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Name A-320
Manufacturer AIRBUS
Body Narrow
Wing Fixed Wing
Position Low wing
Tail Regular tail, mid set
WTC Medium
Type code L2J
Aerodrome Reference Code 4C
RFF Category 6
Engine Jet
Engine count Multi
Position Underwing mounted
Landing gear Tricycle retractable
Mass group 4

Manufacturered as:

AIRBUS A-320 Prestige
AIRBUS Prestige (A-320)




Short to medium range single aisle airliner. In service since 1988. First airliner with a fly-by-wire-system with side stick controlling and an Electronic Flight Instrument System-cockpit. Total of 2532 aircraft ordered, 1563 delivered, 1542 in operation. There are total of 3469 aircraft from A320 family in operation (including 318/319/320/321 - May 2008). The A320 is a member of the A320 family of aircraft. A new "neo" (new engine option) series of the A320 family was developed since 2010 with first aircraft being delivered in 2016. The "neo" aircraft feature new engines (PW 1100G or CFM LEAP-1A) and a new type of wingtips, called "sharklets". The existing aircraft are referred to as "ceo" by Airbus, meaning "current engine option".

Note: While a "ceo" aircraft may or may not be equipped with sharklets, all "neo" aircraft are equipped with sharklets. The sharklet version features a 1.7m wider wingspan.

Technical Data

Wing span 35.8 m117.454 ft <br />
Length 37.57 m123.261 ft <br />
Height 11.76 m38.583 ft <br />
Powerplant 2 x CFM56-5A1 (111kN) or
2 x CFM56-5A3 (118kN) or
2 x IAE V2500 (125kN) turbofans.
Engine model CFM International CFM56, International Aero Engines V2500

Performance Data

Take-Off Initial Climb
(to 5000 ft)
Initial Climb
(to FL150)
Initial Climb
(to FL240)
MACH Climb Cruise Initial Descent
(to FL240)
(to FL100)
Descent (FL100
& below)
V2 (IAS) 145 kts IAS 175 kts IAS 290 kts IAS 290 kts MACH 0.78 TAS 450 kts MACH 0.78 IAS 290 kts IAS kts Vapp (IAS) 137 kts
Distance 2190 m ROC 2500 ft/min ROC 2000 ft/min ROC 1400 ft/min ROC 1000 ft/min MACH 0.79 ROD 1000 ft/min ROD 3500 ft/min MCS 210 kts Distance 1440 m
MTOW 7350073,500 kg <br />73.5 tonnes <br /> kg Ceiling FL410 ROD ft/min APC C
WTC M Range 27002,700 nm <br />5,000,400 m <br />5,000.4 km <br />16,405,511.823 ft <br /> NM

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving A320

  • A319 / A320, Naha Okinawa Japan, 2012 (On 5 July 2012, an Airbus A319 entered its departure runway at Naha without clearance ahead of an A320 already cleared to land on the same runway. The A320 was sent around. The Investigation concluded that the A319 crew - three pilots including one with sole responsibility for radio communications and a commander supervising a trainee Captain occupying the left seat - had misunderstood their clearance and their incorrect readback had not been detected by the TWR controller. It was concluded that the controller's non-use of a headset had contributed to failure to detect the incorrect readback.)
  • A319 / A320, Paris CDG France, 2014 (On 25 November 2014, the crew of an Airbus A320 taking off from Paris CDG and in the vicinity of V1 saw an A319 crossing the runway ahead of them and determined that the safest conflict resolution was to continue the takeoff. The A320 subsequently overflew the A319 as it passed an estimated 100 feet agl. The Investigation concluded that use of inappropriate phraseology by the TWR controller when issuing an instruction to the A319 crew had led to a breach of the intended clearance limit. It was also noted that an automated conflict alert had activated too late to intervene.)
  • A320 (2) / CRJX (2) / B738 (3) / A332, vicinity Madrid Barajas Spain, 2018 (On 27 May 2018, four losses of separation on final approach during use of dependent parallel landing runways occurred within 30 minutes at Madrid following a non-scheduled weather-induced runway configuration change. This continuing situation was then resolved by reverting to a single landing runway. The Investigation attributed these events to “the complex operational situation” which had prevailed following a delayed decision to change runway configuration after seven consecutive go-arounds in 10 minutes using the previous standard runway configuration. The absence of sufficient present weather information for the wider Madrid area to adequately inform ATC tactical strategy was assessed as contributory.)
