If you wish to contribute or participate in the discussions about articles you are invited to join SKYbrary as a registered user


A320 Family

From SKYbrary Wiki

Article Information
Category: Aircraft Family Aircraft Family
Content source: SKYbrary About SKYbrary


The A320 family includes:

Aircraft Family Members
ICAO Type Designator Name Length (m)
AIRBUS A-318 AIRBUS A-318 31.44 m
AIRBUS A-319 AIRBUS A-319 33.84 m
AIRBUS A-319neo AIRBUS A-319neo 33.84 m
AIRBUS A-320 AIRBUS A-320 37.57 m
AIRBUS A-320neo AIRBUS A-320neo 37.57 m
AIRBUS A-321 AIRBUS A-321 44.51 m
AIRBUS A-321neo AIRBUS A-321neo 44.51 m


Aircraft A320 A320neo A318 A319 A319neo A321 A321neo
Overall Length 37.57 m123.261 ft
37.57 m123.261 ft
31.44 m103.15 ft
33.84 m111.024 ft
33.84 m111.024 ft
44.51 m146.03 ft
44.51 m146.03 ft
Wingspan 35.8 m117.454 ft
35.8 m117.454 ft
34.1 m111.877 ft
35.8 m117.454 ft
35.8 m117.454 ft
35.8 m117.454 ft
35.8 m117.454 ft
Engines 2 x CFM56-5A1 (111kN) or
2 x CFM56-5A3 (118kN) or
2 x IAE V2500 (125kN) turbofans.
2 x PW 1100G (120kN) or
2 x CFM LEAP-1A (109-156kN) turbofans
2 x PW6000A (90kN) or
2 x CFM 56-5B (98kN) turbofans.
2 x CFM56-5B (98kN) or
2 x IAE V2524-A5 (104.6kN) turbofans.
2 x PW 1100G (110kN) or
2 x CFM LEAP-1A (109-156kN) turbofans
2 x CFM56-5B1 (133kN) or
2 x IAE V2530-A5 (133kN) turbofans.
2 x PW 1100G (150kN) or
2 x CFM LEAP-1A (109-156kN) turbofans
Typical passenger seating 150 107 124 185
Range 2,700 nm5,000,400 m
5,000.4 km
16,405,511.823 ft
3,500 nm6,482,000 m
6,482 km
21,266,404.215 ft
3,100 nm5,741,200 m
5,741.2 km
18,835,958.019 ft
1,800 nm3,333,600 m
3,333.6 km
10,937,007.882 ft
3,750 nm6,945,000 m
6,945 km
22,785,433.088 ft
3,300 nm6,111,600 m
6,111.6 km
20,051,181.117 ft
3,500 nm6,482,000 m
6,482 km
21,266,404.215 ft
Maximum takeoff weight 73.5 tonnes73,500 kg
73.5 tonnes73,500 kg
59 tonnes59,000 kg
64 tonnes64,000 kg
64 tonnes64,000 kg
89 tonnes89,000 kg
93.5 tonnes93,500 kg

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving A320 Family

  • A318 / B738, en-route, Trasadingen Switzerland, 2009 (On 8 June 2009, an Airbus A318-100 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Belgrade, Serbia to Paris CDG in day VMC came into conflict with a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Ryanair on a scheduled passenger flight from Nottingham East Midlands UK to Bergamo Italy. The conflict was resolved mainly by TCAS RA response and there were no injuries to any occupants during the avoidance manoeuvres carried out by both aircraft.)
  • A318/B738, Nantes France, 2010 (On 25 May 2010 an Air France Airbus A318 making an automatic landing off an ILS Cat 2 approach at Nantes experienced interference with the ILS LOC signal caused by a Boeing 737-800 which was departing from the same runway but early disconnection of the AP removed any risk of un-correctable directional control problems during the landing roll. Both aircraft were operating in accordance with their ATC clearances. Investigation attributed the conflict to the decision of TWR not to instruct the A318 to go around and because of diminished situational awareness.)
  • A318/B739, vicinity Amsterdam Netherlands, 2007 (On 6 December 2007 an Airbus A318 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Lyon to Amsterdam carried out missed approach from runway 18C at destination and lost separation in night VMC against a Boeing 737-900 being operated by KLM on a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to London Heathrow which had just departed from runway 24. The conflict was resolved by correct responses to the respective coordinated TCAS RAs after which the A318 passed close behind the 737. There were no abrupt manoeuvres and none of the 104 and 195 occupants respectively on board were injured.)
  • PC12 /A318, en-route north east of Toulouse France, 2010 (On 2 June 2010, an A318 crew en route from over southern France as cleared at FL290 just managed to avoid collision with a Pilatus PC12 making a non revenue positioning flight on the same track and in the same direction after detection of slight and unexpected turbulence had prompted a visual scan ahead. Earlier, the PC12 pilot cleared at FL270 had observed a difference between his available two altimeters but after getting confirmation from ATC that the altimeter on the side which also had an invalid airspeed reading was correct had assumed that one was the correctly reading one.)
  • A319 / A320, Naha Okinawa Japan, 2012 (On 5 July 2012, an Airbus A319 entered its departure runway at Naha without clearance ahead of an A320 already cleared to land on the same runway. The A320 was sent around. The Investigation concluded that the A319 crew - three pilots including one with sole responsibility for radio communications and a commander supervising a trainee Captain occupying the left seat - had misunderstood their clearance and their incorrect readback had not been detected by the TWR controller. It was concluded that the controller's non-use of a headset had contributed to failure to detect the incorrect readback.)
  • A319 / A321, en-route, west north west of Geneva, Switzerland 2011 (On 6 August 2011 an Easyjet Airbus A319 on which First Officer Line Training was in progress exceeded its cleared level during the climb after a different level to that correctly read back was set on the FMS. As a result, it came into conflict with an Alitalia A321 and this was resolved by responses to coordinated TCAS RAs. STCA alerts did not enable ATC resolution of the conflict and it was concluded that a lack of ATC capability to receive Mode S EHS DAPs - since rectified - was a contributory factor to the outcome.)
  • A319 / B735, vicinity Prague Czech Republic, 2012 (On 7 September 2012, the crew of an Air France Airbus A319 failed to follow their arrival clearance at destination and turned directly towards the ILS FAF and thereby into conflict with a Boeing 737-500 on an ILS approach. When instructed to turn left (and clear of the ILS) by the controller, the crew replied that they were "following standard arrival" which was not the case. As the separation between the two aircraft reduced, the controller repeated the instruction to the A319 to turn left and this was acknowledged. Minimum lateral separation was 1.7nm, sufficient to activate STCA.)
  • A319 / B737, Zurich Switzerland, 2002 (On 23 November 2002, an A319, landing on Rwy16 at Zurich Switzerland, narrowly missed collision with a B737 cleared for take off on an intersecting runway.)
  • A319 / B738 / B738, en-route, near Lausanne Switzerland, 2013 (On 26 May 2013, an A319 in Swiss Class 'C' airspace received a TCAS 'Level Off' RA against a 737 above after being inadvertently given an incorrect climb clearance by ATC. The opposing higher-altitude 737 began a coordinated RA climb from level flight and this triggered a second conflict with another 737 also in the cruise 1000 feet above which resulted in coordinated TCAS RAs for both these aircraft. Correct response to all RAs resulted in resolution of both conflicts after prescribed minimum separations had been breached to as low as 1.5nm when 675 feet apart vertically.)
  • A319 / B744, en-route near Oroville WA USA, 2008 (On 10 January 2008, an Air Canada Airbus A319 en route over the north western USA encountered unexpected sudden wake vortex turbulence from an in trail Boeing 747-400 nearly 11nm ahead to which the pilots who then responded with potentially hazardous flight control inputs which led to reversion to Alternate Control Law and aggravated the external /disturbance to the aircraft trajectory with roll up to 55° and an unintended descent of 1400 feet which with cabin service in progress and sea belt signs off led to cabin service carts hitting the cabin ceiling and several passenger injuries, some serious.)
