In this case, the end goal is the identification of safety issues, in order to inform the definition of safety improvement actions. Detailed objectives may include:
- Analysis of events distribution;
- Trend analysis:
- Identify unexpected variations;
- Verify whether the safety targets have been achieved;
- Detail the target to be achieved regarding the objectives for the next period;
- Formulate an expectation for possible future directions of the safety objectives;
- Identification of hotspots;
- Validation of operational changes;
- Correlation analysis.
Analysis of technical issues
This class of objectives groups the objectives aimed at identifying technical issues at a systemic level in order to support the definition of technical improvement actions, including:
- Analysis of surveillance anomalies;
- Analysis of SNETs performance;
- Trend analysis;
- Identification of hotspots.
Analysis of undesired events
This objective aims at providing investigators additional opportunities to become aware of undesired events (e.g. marginal losses of separation that could occur unnoticed, level busts etc.) and to facilitate the collection of data related to safety occurrences.
This class of objectives groups the use cases aimed at supporting training of ATC personnel. ASMT, in fact, can be a useful tool to review events and support ATCO training, since patterns identified in single events can be used as examples of typical situations in which safety margins are compromised. Again, data shall be de-identified according to ASMT CONOPS provisions, at the level deemed the most appropriate to ensure that no attribution of blame shall be possible. It includes:
- Replay of occurrences suitable for training purposes;
- Support to risk awareness campaigns;
- Analysis of occurrences.
Support to validation of operational concepts
This class of ASMT usage groups the objectives aimed at supporting validation of new/changed operational concepts (new airspace structure and/or operational procedures), e.g. in the context of real time simulations and includes:
- Collection of safety data in simulated environments;
- Collection of data about the performance of new or modified safety nets;
- Support to measurement of KPI in the validation process.
ASMT output sharing
These are the objectives aimed at sharing the results obtained by analysing the ASMT data. The basic principle is to share specific results and sets of data with organisations that are external to the ANSP, following the principles of Just Culture. This means that no attribution of blame shall be possible through the review of the data which, for this reason, shall be de-identified at the level that is deemed the most appropriate. An ASMT Agreement has been developed with regard to the Just Culture principles. This Agreement is signed by EUROCONTROL and the ANSP and is reinforced during the deployment by the development of an ASMT policy. It can include:
- ASMT policy linked with the organisation’s Just Culture policy
- ASMT output sharing internal to the organisation and with other ANSPs;
- Safety data promotion;
- Exchange of relevant safety information with stakeholders.
ASMT Factsheet, EUROCONTROL, March 2020.
- Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement
- Monitoring of ATM Safety Performance
- Safety Occurrence Reporting
- Flight Data Monitoring (FDM)
- Safety Tools Complementarity in the context of FAB, EUROCONTROL, May 2015.
- Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool- Safety Performance Monitoring in FAB Context, Dr F. Lieutaud, EUROCONTROL, May 2015.
- ASMT v5: Safety Tools to Support SMS-Implementation at Regional Level, Dr F. Lieutaud & C. Valbonesi, EUROCONTROL, May 2015.
- ASMT-Considerations for FAB Implementation, Dr F. Lieutaud & C. Valbonesi, EUROCONTROL, May 2015.
- Automatic Tools in Support of ATM Performance - ASMT Application to the validation of airspace design at ROMATSA, B. Donciu, 2011
- Airborne and Ground Based Safety Nets make a positive difference in ATM Safety - Application in Real Time Operations & Operational Monitoring. Ground Based SAFNET for Operational Monitoring Identifying positive deviance - Safety performance monitoring, EUROCONTROL, Safety Forum 2016, Brussels 07-08 June 2016.
- Coupling and Complexity of Interaction of STCA Networks, F. Lillo, S. Pozzi, A. Tedeschi et al.
- Safety Monitoring in the Age of Big Data - From Description to Intervention, S. Pozzi et al., 2011.