  • A320 / A139 vicinity Zurich Switzerland, 2012 (On 29 May 2012, a British Airways Airbus A320 departing Zürich and in accordance with its SID in a climbing turn received and promptly and correctly actioned a TCAS RA 'CLIMB'. The conflict which caused this was with an AW 139 also departing Zürich IFR in accordance with a SID but, as this aircraft was only equipped with a TAS to TCAS 1 standard, the crew independently determined from their TA that they should descend and did so. The conflict, in Class 'C' airspace, was attributed to inappropriate clearance issue by the TWR controller and their inappropriate separation monitoring thereafter.)
  • A320 / A320, Zurich Switzerland, 2011 (On 15 March 2011 two Swiss International Airlines’ Airbus A320 aircraft were cleared for simultaneous take off on intersecting runways at Zurich by the same controller. As both approached the intersection at high speed, the Captain of one saw the other and immediately rejected take off from 130 knots, stopping just at the edge of the intersection shortly after the other aircraft had flown low overhead unaware of the conflict. The Investigation noted a long history of similar incidents at Zurich and concluded that systemic failure of risk management had not been addressed by the air traffic control agency involved.)
  • A320 / A321, vicinity Barcelona Spain, 2016 (On 25 July 2016, an Airbus A320 and an Airbus A321 both departing Barcelona and following their ATC instructions came into conflict and the collision risk was removed by the TCAS RA CLIMB response of the A320. Minimum separation was 1.2 nm laterally and 200 feet vertically with visual acquisition of the other traffic by both aircraft. The Investigation found that the controller involved had become preoccupied with an inbound traffic de-confliction task elsewhere in their sector and, after overlooking the likely effect of the different rates of climb of the aircraft, had not regarded monitoring their separation as necessary.)
  • A320 / A346, en-route, Eastern Indian Ocean, 2012 (On 18 January 2012, ATC error resulted in two aircraft on procedural clearances in oceanic airspace crossing the same waypoint within an estimated 2 minutes of each other without the prescribed 1000 feet vertical separation when the prescribed minimum separation was 15 minutes unless that vertical separation existed. By the time ATC identified the loss of separation and sent a CPDLC message to the A340 to descend in order to restore separation, the crew advised that such action was already being taken. The Investigation identified various organisational deficiencies relating to the provision of procedural service by the ANSP concerned.)
  • A320 / AT76, Yangon Myanmar, 2017 (On 18 September 2017, a departing Airbus A320 was instructed to line up and wait at Yangon but not given takeoff clearance until an ATR72 was less than a minute from touchdown and the prevailing runway traffic separation standard was consequently breached. The Investigation found that the TWR controller had been a temporarily unsupervised trainee who, despite good daylight visibility, had instructed the A320 to line up and wait and then forgotten about it. When the A320 crew, aware of the approaching ATR72, reminded her, she “did not know what to do” and the trainee APP controller had to intervene.)
  • A320 / B738 Barcelona Spain, 2012 (On 27 May 2012, an Airbus A320 departing Barcelona was cleared by GND to taxi across an active runway on which a Boeing 737-800 was about to land. Whilst still moving but before entering the runway, the A320 crew, aware of the aircraft on approach, queried their crossing clearance but the instruction to stop was given too late to stop before crossing the unlit stop bar. The 737 was instructed to go around and there was no actual risk of collision. The Investigation attributed the controller error to lack of familiarisation with the routine runway configuration change in progress.)
  • A320 / B738, en-route, near Córdoba Spain, 2014 (On 30 October 2014, a descending Airbus A320 came close to a Boeing 737-800 at around FL 220 after the A320 crew significantly exceeded a previously-instructed 2,000 fpm maximum rate of descent assuming it no longer applied when not reiterated during re-clearance to a lower altitude. Their response to a TCAS RA requiring descent at not above 1,000 fpm was to further increase it from 3,200 fpm. Lack of notification delayed the start of an independent Investigation but it eventually found that although the A320 TCAS equipment had been serviceable, its crew denied failing to correctly follow their initial RA.)