  • A319 / PRM1, en-route, near Fribourg Switzerland, 2011 (On 10 June 2011 an ATC error put a German Wings A319 and a Hahn Air Raytheon 390 on conflicting tracks over Switzerland and a co-ordinated TCAS RA followed. The aircraft subsequently passed in very close proximity without either sighting the other after the Hahn Air crew, contrary to Company procedures, followed an ATC descent clearance issued during their TCAS ‘Climb’ RA rather than continuing to fly the RA. The Investigation could find no explanation for this action by the experienced crew - both Hahn Air management pilots. The recorded CPA was 0.6 nm horizontally at 50 feet vertically.)
  • A319 / UNKN, Stockholm Arlanda Sweden, 2011 (On 5 February 2011, an Airbus A319-100 being operated by Air Berlin on a passenger flight departing Stockholm inadvertently proceeded beyond the given clearance limit for runway 19R and although it subsequently stopped before runway entry had occurred, it was by then closer to high speed departing traffic than it should have been. There was no abrupt stop and none of the 103 occupants were injured.)
  • A319, Belfast Aldergrove UK, 2011 (On 6 January 2011 an Easyjet Airbus A319 experienced the sudden onset of thick "smoke" in the cabin as the aircraft cleared the runway after landing. The aircraft was stopped and an evacuation was carried out during which one of the 52 occupants received a minor injury. The subsequent investigation attributed the occurrence to the continued use of reverse idle thrust after clearing the runway onto a little used taxiway where the quantity of de-ice fluid residue was much greater than on the runway.)
  • A319, Casablanca Morocco, 2011 (On 8 August 2011 an Air France Airbus A319 crew failed to correctly identify the runway on which they were cleared to land off a visual approach at Casablanca and instead landed on the parallel runway. ATC, who had already cleared another aircraft to cross the same runway, did not notice until this other aircraft crew, who had noticed the apparently abnormal position of the approaching aircraft and remained clear of the runway as a precaution, advised what had happened. Investigation was hindered by the stated perception of the Air France PIC that the occurrence was not a Serious Incident.)
  • A319, Copenhagen Denmark, 2012 (On 21 September 2012, an SAS A319 which had just landed normally under the control of an experienced pilot left the paved surface when attempting to make a turn off the RET at a taxi speed greater than appropriate. The pilot was familiar with the airport layout and the misjudgement was attributed in part to the fact that the pilot involved had recently converted to their first Airbus type after a long period operating the DC9/MD80/90 series which had a different pilot eye height and was fitted with steel rather than the more modern carbon brakes.)
  • A319, Ibiza Spain, 2016 (On 19 June 2016, an Airbus A320 failed to follow the clearly-specified and ground-marked self-positioning exit from a regularly used gate at Ibiza and its right wing tip collided with the airbridge, damaging both it and the aircraft. The Investigation found that the crew had attempted the necessary left turn using the Operator’s ‘One Engine Taxi Departure’ procedure using the left engine but then failed to follow the marked taxi guideline by a significant margin. It was noted that there had been no other such difficulties with the same departure in the previous four years it had been in use.)
  • A319, Las Vegas NV USA, 2006 (On 30 January 2006 the Captain of an Airbus A319 inadvertently lined up and commenced a night rolling take off from Las Vegas on the runway shoulder instead of the runway centreline despite the existence of an illuminated lead on line to the centre of the runway from the taxiway access used. The aircraft was realigned at speed and the take off was completed. ATC were not advised and broken edge light debris presented a potential hazard to other aircraft until eventually found. The Investigation found that other similar events on the same runway had not been reported at all.)
  • A319, London Heathrow UK, 2007 (On 12 February 2007, an Airbus A319-100 being operated by British Airways on a scheduled passenger flight into London Heathrow made unintended contact in normal daylight visibility with the stationary airbridge at the arrival gate. This followed an emergency stop made after seeing hand signals from ground staff whilst following SEGS indications which appeared to suggest that there was a further 5 metres to run to the correct parking position. There was no damage to the aircraft, only minimal damage to the airbridge and there were no injuries to the aircraft occupants or any other person)
  • A319, London Heathrow UK, 2009 (On 15 March 2009, an Airbus A319-100 being operated by British Airways on a scheduled passenger flight from London Heathrow to Edinburgh experienced an electrical malfunction which blanked the EFIS displays following engine start with some electrical fumes but no smoke. The engines were shut down, a PAN was declared to ATC and the aircraft was towed back onto the gate where passengers disembarked normally via the airbridge.)
  • A319, London Heathrow UK, 2013 (On 24 May 2013 the fan cowl doors on both engines of an Airbus A319 detached as it took off from London Heathrow. Their un-latched status after a routine maintenance input had gone undetected. Extensive structural and system damage resulted and a fire which could not be extinguished until the aircraft was back on the ground began in one engine. Many previously-recorded cases of fan cowl door loss were noted but none involving such significant collateral damage. Safety Recommendations were made on aircraft type certification in general, A320-family aircraft modification, maintenance fatigue risk management and aircrew procedures and training.)
  • A319, Luton UK, 2012 (On 14 February 2011, an Easyjet Airbus A319 being flown by a trainee Captain under supervision initiated a go around from below 50 feet agl after a previously stabilised approach at Luton and a very hard three point landing followed before the go around climb could be established. The investigation found that the Training Captain involved, although experienced, had only limited aircraft type experience and that, had he taken control before making a corrective sidestick input opposite to that of the trainee, it would have had the full instead of a summed effect and may have prevented hard runway contact.)
  • A319, Montego Bay Jamaica, 2014 (On 10 May 2014 the crew of an Airbus A319 failed to manage their daylight non-precision approach at destination effectively and it culminated in a very hard touchdown which exceeded landing gear design criteria. The Investigation concluded that the comprehensively poor performance of both pilots during the preparation for and execution of the approach could be attributed to both their repeated failure to follow SOPs and retain adequate situational awareness and to a failure of the aircraft operator to fully deliver effective training even though both this training and its SMS met relevant regulatory requirements and guidance.)
  • A319, Mumbai India, 2013 (On 12 April 2013, an Airbus A319 landed without clearance on a runway temporarily closed for routine inspection after failing to check in with TWR following acceptance of the corresponding frequency change. Two vehicles on the runway saw the aircraft approaching on short final and successfully vacated. The Investigation concluded that the communication failure was attributable entirely to the Check Captain who was in command of the flight involved and was acting as 'Pilot Monitoring'. It was considered that the error was probably attributable to the effects of operating through the early hours during which human alertness is usually reduced.)
  • A319, Santiago de Compostela Spain, 2016 (On 10 October 2016, an Airbus 319 was cleared to divert to its first alternate after failing to land off its Cat II ILS approach at Porto and obliged to land at its second alternate with less than final reserve fuel after the first alternate declined acceptance due to lack of parking capacity. The Investigation concluded that adjacent ATC Unit coordination in respect of multiple diversions was inadequate and also found that the crew had failed to adequately appraise ATC of their fuel status. It also noted that the unsuccessful approach at the intended destination had violated approach ban visibility conditions.)
  • A319, en-route, Free State Province South Africa, 2008 (On 7 September 2008 a South African Airways Airbus A319 en route from Cape Town to Johannesburg at FL370 received an ECAM warning of the failure of the No 1 engine bleed system. The crew then closed the No. 1 engine bleed with the applicable press button on the overhead panel. The cabin altitude started to increase dramatically and the cockpit crew advised ATC of the pressurisation problem and requested an emergency descent to a lower level. During the emergency descent to 11000 ft amsl, the cabin altitude warning sounded at 33000ft and the flight crew activated the cabin oxygen masks. The APU was started and pressurisation was re-established at 15000ft amsl. The crew completed the flight to the planned destination without any further event. The crew and passengers sustained no injuries and no damage was caused to the aircraft.)