  • A320 / B738, en-route, north northwest of Sofia Bulgaria, 2016 (On 4 June 2016, a Boeing 737-800 instructed to climb from FL340 to FL380 by the controller of one sector in Bulgarian upper airspace came into sufficiently close proximity to an Airbus A320 under the control of a different sector controller to trigger co-ordinated TCAS RAs. Separation was eventually restored after the 737 followed its RA despite the A320, which had already deviated from its clearance on the basis of a prior TCAS TA without informing ATC, ignoring their RA. The Investigation found that the root cause of the conflict had been inadequate coordination between two vertically separated ATC sectors.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Barcelona, Spain 2018 (On 6 July 2018, a Boeing 737-800 being positioned to join the intermediate approach sequence in the Barcelona CTR was obliged to take lateral avoiding action against an Airbus A320 ahead. The Investigation found that although both aircraft were in the same sector at the time, the controller had overlooked the presence of the A320 which had been transferred to the next sector before entering it prior to the controller involved routinely taking over the position. An on-screen alert to the developing conflict had not been seen by the controller. Minimum separation was 1.1nm laterally and 200 feet vertically.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Delhi India, 2016 (On 30 January 2016, an Airbus A320 crew cleared for an ILS approach to runway 11 at Delhi reported established on the runway 11 LLZ but were actually on the runway 09 LLZ in error and continued on that ILS finally crossing in front of a Boeing 737-800 on the ILS for runway 10. The Investigation found that the A320 crew had not noticed they had the wrong ILS frequency set and that conflict with the 737 occurred because Approach transferred the A320 to TWR whilst a conflict alert was active and without confirming it was complying with its clearance.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Dubai UAE, 2012 (On 22 April 2012, an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737 came into close proximity near Dubai whilst on the same ATC frequency and correctly following their ATC clearances shortly after they had departed at night from Sharjah and Dubai respectively. The Investigation found that correct response by both aircraft to coordinated TCAS RAs eliminated any risk of collision. The fact that the controller involved had only just taken over the radar position involved and was only working the two aircraft in conflict was noted, as was the absence of STCA at the unit due to set up difficulties.)
  • A320 / B738, vicinity Launceston Australia, 2008 (On 1 May 2008 an Airbus A320-200 being operated by JetStar on a scheduled passenger flight from Melbourne to Launceston, Tasmania was making a missed approach from runway 32L when it came into close proximity in night VMC with a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Virgin Blue and also inbound to Launceston from Melbourne which was manoeuvring about 5nm north west of the airport after carrying out a similar missed approach. Minimum separation was 3 nm at the same altitude and the situation was fully resolved by the A320 climbing to 4000 feet.)
  • A320 / B739, Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2013 (On 20 November 2013, an A320 misunderstood its taxi out clearance at Yogyakarta and began to enter the same runway on which a Boeing 737, which had a valid landing clearance but was not on TWR frequency, was about to touch down from an approach in the other direction of use. On seeing the A320, which had stopped with the nose of the aircraft protruding onto the runway, the 737 applied maximum manual braking and stopped just before reaching the A320. The Investigation faulted ATC and airport procedures as well as the A320 crew for contributing to the risk created.)
  • A320 / B789 / A343, San Francisco CA USA, 2017 (On 7 July 2017 the crew of an Airbus A320, cleared for an approach and landing on runway 28R at San Francisco in night VMC, lined up for the visual approach for which it had been cleared on the occupied parallel taxiway instead of the runway extended centreline and only commenced a go-around at the very last minute, having descended to about 60 feet agl whilst flying over two of the four aircraft on the taxiway. The Investigation determined that the sole direct cause of the event was the poor performance of the A320 flight crew.)
  • A320 / C56X, vicinity Geneva Switzerland, 2011 (On 17 August 2012, a Swiss A320 being positioned under radar vectors for arrival at Geneva was inadvertently vectored into conflict with a Cessna Citation already established on the ILS LOC for runway 23 at Geneva. Controller training was in progress and the Instructor had just taken control because of concerns at the actions of the Trainee. An error by the Instructor was recognised and de-confliction instructions were given but a co-ordinated TCAS RA still subsequently occurred. STCA was activated but constraints on access to both visual and aural modes of the system served to diminish its value.)
  • A320 / CRJ2, Port Elizabeth South Africa, 2014 (On 10 July 2014, the crew of a Bombardier CRJ200 on a visual go around from an approach to runway 26 at Port Elizabeth took visual avoiding action overhead of the aerodrome to ensure safe separation from an Airbus A320 which had just taken off. Both aircraft also received TCAS RAs. Minimum achieved separation from radar was 370 metres laterally and 263 feet vertically. The Investigation noted that the go around resulted from the TWR controller, who was supervising a student controller, clearing the A320 to enter the runway and take off when the CRJ200 was on short final to land.)
  • A320 / CRJ2, Sofia Bulgaria, 2007 (On 13 April 2007 in day VMC, an Air France A320 departing Sofia lined up contrary to an ATC Instruction to remain at the holding point and be ready immediate. The controller did not immediately notice and after subsequently giving a landing clearance for the same runway, was obliged to cancel it send the approaching aircraft around. An Investigation attributed the incursion to both the incorrect terminology used by TWR and the failure to challenge the incomplete clearance read back by the A320 crew.)
  • A320 / F50, Adelaide Australia, 2016 (On 17 August 2016, a Fokker F50 crossed an active runway at Adelaide ahead of an A320 which was about to land after both its pilots and the controller involved had made assumptions about the content of radio transmissions they were aware they had not fully heard. The Investigation found that the A320 crew had responded promptly to the potential conflict by initiating a low go around over the other aircraft and noted that stop bars were not installed at Adelaide. In addition, aircraft taxiing across active runways were not required to obtain their crossing clearances on the runway control frequency.)
  • A320 / GLID, vicinity Memmingen Germany, 2015 (On 6 April 2015, the crew of an A320 under radar control in Class E airspace and approaching 4000 feet made a very late sighting of a glider being flown by a student pilot which appeared ahead at a similar altitude. The glider pilot reported having seen a 'cone of light' coming towards him. Both aircraft took avoiding action as practicable and passed within a recorded 450 metres with the A320 passing an estimated 250 feet over the glider. The glider was not fitted with a transponder and was not required to be, and the controller had only secondary radar.)
  • A320 / SF34, vicinity London Stansted UK, 2019 (On 12 February 2019, an Airbus A320 under the command of a Captain reportedly undergoing line training supervised by a Training Captain occupying the supernumerary crew seat was slow to follow ATC instructions after breaking off from an unstabilised approach at London Stansted caused by the First Officer’s mismanagement of the approach and lost separation at night as it crossed approximately 600 feet above a Saab 340B climbing after takeoff. The Investigation found that flight crew workload had been exacerbated after the Captain under supervision unnecessarily delayed taking over control and had then not done so in the prescribed way.)
  • A320 / SW4, Calgary AB Canada, 2016 (On 2 December 2016, the crew of an Airbus A320 passing 100 knots on takeoff at Calgary saw another aircraft crossing an intersection ahead but continued because they considered that, as the other aircraft was already more than half way across, it would be clear before they reached that point. The Investigation found that the GND Controller had cleared the other aircraft to cross after forgetting that the runway was active and under TWR control. It was concluded that the response of the ANSP SMS process to a history of identical controller errors and related reports had been inadequate.)
  • A320 / Vehicle, London Gatwick UK, 2018 (On 3 February 2018, a runway inspection vehicle was cleared onto the active runway at London Gatwick ahead of an aircraft which had just touched down and driven towards it having been cleared to do so because the aircraft crew’s confirmation that they would clear the runway before reaching the vehicle was considered by the controller as a clearance limit. The Investigation found that the associated runway inspection procedure had not been adequately risk-assessed and noted that many issues raised by it had still not been addressed by the time it was completed eighteen months later.)