  • A319, en-route, Nantes France, 2006 (On 15 September 2006, an Easyjet Airbus A319, despatched under MEL provision with one engine generator inoperative and the corresponding electrical power supplied by the Auxiliary Power Unit generator, suffered a further en route electrical failure which included power loss to all COM radio equipment which could not then be re-instated. The flight was completed as flight planned using the remaining flight instruments with the one remaining transponder selected to the standard emergency code. The incident began near Nantes, France.)
  • A319, en-route, east of Dublin Ireland, 2008 (On 27 May 2008 an Airbus A319-100 being operated by Germanwings on a scheduled passenger flight from Dublin to Cologne was 30nm east of Dublin and passing FL100 in the climb in unrecorded daylight flight conditions when the Purser advised the flight crew by intercom that “something was wrong”, that almost all the passengers had fallen asleep, and that at least one of the cabin crew seated nearby was “unresponsive”. Following a review of this information and a check of the ECAM pressurisation page which showed no warnings or failures, a decision was taken to don oxygen masks and the aircraft returned uneventfully to Dublin without any further adverse effects on the 125 occupants. A MAYDAY was declared during the diversion.)
  • A319, south of London UK, 2005 (On 22 October 2005, a British Airways Airbus A319 climbing en route to destination over south east England at night in VMC experienced a major but temporary electrical failure. Most services were re-instated within a short time and the flight was continued. However, during the subsequent Investigation, which took over two years, a series of significant deficiencies were identified in the design of the A320 series electrical system and the manufacturer-recommended responses to failures in it and in response, Airbus developed solutions to most of them.)
  • A319, vicinity Tunis Tunisia, 2012 (On 24 March 2012, an Air France Airbus A319 Captain continued descent towards destination Tunis at high speed with the landing runway in sight well beyond the point where a stabilised approach was possible. With 5nm to go, airspeed was over 100 KIAS above the applicable VApp and the aircraft was descending at over 4000fpm with flaps zero. EGPWS activations for Sink Rate, PULL UP and Too Low Terrain apparently went unnoticed but at 400 feet agl, ATC granted a crew request for a 360° turn. The subsequent approach/landing was without further event. Investigation attributed the event to “sloppy CRM”.)
  • A319, vicinity Wuxi China, 2010 (On 14 September 2010, the crew of a Sichuan Airlines Airbus A319 continued an ILS approach into Wuxi despite awareness of adverse convective weather conditions at the airport. Their inattention to automation management then led to a low energy warning and the inappropriate response to this led to the activation of flight envelope protection quickly followed by a stall warning. Inappropriate response to this was followed by loss of control and a full stall and high rate of descent from which recovery was finally achieved less than 900 feet agl.)
  • A319, vicinity Zurich Switzerland, 2014 (On 17 October 2014, two recently type-qualified Airbus A319 pilots responded in a disorganised way after a sudden malfunction soon after take-off from Zurich required one engine to be shutdown. The return to land was flown manually and visually at an excessive airspeed and rate of descent with idle thrust on the remaining engine all the way to a touchdown which occurred without a landing clearance. The Investigation concluded that the poor performance of the pilots had been founded on a lack of prior analysis of the situation, poor CRM and non-compliance with system management and operational requirements.)
  • A319/A319, en-route, South west of Basle-Mulhouse France, 2010 (On 29 June 2010, an Easyjet Switzerland Airbus A319 inbound to Basle-Mulhouse and an Air France Airbus A319 outbound from Basle-Mulhouse lost separation after an error made by a trainee APP controller under OJTI supervision during procedural service. The outcome was made worse by the excessive rate of climb of the Air France aircraft approaching its cleared level and both an inappropriate response to an initial preventive TCAS RA and a change of track during the ensuing short sequence of RAs by the Training Captain in command of and flying the Easyjet aircraft attributed by him to his situational ‘anxiety’.)
  • A319/A332, vicinity Barcelona Spain, 2012 (On 8 February 2012, a TCAS RA occurred between an Airbus A330 and an Airbus A319 both under ATC control for landing on runway 25R at Barcelona as a result of an inappropriate plan to change the sequence. The opposite direction aircraft both followed their respective RAs and minimum separation was 1.4 nm horizontally and 400 feet vertically. The Investigation noted that the use of Spanish to communicate with one aircraft and English to communicate with the other had compromised situational awareness of the crew of the latter who had also not had visual contact with the other aircraft.)
  • A319/B733, en-route, near Moutiers France, 2010 (On 8 July 2010 an Easyjet Airbus A319 on which line training was being conducted mis-set a descent level despite correctly reading it back and, after subsequently failing to notice an ATC re-iteration of the same cleared level, continued descent to 1000 feet below it in day VMC and into conflict with crossing traffic at that level, a Boeing 737. The 737 received and actioned a TCAS RA ‘CLIMB’ and the A319, which received only a TCAS TA, was given an emergency turn by ATC. The recorded CPA was 2.2 nm and 125 feet.)
  • A333 / A319, en-route, east of Lashio Myanmar, 2017 (On 3 May 2017, an Airbus A330 and an Airbus A319 lost prescribed separation whilst tracking in opposite directions on a radar-controlled ATS route in eastern Myanmar close to the Chinese border. The Investigation found that the response of the A330 crew to a call for another aircraft went undetected and they descended to the same level as the A319 with the lost separation only being mitigated by intervention from the neighbouring Chinese ACC which was able to give the A319 an avoiding action turn. At the time of the conflict, the A330 had disappeared from the controlling ACCs radar.)
  • B733, Nashville TN USA, 2015 (On 15 December 2015, a Boeing 737-300 crew inadvertently taxied their aircraft off the side of the taxiway into a ditch whilst en route to the gate after landing at Nashville in normal night visibility. Substantial damage was caused to the aircraft after collapse of the nose landing gear and some passengers sustained minor injuries during a subsequent cabin crew-initiated evacuation. The Investigation found that taxiing had continued when it became difficult to see the taxiway ahead in the presence of apron lighting glare after all centreline and edge lighting in that area had been inadvertently switched off by ATC.)
  • B738 / A319, Dublin Ireland, 2010 (On 16 October 2010, in day VMC, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Turkish Airlines on a passenger flight from Dublin to Istanbul entered runway 28 at Dublin whilst an Airbus A319 being operated by Germanwings on a scheduled passenger flight from Koln to Dublin was about 0.5nm from touchdown on the same runway. The Airbus immediately initiated a missed approach from approximately 200 ft aal simultaneously with an ATC call to do so.)
  • B738, en-route, near Lugano Switzerland, 2012 (On 4 April 2012, the cabin pressurisation controller (CPC) on a Boeing 737-800 failed during the climb passing FL305 and automatic transfer to the alternate CPC was followed by a loss of cabin pressure control and rapid depressurisation because it had been inadvertently installed with the shipping plug fitted. An emergency descent and diversion followed. The subsequent Investigation attributed the failure to remove the shipping plug to procedural human error and the poor visibility of the installed plug. It was also found that "the pressurisation system ground test after CPC installation was not suitable to detect the error".)
  • B738/A319 en-route, south east of Zurich Switzerland, 2013 (On 12 April 2013, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 took a climb clearance intended for another Ryanair aircraft on the same frequency. The aircraft for which the clearance was intended did not respond and the controller did not notice that the clearance readback had come from a different aircraft. Once the wrong aircraft began to climb, from FL360 to FL380, a TCAS RA to descend occurred due to traffic just transferred to a different frequency and at FL370. That traffic received a TCAS RA to climb. STCA was activated at the ATS Unit controlling both Ryanair aircraft.)