  • A320, Auckland New Zealand, 2017 (On 27 October 2017, an Airbus A320 returned to Auckland after advice from ATC that the right engine may have been affected by ingestion of FOD during engine start - a clipboard and paper left just inside the right hand engine by an employee of the airline’s ground handling contractor acting as the aircraft loading supervisor. The subsequent inspection found paper throughout the engine and minor damage to an engine fan blade and the fan case attrition liner. The Dispatcher overseeing the departure said she had seen the clipboard inside the engine but assumed it would be retrieved before departure.)
  • A320, Ballykelly Northern Ireland UK, 2006 (On 29 March 2006, an Eirjet Airbus 320 was operating a scheduled passenger flight from Liverpool to Londonderry Airport in Northern Ireland for Ryanair in daylight. At 8nm from LDY, the operating crew reported that they were having problems with the ILS glideslope on approach to Runway 26. They judged that they were too high to carry out a safe landing from the ILS approach and requested permission from ATC to carry out a visual approach. The aircraft, with the commander as PF, then flew a right hand descending orbit followed by a visual circuit from which it landed. Upon landing, the crew were advised by Londonderry ATC, who had had the aircraft in sight when it called Finals and had then cleared it to land that they had, in fact, landed at Ballykelly airfield, a military helicopter base 5nm to the east-north-east of Londonderry.)
  • A320, Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg France, 2014 (On 6 October 2014, an A320 crew requested, accepted and commenced an intersection takeoff at Basel using reduced thrust performance data based on the originally anticipated full length takeoff which would have given 65% more TODA. Recognition of the error and application of TOGA allowed the aircraft to get airborne just before the runway end but the Investigation found that a rejected take off from high speed would have resulted in an overrun and noted that despite changes to crew procedures after a similar event involving the same operator a year earlier, the relevant procedures were still conducive to error.)
  • A320, Bilbao Spain, 2001 (On 7th February 2001, an Iberia A320 was about to make a night touch down at Bilbao in light winds when it experienced unexpected windshear. The attempt to counter the effect of this by initiation of a go around failed because the automatic activation of AOA protection in accordance with design criteria which opposed the crew pitch input. The aircraft then hit the runway so hard that a go around was no longer possible. Severe airframe structural damage and evacuation injuries to some of the occupants followed. A mandatory modification to the software involved was subsequently introduced.)
  • A320, Brasilia Brazil, 2015 (On 8 April 2015, an Airbus A320 crew lost their previously-acquired and required visual reference for the intended landing runway at Brasilia but continued descent in heavy rain and delayed beginning a go around until the aircraft was only 40 feet above the runway threshold but had not reached it. A premature touchdown prior to the runway then occurred and the aircraft travelled over 30 metres on the ground before becoming airborne again. The Investigation was unable to establish any explanation for the failure to begin a go around once sufficient visual reference was no longer available.)
  • A320, Bristol UK, 2019 (On 23 March 2019, the crew of a fully-loaded Airbus A320 about to depart Bristol detected an abnormal noise from the nose landing gear as a towbarless tug was being attached. Inspection found that the aircraft nose gear had been impact-damaged rendering the aircraft no longer airworthy and the passengers were disembarked. The Investigation noted that tug driver training had been in progress and that the tug had not been correctly aligned with the nose wheels, possibly due to a momentary lapse in concentration causing the tug being aligned with the nose leg rather than the nose wheels.)
  • A320, Brunei, 2014 (On 7 July 2014, an Airbus A320 landing at Brunei departed the side of the runway almost immediately after touchdown and continued to gradually diverge from the runway axis until stopping after a ground run of approximately 1,050 metres. The Investigation concluded that the aircraft commander, having taken over control from the First Officer when the latter lost their previously-acquired prescribed visual reference below Decision Altitude due to a sudden-onset intense rain shower ahead, had then continued the approach without recognising that the only lights still visible to him were those at the right hand edge of the runway.)
  • A320, Calicut India, 2019 (On 20 June 2019, an Airbus A320 about to touchdown at night at Calicut drifted to the right once over the runway when the rain intensity suddenly increased and briefly left the runway before regaining it and completing the landing and taxi in. Runway edge lighting and the two main gear tyres were damaged. The Investigation attributed the excursion to loss of enough visual reference to maintain the centreline until touchdown followed by late recognition of the deviation and delayed response to it. The visibility reduction was considered to have created circumstances in which a go-around would have been advisable.)