  • GLF5 / A319, south-eastern France, 2004 (On 16 September 2004, a loss of separation occurred over Geneva between Air France A319 and a Gulfstream 5 which commenced descent without clearance by ATC and with coordinated TCAS RAs not followed by either aircraft.)
  • MD82 / A319, vicinity Helsinki Finland, 2007 (On 5 September 2007 in day VMC, an MD82 being operated by SAS was obliged to carry out an own-initiative avoiding action orbit in day VMC against an Airbus A319 being operated by Finnair on a scheduled passenger after conflict when about to join final approach. Both aircraft were following ATC instructions which, in the case of the MD 82, had not included maintaining own separation so that the applicable separation minima were significantly breached.)
  • ULAC / A319 vicinity Southend UK, 2013 (On 18 July 2013, an Airbus A319 level at 2000 feet QNH in Class G airspace and being radar vectored towards an ILS approach at Southend in day VMC had a sudden but brief base leg encounter with a paramotor which was not visible on radar and was seen too late for avoiding action to be practicable, before passing within an estimated 50 metres of the A319. The paramotor pilot could not subsequently be traced. The Investigation made a safety recommendation to the UK CAA to "review the regulation and licensing of paramotor pilots".)
  • A319 / A320, Naha Okinawa Japan, 2012 (On 5 July 2012, an Airbus A319 entered its departure runway at Naha without clearance ahead of an A320 already cleared to land on the same runway. The A320 was sent around. The Investigation concluded that the A319 crew - three pilots including one with sole responsibility for radio communications and a commander supervising a trainee Captain occupying the left seat - had misunderstood their clearance and their incorrect readback had not been detected by the TWR controller. It was concluded that the controller's non-use of a headset had contributed to failure to detect the incorrect readback.)
  • A320 / A139 vicinity Zurich Switzerland, 2012 (On 29 May 2012, a British Airways Airbus A320 departing Zürich and in accordance with its SID in a climbing turn received and promptly and correctly actioned a TCAS RA 'CLIMB'. The conflict which caused this was with an AW 139 also departing Zürich IFR in accordance with a SID but, as this aircraft was only equipped with a TAS to TCAS 1 standard, the crew independently determined from their TA that they should descend and did so. The conflict, in Class 'C' airspace, was attributed to inappropriate clearance issue by the TWR controller and their inappropriate separation monitoring thereafter.)
  • A320 / A320, Zurich Switzerland, 2011 (On 15 March 2011 two Swiss International Airlines’ Airbus A320 aircraft were cleared for simultaneous take off on intersecting runways at Zurich by the same controller. As both approached the intersection at high speed, the Captain of one saw the other and immediately rejected take off from 130 knots, stopping just at the edge of the intersection shortly after the other aircraft had flown low overhead unaware of the conflict. The Investigation noted a long history of similar incidents at Zurich and concluded that systemic failure of risk management had not been addressed by the air traffic control agency involved.)
  • A320 / A321, vicinity Barcelona Spain, 2016 (On 25 July 2016, an Airbus A320 and an Airbus A321 both departing Barcelona and following their ATC instructions came into conflict and the collision risk was removed by the TCAS RA CLIMB response of the A320. Minimum separation was 1.2 nm laterally and 200 feet vertically with visual acquisition of the other traffic by both aircraft. The Investigation found that the controller involved had become preoccupied with an inbound traffic de-confliction task elsewhere in their sector and, after overlooking the likely effect of the different rates of climb of the aircraft, had not regarded monitoring their separation as necessary.)
  • A320 / A346, en-route, Eastern Indian Ocean, 2012 (On 18 January 2012, ATC error resulted in two aircraft on procedural clearances in oceanic airspace crossing the same waypoint within an estimated 2 minutes of each other without the prescribed 1000 feet vertical separation when the prescribed minimum separation was 15 minutes unless that vertical separation existed. By the time ATC identified the loss of separation and sent a CPDLC message to the A340 to descend in order to restore separation, the crew advised that such action was already being taken. The Investigation identified various organisational deficiencies relating to the provision of procedural service by the ANSP concerned.)
  • A320 / AT76, Yangon Myanmar, 2017 (On 18 September 2017, a departing Airbus A320 was instructed to line up and wait at Yangon but not given takeoff clearance until an ATR72 was less than a minute from touchdown and the prevailing runway traffic separation standard was consequently breached. The Investigation found that the TWR controller had been a temporarily unsupervised trainee who, despite good daylight visibility, had instructed the A320 to line up and wait and then forgotten about it. When the A320 crew, aware of the approaching ATR72, reminded her, she “did not know what to do” and the trainee APP controller had to intervene.)
  • A320 / B738 Barcelona Spain, 2012 (On 27 May 2012, an Airbus A320 departing Barcelona was cleared by GND to taxi across an active runway on which a Boeing 737-800 was about to land. Whilst still moving but before entering the runway, the A320 crew, aware of the aircraft on approach, queried their crossing clearance but the instruction to stop was given too late to stop before crossing the unlit stop bar. The 737 was instructed to go around and there was no actual risk of collision. The Investigation attributed the controller error to lack of familiarisation with the routine runway configuration change in progress.)
  • A320 / B738, en-route, near Córdoba Spain, 2014 (On 30 October 2014, a descending Airbus A320 came close to a Boeing 737-800 at around FL 220 after the A320 crew significantly exceeded a previously-instructed 2,000 fpm maximum rate of descent assuming it no longer applied when not reiterated during re-clearance to a lower altitude. Their response to a TCAS RA requiring descent at not above 1,000 fpm was to further increase it from 3,200 fpm. Lack of notification delayed the start of an independent Investigation but it eventually found that although the A320 TCAS equipment had been serviceable, its crew denied failing to correctly follow their initial RA.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Dubai UAE, 2012 (On 22 April 2012, an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737 came into close proximity near Dubai whilst on the same ATC frequency and correctly following their ATC clearances shortly after they had departed at night from Sharjah and Dubai respectively. The Investigation found that correct response by both aircraft to coordinated TCAS RAs eliminated any risk of collision. The fact that the controller involved had only just taken over the radar position involved and was only working the two aircraft in conflict was noted, as was the absence of STCA at the unit due to set up difficulties.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Launceston Australia, 2008 (On 1 May 2008 an Airbus A320-200 being operated by JetStar on a scheduled passenger flight from Melbourne to Launceston, Tasmania was making a missed approach from runway 32L when it came into close proximity in night VMC with a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Virgin Blue and also inbound to Launceston from Melbourne which was manoeuvring about 5nm north west of the airport after carrying out a similar missed approach. Minimum separation was 3 nm at the same altitude and the situation was fully resolved by the A320 climbing to 4000 feet.)
  • A320 / B739, Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2013 (On 20 November 2013, an A320 misunderstood its taxi out clearance at Yogyakarta and began to enter the same runway on which a Boeing 737, which had a valid landing clearance but was not on TWR frequency, was about to touch down from an approach in the other direction of use. On seeing the A320, which had stopped with the nose of the aircraft protruding onto the runway, the 737 applied maximum manual braking and stopped just before reaching the A320. The Investigation faulted ATC and airport procedures as well as the A320 crew for contributing to the risk created.)
  • A320 / B789 / A343, San Francisco CA USA, 2017 (On 7 July 2017 the crew of an Airbus A320, cleared for an approach and landing on runway 28R at San Francisco in night VMC, lined up for the visual approach for which it had been cleared on the occupied parallel taxiway instead of the runway extended centreline and only commenced a go-around at the very last minute, having descended to about 60 feet agl whilst flying over two of the four aircraft on the taxiway. The Investigation determined that the sole direct cause of the event was the poor performance of the A320 flight crew.)
  • A320 / C56X, vicinity Geneva Switzerland, 2011 (On 17 August 2012, a Swiss A320 being positioned under radar vectors for arrival at Geneva was inadvertently vectored into conflict with a Cessna Citation already established on the ILS LOC for runway 23 at Geneva. Controller training was in progress and the Instructor had just taken control because of concerns at the actions of the Trainee. An error by the Instructor was recognised and de-confliction instructions were given but a co-ordinated TCAS RA still subsequently occurred. STCA was activated but constraints on access to both visual and aural modes of the system served to diminish its value.)
  • A320 / CRJ2, Port Elizabeth South Africa, 2014 (On 10 July 2014, the crew of a Bombardier CRJ200 on a visual go around from an approach to runway 26 at Port Elizabeth took visual avoiding action overhead of the aerodrome to ensure safe separation from an Airbus A320 which had just taken off. Both aircraft also received TCAS RAs. Minimum achieved separation from radar was 370 metres laterally and 263 feet vertically. The Investigation noted that the go around resulted from the TWR controller, who was supervising a student controller, clearing the A320 to enter the runway and take off when the CRJ200 was on short final to land.)
  • A320 / CRJ2, Sofia Bulgaria, 2007 (On 13 April 2007 in day VMC, an Air France A320 departing Sofia lined up contrary to an ATC Instruction to remain at the holding point and be ready immediate. The controller did not immediately notice and after subsequently giving a landing clearance for the same runway, was obliged to cancel it send the approaching aircraft around. An Investigation attributed the incursion to both the incorrect terminology used by TWR and the failure to challenge the incomplete clearance read back by the A320 crew.)
  • A320 / F50, Adelaide Australia, 2016 (On 17 August 2016, a Fokker F50 crossed an active runway at Adelaide ahead of an A320 which was about to land after both its pilots and the controller involved had made assumptions about the content of radio transmissions they were aware they had not fully heard. The Investigation found that the A320 crew had responded promptly to the potential conflict by initiating a low go around over the other aircraft and noted that stop bars were not installed at Adelaide. In addition, aircraft taxiing across active runways were not required to obtain their crossing clearances on the runway control frequency.)
  • A320 / GLID, vicinity Memmingen Germany, 2015 (On 6 April 2015, the crew of an A320 under radar control in Class E airspace and approaching 4000 feet made a very late sighting of a glider being flown by a student pilot which appeared ahead at a similar altitude. The glider pilot reported having seen a 'cone of light' coming towards him. Both aircraft took avoiding action as practicable and passed within a recorded 450 metres with the A320 passing an estimated 250 feet over the glider. The glider was not fitted with a transponder and was not required to be, and the controller had only secondary radar.)
  • A320 / SW4, Calgary AB Canada, 2016 (On 2 December 2016, the crew of an Airbus A320 passing 100 knots on takeoff at Calgary saw another aircraft crossing an intersection ahead but continued because they considered that, as the other aircraft was already more than half way across, it would be clear before they reached that point. The Investigation found that the GND Controller had cleared the other aircraft to cross after forgetting that the runway was active and under TWR control. It was concluded that the response of the ANSP SMS process to a history of identical controller errors and related reports had been inadequate.)
  • A320, Auckland New Zealand, 2017 (On 27 October 2017, an Airbus A320 returned to Auckland after advice from ATC that the right engine may have been affected by ingestion of FOD during engine start - a clipboard and paper left just inside the right hand engine by an employee of the airline’s ground handling contractor acting as the aircraft loading supervisor. The subsequent inspection found paper throughout the engine and minor damage to an engine fan blade and the fan case attrition liner. The Dispatcher overseeing the departure said she had seen the clipboard inside the engine but assumed it would be retrieved before departure.)
  • A320, Ballykelly Northern Ireland UK, 2006 (On 29 March 2006, an Eirjet Airbus 320 was operating a scheduled passenger flight from Liverpool to Londonderry Airport in Northern Ireland for Ryanair in daylight. At 8nm from LDY, the operating crew reported that they were having problems with the ILS glideslope on approach to Runway 26. They judged that they were too high to carry out a safe landing from the ILS approach and requested permission from ATC to carry out a visual approach. The aircraft, with the commander as PF, then flew a right hand descending orbit followed by a visual circuit from which it landed. Upon landing, the crew were advised by Londonderry ATC, who had had the aircraft in sight when it called Finals and had then cleared it to land that they had, in fact, landed at Ballykelly airfield, a military helicopter base 5nm to the east-north-east of Londonderry.)
  • A320, Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg France, 2014 (On 6 October 2014, an A320 crew requested, accepted and continued with an intersection take off but failed to correct the takeoff performance data previously entered for a full length take off which would have given 65% more TODA. Recognition of the error and application of TOGA enabled completion of the take-off but the Investigation concluded that a rejected take off from high speed would have resulted in an overrun. It also concluded that despite change after a similar event involving the same operator a year earlier, relevant crew procedures were conducive to error.)
  • A320, Bilbao Spain, 2001 (On 7th February 2001, an Iberia A320 was about to make a night touch down at Bilbao in light winds when it experienced unexpected windshear. The attempt to counter the effect of this by initiation of a go around failed because the automatic activation of AOA protection in accordance with design criteria which opposed the crew pitch input. The aircraft then hit the runway so hard that a go around was no longer possible. Severe airframe structural damage and evacuation injuries to some of the occupants followed. A mandatory modification to the software involved was subsequently introduced.)
  • A320, Brunei, 2014 (On 7 July 2014, an Airbus A320 landing at Brunei departed the side of the runway almost immediately after touchdown and continued to gradually diverge from the runway axis until stopping after a ground run of approximately 1,050 metres. The Investigation concluded that the aircraft commander, having taken over control from the First Officer when the latter lost their previously-acquired prescribed visual reference below Decision Altitude due to a sudden-onset intense rain shower ahead, had then continued the approach without recognising that the only lights still visible to him were those at the right hand edge of the runway.)
  • A320, Cochin India, 2011 (On 29 August 2011, an Airbus A320 which had up to that point made a stabilised auto LS approach at destination deviated from the runway centreline below 200 feet aal but continued to a night touchdown which occurred on the edge of the 3400 metre runway and was followed by exit from the side onto soft ground before eventually coming to a stop adjacent to the runway about a third of the way along it. The subsequent investigation attributed the event to poor crew performance in reduced visibility)
  • A320, Dublin Ireland, 2017 (On 27 September 2017, an Airbus A320 being manoeuvred off the departure gate at Dublin by tug was being pulled forward when the tow bar shear pin broke and the tug driver lost control. The tug then collided with the right engine causing significant damage. The tug driver and assisting ground crew were not injured. The Investigation concluded that although the shear pin failure was not attributable to any particular cause, the relative severity of the outcome was probably increased by the wet surface, a forward slope on the ramp and fact that an engine start was in progress.)
  • A320, Halifax NS Canada, 2015 (On 29 March 2015, an Airbus A320 crew mismanaged the descent during a night non-precision approach at Halifax and continued below MDA without the mandatory autopilot disconnection until, with inadequate visual reference, the aircraft impacted terrain and obstructions 225 metres short of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed but there were no fatalities. The Investigation found that the crew did not monitor their descent against the required vertical profile, as there was no SOP requiring them to do so, and did not recognise in time that a go around was appropriate.)
  • A320, Hamburg Germany, 2008 (On 1 March 2008 an Airbus A320 being operated by Lufthansa on a scheduled passenger flight from Munich to Hamburg experienced high and variable wind velocity on short finals in good daylight visibility and during the attempt at landing on runway 23 with a strong crosswind component from the right, a bounced contact of the left main landing gear with the runway was followed by a left wing down attitude which resulted in the left wing tip touching the ground. A rejected landing was then flown and after radar vectoring, a second approach to runway 33 was made to a successful landing. No aircraft occupants were injured but the aircraft left wing tip was found to have been damaged by the runway contact. The track of the aircraft and spot wind velocities given by ATC at key points are shown on the illustration below.)