  • A320, Cochin India, 2011 (On 29 August 2011, an Airbus A320 which had up to that point made a stabilised auto ILS approach at destination deviated from the runway centreline below 200 feet aal but continued to a night touchdown which occurred on the edge of the 3400 metre runway and was followed by exit from the side onto soft ground before eventually coming to a stop adjacent to the runway about a third of the way along it. The subsequent investigation attributed the event to poor crew performance in reduced visibility)
  • A320, Dublin Ireland, 2017 (On 27 September 2017, an Airbus A320 being manoeuvred off the departure gate at Dublin by tug was being pulled forward when the tow bar shear pin broke and the tug driver lost control. The tug then collided with the right engine causing significant damage. The tug driver and assisting ground crew were not injured. The Investigation concluded that although the shear pin failure was not attributable to any particular cause, the relative severity of the outcome was probably increased by the wet surface, a forward slope on the ramp and fact that an engine start was in progress.)
  • A320, Gold Coast QLD Australia, 2017 (On 18 December 2017, an A320 crew found that only one thrust reverser deployed when the reversers were selected shortly after touchdown but were able to retain directional control. The Investigation found that the aircraft had been released to service in Adelaide with the affected engine reverser lockout pin in place. This error was found to have occurred in a context of multiple failures to follow required procedures during the line maintenance intervention involved for which no mitigating factors of any significance could be identified. A corrective action after a previous similar event at the same maintenance facility was also found not to have been fully implemented.)
  • A320, Halifax NS Canada, 2015 (On 29 March 2015, an Airbus A320 crew mismanaged the descent during a night non-precision approach at Halifax and continued below MDA without the mandatory autopilot disconnection until, with inadequate visual reference, the aircraft impacted terrain and obstructions 225 metres short of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed but there were no fatalities. The Investigation found that the crew did not monitor their descent against the required vertical profile, as there was no SOP requiring them to do so, and did not recognise in time that a go around was appropriate.)
  • A320, Hamburg Germany, 2008 (On 1 March 2008 an Airbus A320 being operated by Lufthansa on a scheduled passenger flight from Munich to Hamburg experienced high and variable wind velocity on short finals in good daylight visibility and during the attempt at landing on runway 23 with a strong crosswind component from the right, a bounced contact of the left main landing gear with the runway was followed by a left wing down attitude which resulted in the left wing tip touching the ground. A rejected landing was then flown and after radar vectoring, a second approach to runway 33 was made to a successful landing. No aircraft occupants were injured but the aircraft left wing tip was found to have been damaged by the runway contact. The track of the aircraft and spot wind velocities given by ATC at key points are shown on the illustration below.)
  • A320, Harstad/Narvik Norway 2004 (On 25 November 2004, a MyTravel Airways Airbus A320 departed the side of the runway at Harstad, Norway at a low speed after loss of directional control when thrust was applied for a night take off on a runway with below normal surface friction characteristics. It was found that the crew had failed to follow an SOP designed to ensure that any accumulated fan ice was shed prior to take off and also failed to apply take off thrust as prescribed, thus delaying their appreciation of the uneven thrust produced.)
  • A320, Hiroshima Japan, 2015 (On 14 April 2015, a night RNAV(GNSS) approach to Hiroshima by an Airbus A320 was continued below minima without the prescribed visual reference and subsequently touched down 325 metres before the runway after failing to transition to a go around initiated from a very low height. The aircraft hit a permitted ground installation, then slid onto the runway before veering off it and stopping. The aircraft sustained extensive damage and an emergency evacuation followed with 28 of the 81 occupants sustaining minor injuries. The Investigation noted the unchallenged gross violation of minima by the Captain.)
  • A320, Jaipur India, 2014 (On 5 January 2014, an Airbus A320 was unable to land at Delhi due to visibility below crew minima and during subsequent diversion to Jaipur, visibility there began to deteriorate rapidly. A Cat I ILS approach was continued below minima without any visual reference because there were no other alternates within the then-prevailing fuel endurance. The landing which followed was made in almost zero visibility and the aircraft sustained substantial damage after touching down to the left of the runway. The Investigation found that the other possible alternate on departure from Delhi had materially better weather but had been ignored.)