  • A320, Harstad/Narvik Norway 2004 (On 25 November 2004, a MyTravel Airways Airbus A320 departed the side of the runway at Harstad, Norway at a low speed after loss of directional control when thrust was applied for a night take off on a runway with below normal surface friction characteristics. It was found that the crew had failed to follow an SOP designed to ensure that any accumulated fan ice was shed prior to take off and also failed to apply take off thrust as prescribed, thus delaying their appreciation of the uneven thrust produced.)
  • A320, Hiroshima Japan, 2015 (On 14 April 2015, a night RNAV(GNSS) approach to Hiroshima by an Airbus A320 was continued below minima without the prescribed visual reference and subsequently touched down 325 metres before the runway after failing to transition to a go around initiated from a very low height. The aircraft hit a permitted ground installation, then slid onto the runway before veering off it and stopping. The aircraft sustained extensive damage and an emergency evacuation followed with 28 of the 81 occupants sustaining minor injuries. The Investigation noted the unchallenged gross violation of minima by the Captain.)
  • A320, Jaipur India, 2014 (On 5 January 2014, an Airbus A320 was unable to land at Delhi due to visibility below crew minima and during subsequent diversion to Jaipur, visibility there began to deteriorate rapidly. A Cat I ILS approach was continued below minima without any visual reference because there were no other alternates within the then-prevailing fuel endurance. The landing which followed was made in almost zero visibility and the aircraft sustained substantial damage after touching down to the left of the runway. The Investigation found that the other possible alternate on departure from Delhi had materially better weather but had been ignored.)
  • A320, Khartoum Sudan, 2005 (On 11 March 2005, an Airbus A321-200 operated by British Mediterranean Airways, executed two unstable approaches below applicable minima in a dust storm to land in Khartoum Airport, Sudan. The crew were attempting a third approach when they received information from ATC that visibility was below the minimum required for the approach and they decided to divert to Port Sudan where the A320 landed without further incident.)
  • A320, Lisbon Portugal, 2015 (On 19 May 2015, an Airbus A319 crew attempted to taxi into a nose-in parking position at Lisbon despite the fact that the APIS, although switched on, was clearly malfunctioning whilst not displaying an unequivocal ‘STOP’. The aircraft continued 6 metres past the applicable apron ground marking by which time it had hit the airbridge. The marshaller in attendance to oversee the arrival did not signal the aircraft or manually select the APIS ‘STOP’ instruction. The APIS had failed to detect the dark-liveried aircraft and the non-display of a steady ‘STOP’ indication was independently attributed to a pre-existing system fault.)
  • A320, London Heathrow UK, 2006 (On 26 June 2006, after an uneventful pre-flight pushback of a British Airways Airbus A320-200 at London Heathrow Airport, the aircraft started moving under its own power and, shortly afterwards, collided with the tractor that had just performed the pushback, damaging both the right engine and the tractor.)
  • A320, Los Angeles USA, 2005 (On 21 September 2005, an Airbus A320 operated by Jet Blue Airways made a successful emergency landing at Los Angeles Airport, California, with the nose wheels cocked 90 degrees to the fore-aft position after an earlier fault on gear retraction.)
  • A320, Oslo Norway, 2010 (On 25 February 2010, an Aeroflot Airbus A320-200 unintentionally made a daylight take off from Oslo in good visibility from the taxiway parallel to the runway for which take off clearance had been given. Because of the available distance and the absence of obstructions, the take off was otherwise uneventful. The Investigation identified contributory factors attributable to the airline, the airport and the ANSP.)
  • A320, Paris Orly France, 2013 (On 12 March 2013, a Tunis Air Airbus A320 landed on runway 08 at Paris Orly and, having slowed to just over 40 knots, were expecting, despite the covering of dry snow and some slush pre-notified and found on the runway, to vacate it without difficulty at the mid point. ATC then requested that the aircraft roll to the end of the runway before clearing. However, after a slight increase in speed, the crew were unable to subsequently slow the aircraft as the runway end approached and it overran at a low groundspeed before coming to a stop 4 seconds later.)
  • A320, Phoenix AZ USA, 2002 (On 28 August 2002, an America West Airbus A320 operating under an ADD for an inoperative left engine thrust reverser veered off the side of the runway during the landing roll at Phoenix AZ after the Captain mismanaged the thrust levers and lost directional control as a consequence of applying asymmetric thrust. Substantial damage occurred to the aircraft but most occupants were uninjured.)
  • A320, Porto Portugal, 2013 (On 1 October 2013, an Airbus A320 took off from a runway intersection at Porto which provided 1900 metres TORA using take off thrust that had been calculated for the full runway length of 3480 metres TORA. It became airborne 350 metres prior to the end of the runway but the subsequent Investigation concluded that it would not have been able to safely reject the take-off or continue it, had an engine failed at high speed. The event was attributed to distraction and the inappropriate formulation of the operating airline's procedures for the pre take-off phase of flight.)
  • A320, Singapore, 2015 (On 16 October 2015, the unlatched fan cowl doors of the left engine on an A320 fell from the aircraft during and soon after takeoff. The one which remained on the runway was not recovered for nearly an hour afterwards despite ATC awareness of engine panel loss during takeoff and as the runway remained in use, by the time it was recovered it had been reduced to small pieces. The Investigation attributed the failure to latch the cowls shut to line maintenance and the failure to detect the condition to inadequate inspection by both maintenance personnel and flight crew.)
  • A320, São Paulo Congonhas Brazil, 2007 (On 17 July 2007, the commander of a TAM Airlines Airbus A320 being operated with one thrust reverser locked out was unable to stop the aircraft leaving the landing runway at Congonhas at speed and it hit buildings and was destroyed by the impact and fire which followed killing all on board and others on the ground. The investigation attributed the accident to pilot failure to realise that the thrust lever of the engine with the locked out reverser was above idle, which by design then prevented both the deployment of ground spoilers and the activation of the pre-selected autobrake.)
  • A320, Tehran Mehrabad Iran, 2016 (On 13 August 2016, an Airbus A320 departed the side of the runway at low speed during takeoff from Tehran Mehrabad and became immobilised in soft ground. The Investigation found that the Captain had not ensured that both engines were simultaneously stabilised before completing the setting of takeoff thrust and that his subsequent response to the resulting directional control difficulties had been inappropriate and decision to reject the takeoff too late to prevent the excursion. Poor CRM on the flight deck was identified as including but not limited to the First Officer’s early call to reject the takeoff being ignored.)
  • A320, Toronto Canada, 2000 (On 13 September 2000, an Airbus A320-200 being operated by Canadian airline Skyservice on a domestic passenger charter flight from Toronto to Edmonton was departing in day VMC when, after a “loud bang and shudder” during rotation, evidence of left engine malfunction occurred during initial climb and the flight crew declared an emergency and returned for an immediate overweight landing on the departure runway which necessitated navigation around several pieces of debris, later confirmed as the fan cowlings of the left engine. There were no injuries to the occupants.)
  • A320, Toronto ON Canada, 2017 (On 25 February 2017, an Airbus A320 left the side of the landing runway at Toronto when, for undetermined reasons, the Captain, as Pilot Flying, set up a drift to the right just before touchdown. This was then followed by a lateral runway excursion into wet grass in rain-reduced visibility which continued for 1,650 metres before the aircraft regained the runway and stopped. The Investigation noted that both the absence of runway centreline lighting and the aircraft operator’s policy of not activating the aircraft rain repellent system or applying the alternative hydrophobic windshield coating may have increased the excursion risk.)
  • A320, Varadero Cuba, 2010 (On 31 January 2010, an Airbus A320-200 being operated by the Canadian Airline Skyservice on a passenger flight from Toronto Canada to Varadero Cuba made a procedural night ILS approach to destination in heavy rain and, soon after touchdown on a flooded runway, drifted off the side and travelled parallel to it for a little over 500 metres before subsequently re-entering it at low speed. There were no injuries to the 186 occupants and the aircraft sustained only minor damage.)
  • A320, en route, north of Marseilles France, 2013 (On 12 September 2013, pressurisation control failed in an A320 after a bleed air fault occurred following dispatch with one of the two pneumatic systems deactivated under MEL provisions. The Investigation found that the cause of the in-flight failure was addressed by an optional SB not yet incorporated. Also, relevant crew response SOPs lacking clarity and a delay in provision of a revised MEL procedure meant that use of the single system had not been optimal and after a necessary progressive descent to FL100 was delayed by inadequate ATC response, and ATC failure to respond to a PAN call required it to be upgraded to MAYDAY.)
  • A320, en-route Alpes-de-Haute-Provence France, 2015 (On 24 March 2015, after waiting for the Captain to leave the flight deck and preventing his return, a Germanwings A320 First Officer put his aircraft into a continuous descent from FL380 into terrain killing all 150 occupants. Investigation concluded the motive was suicide, noted a history of mental illness dating from before qualification as a pilot and found that prior to the crash he had been "experiencing mental disorder with psychotic symptoms" which had not been detected through the applicable "process for medical certification of pilots". Conflict between the principles of medical confidentiality and wider public interest was identified.)
  • A320, en-route Karimata Strait Indonesia, 2014 (On 28 December 2014, an A320 crew took unapproved action in response to a repeating system caution shortly after levelling at FL320. The unexpected consequences degraded the flight control system and obliged manual control. Gross mishandling followed which led to a stall, descent at a high rate and sea surface impact with a 20º pitch attitude and a 50º angle of attack four minutes later. The Investigation noted the accident origin as a repetitive minor system fault but demonstrated that the subsequent loss of control followed a combination of explicitly inappropriate pilot action and the absence of appropriate pilot action.)
  • A320, en-route, Denver CO USA, 2009 (On 21 October 2009, an Airbus 320-200 being operated by Northwest Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from San Diego to Minneapolis-St Paul, with the Captain as PF, overflew its destination at cruise level in VMC at night by more than 100 nm, after the two pilots had become distracted in conversation and lost situational awareness. They failed to maintain radio communications with a series of successive ATC units for well over an hour. After a routine inquiry from the cabin crew as to the expected arrival time, the flight crew realised what had happened and re-established ATC contact after which the flight was completed without further incident.)
  • A320, en-route, Kalmar County Sweden, 2009 (On 2 March 2009, communication difficulties and inadequate operator procedures led to an Airbus A320-200 being de-iced inappropriately prior to departure from Vasteras and fumes entered the air conditioning system via the APU. Although steps were then taken before departure in an attempt to clear the contamination, it returned once airborne. The flight crew decided to don their oxygen masks and complete the flight to Poznan. Similar fumes in the passenger cabin led to only temporary effects which were alleviated by the use of therapeutic oxygen. The Investigation concluded that no health risks arose from exposure to the fumes involved.)
  • A320, en-route, North East Spain 2006 (On 28 May 2006, a Vueling Airbus A320 encountered sudden significant turbulence at FL325 and, during a temporary loss of control, was forced down to FL310 before recovery was achieved. Seven occupants sustained minor injuries and there was some internal damage caused by an unrestrained cabin service cart. The origin of the disturbance was found to have been wake vortices from an Airbus A340-300 which was 10nm ahead and 500 feet above on the same airway but the Investigation found that the crew response had been inappropriate and could have served to exacerbate the effects of the external disturbance.)
  • A319 / A321, en-route, west north west of Geneva, Switzerland 2011 (On 6 August 2011 an Easyjet Airbus A319 on which First Officer Line Training was in progress exceeded its cleared level during the climb after a different level to that correctly read back was set on the FMS. As a result, it came into conflict with an Alitalia A321 and this was resolved by responses to coordinated TCAS RAs. STCA alerts did not enable ATC resolution of the conflict and it was concluded that a lack of ATC capability to receive Mode S EHS DAPs - since rectified - was a contributory factor to the outcome.)
  • A320 / A321, vicinity Barcelona Spain, 2016 (On 25 July 2016, an Airbus A320 and an Airbus A321 both departing Barcelona and following their ATC instructions came into conflict and the collision risk was removed by the TCAS RA CLIMB response of the A320. Minimum separation was 1.2 nm laterally and 200 feet vertically with visual acquisition of the other traffic by both aircraft. The Investigation found that the controller involved had become preoccupied with an inbound traffic de-confliction task elsewhere in their sector and, after overlooking the likely effect of the different rates of climb of the aircraft, had not regarded monitoring their separation as necessary.)
  • A321 / B734, Barcelona Spain, 2015 (On 25 November 2015, an Airbus A321 taxiing for departure at Barcelona was cleared across an active runway in front of an approaching Boeing 737 with landing clearance on the same runway by a Ground Controller unaware that the runway was active. On reaching the lit stop bar protecting the runway, the crew queried their clearance and were told to hold position. Noting that the event had occurred at the time of a routine twice-daily runway configuration change and two previous very similar events in 2012 and 2014, further safety recommendations on risk management of runway configuration change were made.)
  • A321 / B738, Dublin Ireland, 2011 (On 21 May 2011, a Monarch Airlines A321 taxiing for departure at Dublin inadvertently taxied onto an active runway after failing to follow its taxi clearance. The incursion was not noticed by ATC but the crew of a Boeing 737 taking off from the same runway did see the other aircraft and initiated a very high speed rejected take off stopping 360 metres from it. The incursion occurred in a complex manoeuvring area to a crew unfamiliar with the airport at a location which was not a designated hot spot. Various mitigations against incursions at this position have since been implemented.)
  • A321 / B738, en-route, south eastern Bulgaria, 2016 (On 8 September 2016, an Airbus A321 en route in Bulgarian airspace at FL 350 was given and acknowledged a descent but then climbed and came within 1.2nm of a descending Boeing 737. The Investigation found that the inexperienced A321 First Officer had been temporarily alone when the instruction was given and had insufficient understanding of how to control the aircraft. It was also found that despite an STCA activation of the collision risk, the controller, influenced by a Mode ‘S’ downlink of the correctly-set A321 cleared altitude, had then added to the risk by instructing the 737 to descend.)
  • A321, Daegu South Korea, 2006 (On 21 February 2006, an Airbus A321-200 being operated by China Eastern on a scheduled passenger flight from Daegu to Shanghai Pudong failed to follow the marked taxiway centreline when taxiing for departure in normal daylight visibility and a wing tip impacted an adjacent building causing minor damage to both building and aircraft. None of the 166 occupants were injured.)
  • A321, Fuerteventura Spain, 2016 (On 16 July 2016, an Airbus A321’s unstabilised approach at Fuerteventura during pilot line training was not discontinued and takeover of control and commencement of a go-around had occurred just before a very hard runway contact. The subsequent landing was successful but serious damage to the main landing gear was not rectified before the next flight. The Investigation found that the hard touchdown had been recorded as in excess of 3.3g and that the return flight had been “risky and unsafe” after failure of the Captain and maintenance personnel at the Operator to recognise the seriousness of the hard landing.)
  • A321, Hakodate Japan, 2002 (On 21 January 2002, an Airbus A321-100 being operated by All Nippon Airways on a scheduled passenger flight from Nagoya to Hakodate encountered sudden negative windshear just prior to planned touchdown and the pitch up which followed resulted in the aft fuselage being damaged prior to the initiation of a climb away to position for a further approach which led to a normal landing. Three of the cabin crew sustained minor injuries but the remaining 90 occupants were uninjured.)
  • A321, Hurghada Egypt, 2013 (On 28 February 2013, the initial night landing attempt of a Ural Airlines Airbus A321 at Hurghada was mishandled in benign conditions resulting in a tail strike due to over-rotation. The Investigation noted that a stabilised approach had been flown by the First Officer but found that the prescribed recovery from the effects of a misjudged touchdown had not then been followed. It was also concluded that communication between the two pilots had been poor and that the aircraft commander's monitoring role had been ineffective. The possibility of the effects of fatigue was noted.)