  • A320, Khartoum Sudan, 2005 (On 11 March 2005, an Airbus A321-200 operated by British Mediterranean Airways, executed two unstable approaches below applicable minima in a dust storm to land in Khartoum Airport, Sudan. The crew were attempting a third approach when they received information from ATC that visibility was below the minimum required for the approach and they decided to divert to Port Sudan where the A320 landed without further incident.)
  • A320, Lisbon Portugal, 2015 (On 19 May 2015, an Airbus A319 crew attempted to taxi into a nose-in parking position at Lisbon despite the fact that the APIS, although switched on, was clearly malfunctioning whilst not displaying an unequivocal ‘STOP’. The aircraft continued 6 metres past the applicable apron ground marking by which time it had hit the airbridge. The marshaller in attendance to oversee the arrival did not signal the aircraft or manually select the APIS ‘STOP’ instruction. The APIS had failed to detect the dark-liveried aircraft and the non-display of a steady ‘STOP’ indication was independently attributed to a pre-existing system fault.)
  • A320, London Heathrow UK, 2006 (On 26 June 2006, after an uneventful pre-flight pushback of a British Airways Airbus A320-200 at London Heathrow Airport, the aircraft started moving under its own power and, shortly afterwards, collided with the tractor that had just performed the pushback, damaging both the right engine and the tractor.)
  • A320, London Stansted UK, 2019 (On 1 March 2019, an Airbus A320 left engine suffered a contained failure soon after takeoff thrust was set for a night departure from London Stansted but despite the absence of an instruction to cabin crew to begin an evacuation, they did so anyway just before the aircraft was going to be taxied clear of the runway with the Captain only aware when passengers were seen outside the aircraft. The Investigation found that an evacuation had been ordered by the senior member of the cabin crew after she was “overwhelmed” by the situation and believed her team members were “scared”.)
  • A320, Los Angeles USA, 2005 (On 21 September 2005, an Airbus A320 operated by Jet Blue Airways made a successful emergency landing at Los Angeles Airport, California, with the nose wheels cocked 90 degrees to the fore-aft position after an earlier fault on gear retraction.)
  • A320, Macau SAR China, 2018 (1) (On 28 August 2018, an Airbus A320 bounced touchdown in apparently benign conditions resulted in nose gear damage and debris ingestion into both engines, in one case sufficient to significantly reduce thrust. The gear could not be raised at go around and height loss with EGPWS and STALL warnings occurred when the malfunctioning engine was briefly set to idle. Recovery was followed by a MAYDAY diversion to Shenzen and an emergency evacuation. The Investigation attributed the initial hard touchdown to un-forecast severe very low level wind shear and most of the damage to the negative pitch attitude during the second post-bounce touchdown.)
  • A320, Macau SAR China, 2018 (2) (On 12 November 2018, an Airbus A320 took off from Macau in good daylight visibility whilst a same-direction runway inspection was in progress but became airborne well before reaching it. The conflict was not recognised until an aural conflict alert was activated, at which point the ATC Assistant took the microphone and instructed the vehicle to clear the runway. The Investigation found that the TWR Controller had forgotten that the vehicle was still on the runway until alerted by the audible alarm and had not checked either the flight progress board or the surface radar before issuing the takeoff clearance.)
  • A320, Malé Maldives, 2018 (On 7 September 2018, an Airbus A320 was inadvertently landed on an under- construction runway at Malé in daylight VMC but met no significant obstructions and sustained only minor damage. The Investigation attributed the error to confusion generated by a combination of pilot inattention to clearly relevant notification, controller distraction, the failure of the airport operator to follow required procedures and the failure of the safety regulator to ensure that sufficient arrangements to ensure safety were in place and complied with.)
  • A320, Oslo Norway, 2010 (On 25 February 2010, an Aeroflot Airbus A320-200 unintentionally made a daylight take off from Oslo in good visibility from the taxiway parallel to the runway for which take off clearance had been given. Because of the available distance and the absence of obstructions, the take off was otherwise uneventful. The Investigation identified contributory factors attributable to the airline, the airport and the ANSP.)


Further Reading