  • A321, Incheon South Korea, 2013 (On 16 April 2013, an A321 sustained significant damage during a tail strike during a bounced landing which followed loss of airspeed and an increase in sink rate shortly before touchdown after an otherwise stabilised approach. The Investigation attributed the tail strike to a failure to follow the recommended bounced landing response and noted the inadequate training provided by Asiana for bounced landing recovery.)
  • A321, Manchester UK, 2008 (1) (On 18 July 2008, an Airbus A321-200 operated by Thomas Cook Airlines experienced hard landing during night line training with significant aircraft damage not found until several days later. The hard landing was subsequently partially attributed to the inability to directly observe the trainee pitch control inputs on side stick of the A321.)
  • A321, Manchester UK, 2008 (2) (On 28 July 2008, the crew flying an Airbus A321-200 departing Manchester UK were unable to raise the landing gear. The fault was caused by damage to the Nose Landing Gear sustained on the previous flight which experienced a heavy landing.)
  • A321, Manchester UK, 2011 (1) (On 29 April 2011, an Airbus A321-200 being operated by Thomas Cook Airlines on a passenger service from Manchester UK to Iraklion, Greece took off in day VMC but failed to establish a climb at the expected speed until the aircraft pitch attitude was reduced below that prescribed for the aircraft weight which had been entered into the FMS. No abnormal manoeuvres occurred and none of the 231 occupants were injured.)
  • A321, Manchester UK, 2011 (2) (On 23 December 2011, an Austrian Airlines Airbus A321 sustained a tail strike at Manchester as the main landing gear contacted the runway during a night go around initiated at a very low height after handling difficulties in the prevailing wind shear. The remainder of the go around and subsequent approach in similar conditions was uneventful and the earlier tail strike was considered to have been the inevitable consequence of initiating a go around so close to the ground after first reducing thrust to idle. Damage to the aircraft rendered it unfit for further flight until repaired but was relatively minor.)
  • A321, Sandefjord Norway, 2006 (A321 experienced minimal braking action during the daylight landing roll in wet snow conditions and normal visibility and an overrun occurred. The aircraft came to a stop positioned sideways in relation to the runway centreline with the right hand main landing gear 2 metres beyond the limit of the paved surface.)
  • A321, en-route, Gimpo South Korea, 2006 (On 9 June 2006, an Airbus 321-100, operated by Asiana Airlines, encountered a thunderstorm accompanied by Hail around 20 miles southeast of Anyang VOR at an altitude of 11,500 ft, while descending for an approach to Gimpo Airport. The radome was detached and the cockpit windshield was cracked due to impact with Hail.)
  • A321, en-route, Northern Sudan, 2010 (On 24 August 2010, an Airbus A321-200 being operated by British Midland on a scheduled public transport service from Khartoum to Beirut experienced, during cruise at FL360 in night IMC, an electrical malfunction which was accompanied by intermittent loss of the display on both pilots’ EFIS and an uncommanded change to a left wing low attitude. De-selection of the No 1 generator and subsequent return of the rudder trim, which had not previously been intentionally moved, to neutral removed all abnormalities and the planned flight was completed without further event with no damage to the aircraft or injuries to the 49 occupants.)
  • A321, en-route, Vienna Austria, 2003 (On 26th May 2003, a British Midland A321 suffered severe damage from hail en route near Vienna.)
  • A321, en-route, near Pamplona Spain, 2014 (On 5 November 2014, the crew of an Airbus A321 temporarily lost control of their aircraft in the cruise and were unable to regain it until 4000 feet of altitude had been lost. An investigation into the causes is continuing but it is already known that blockage of more than one AOA probe resulted in unwanted activation of high AOA protection which could not be stopped by normal sidestick inputs until two of the three ADRs had been intentionally deactivated in order to put the flight control system into Alternate Law.)
  • A321, vicinity Islamabad Pakistan, 2010 (On 28 July 2010, the crew of an Airbus A321 lost contact with the runway at Islamabad during a visual circling approach and continued in IMC outside the protected area and flying into terrain after repeatedly ignoring EGPWS Terrain Alerts and PULL UP Warnings. The Investigation concluded that the Captain had pre-planned a non-standard circuit which had been continued into IMC and had then failed to maintain situational awareness, control the aircraft through correct FMU inputs or respond to multiple EGPWS Warnings. The inexperienced First Officer appeared unwilling to take control in the absence of corrective action by the Captain.)
  • A321, vicinity Singapore, 2010 (On 27 May 2010 an Airbus A321-200 being operated by Australian operator JetStar on a passenger flight from Darwin to Singapore continued an initial approach at destination in day VMC with the aircraft inappropriately configured before a late go around was commenced which was also flown in a configuration contrary to prescribed SOPs. A subsequent second approach proceeded to an uneventful landing. There were no unusual or sudden manoeuvres during the event and no injuries to the occupants.)
  • B732 / A321, Manchester UK, 2004 (On 29 February 2004, a Boeing 737-200 crossed an active runway in normal daylight visibility ahead of a departing Airbus A321, the crew of which made a high speed rejected take off upon sighting the other aircraft after hearing its crossing clearance being confirmed. Both aircraft were found to have been operating in accordance with their acknowledged ATC clearances issued by the same controller. An alert was generated by the TWR conflict detection system but it was only visually annunciated and had not been noticed. Related ATC procedures were subsequently reviewed and improved.)
  • B738/A321, Prague Czech Republic, 2010 (On 18 June 2010 a Sun Express Boeing 737-800 taxiing for a full length daylight departure from runway 06 at Prague was in collision with an Airbus 321 which was waiting on a link taxiway leading to an intermediate take off position on the same runway. The aircraft sustained damage to their right winglet and left horizontal stabiliser respectively and both needed subsequent repair before being released to service.)
  • B744 / A321, London Heathrow UK, 2004 (On 23 March 2004, an out of service British Airways Boeing 747-400, under tow passed behind a stationary Airbus A321-200 being operated by Irish Airline Aer Lingus on a departing scheduled passenger service in good daylight visibility and the wing tip of the 747 impacted and seriously damaged the rudder of the A321. The aircraft under tow was cleared for the towing movement and the A321 was holding position in accordance with clearance. The towing team were not aware of the collision and initially, there was some doubt in the A321 flight deck about the cause of a ‘shudder’ felt when the impact occurred but the cabin crew of the A321 had felt the impact shudder and upon noticing the nose of the 747 appearing concluded that it had struck their aircraft. Then the First Officer saw the damaged wing tip of the 747 and informed ATC about the possible impact. Later another aircraft, positioned behind the A321, confirmed the rudder damage. At the time of the collision, the two aircraft involved were on different ATC frequencies.)
  • B744 / A321, vicinity London Heathrow UK, 2000 (On 28 April 2000, a British Airways Boeing 747-400 on go around at London Heathrow Airport, UK, had a loss of separation vertically from a British Midland A321 stationary on the runway waiting for take-off.)
  • B772 / A321, London Heathrow UK, 2007 (On 27 July 2007, a British Airways Boeing 777-200ER collided, during pushback, with a stationary Airbus A321-200. The A321 was awaiting activation of the electronic Stand Entry Guidance (SEG) and expecting entry to its designated gate.)
  • EUFI / A321, en-route, near Clacton UK, 2008 (On 15 October 2008, following participation in a military exercise over East Anglia (UK), a formation of 2 foreign Eurofighters entered busy controlled airspace east north east of London without clearance while in the process of trying to establish the required initial contact with military ATC, resulting in loss of prescribed separation against several civil aircraft.)

Further Reading

For further information, visit the Airbus website