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Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau AAIB

Final Report No. 1983 by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

concerning the serious incident (AIRPROX)
between EZY 2076, B737, registration G-EZJL
operated by Easyjet
and KLM 57W, F100, registration PH-OFF
operated by KLM Cityhopper
on 29 December 2006
at Geneva Airport

Federal Palace North, CH-3003 Berne

General remarks concerning this report

This report contains the AAIB's conclusions on the circumstances and causes of the accident/serious incident which is the subject of the investigation.

In accordance with Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944 and article 24 of the Federal Air Navigation Law, the sole purpose of the investigation of an aircraft accident or serious incident is to prevent future accidents or serious incidents. It is therefore not the purpose of this investigation to determine blame or clarify questions of liability. The legal assessment of accident/incident causes and circumstances is no concern of the incident investigation (art. 24 of the Air Navigation Law).

If this report is used for purposes other than accident prevention, due consideration shall be given to this circumstance.

The definitive version of this report is the original in the French language

All times in this report, unless otherwise indicated, follow the coordinated universal time (UTC) format. The local time (LT) in force in Switzerland at the time of the accident was Central European Time (CEST). The relation between LT, CEST and UTC is: $LT = CEST = UTC + 1 \text{ h}$.

For reasons of protection of privacy, the masculine form is used in this report for all natural persons, regardless of their gender.

Final Report

Aircraft

EZY 2076, G-EZJL, B737
Easyjet (UK)
Geneva (LSGG) – London Luton (EGGW)

Commercial flight, IFR

KLM 57W, PH-OFF, F100
KLM Cityhopper
Amsterdam (EHAM) – Geneva (LSGG)

Commercial flight, IFR

Crews

EZY 2076

Commander
Copilot

KLM 57W

Commander
Copilot

Location

Geneva - airport

Date and time

29 December, 18:36 UTC

ATC unit

Terminal Control Geneva; Aerodrome Control (ADC)

Controllers

Aerodrome controller
Swiss citizen, born 1959

Airspace

D

1 Factual information

1.1 History of the flight

On Friday 29 December 2006 at 18:33:50 UTC, aircraft KLM 57W, type F100, en route from Amsterdam to Geneva, called Geneva TWR on the 118.70 MHz frequency. The F100 was on the ILS extended centreline of runway 23, at a distance of 8 NM. Aerodrome control reported to him that he was second in the arrival sequence and asked him to call back on short final.

Night fell at 16:24 UTC.

At 18:32:56 UTC, the aerodrome controller cleared the first aircraft in the arrival sequence, a Hawker 800XP, registration HB-VOB, to land on runway 23. Visibility was 2000 metres through a damp mist. The cloud ceiling was at 400 ft/AGL and the meteorological trend was for a reduction in visibility to 1500 metres.

The aerodrome controller was aware that aircraft HB-VOB was expected at the General Aviation Centre, i.e. that it had to vacate the runway via a taxiway located on the right of runway 23, the first one available being taxiway YANKEE and the second taxiway ZULU.

In their statement, the crew of HB-VOB explained that during the approach phase they did not receive any instruction regarding which exit taxiway to take. The commander explained that to reach the General Aviation Centre after landing on runway 23, which was the case at the time of this incident, he generally preferred the YANKEE exit, i.e. the first one, as long as visibility conditions permitted. The pilot noted the cloud ceiling at approximately 500 ft/AGL and visibility of less than 2,500 m. During the approach briefing given by the commander, the choice of exit was not specified.

In his statement, the aerodrome controller explained that the aircraft braked strongly after crossing taxiway YANKEE and continued to roll at low speed as far as the ZULU exit taxiway.

After HB-VOB had landed, a B737, registration EZY2076, destination London Luton, was approaching the holding point for runway 23 and received an instruction to line up and hold.

Aircraft HB-VOB, on the ground, was taxiing on runway 23 and was preparing to leave on the right, at the ZULU intersection, in order to proceed to the General Aviation Centre.

This action requires some time to clear the runway, given the distance to be covered and the 90° turn which has to be performed.

The commander of HB-VOB stated that the YANKEE exit is difficult to locate once landing has taken place, adding that its narrowness and its intersection with runway 23 at 90° requires the aircraft to almost completely stop before it can enter.

Communications between aerodrome control and the crew of aircraft HB-VOB took place in French, whilst they took place in English with the other two aircraft involved in the incident.

According to the statements of the crew of KLM 57W, they did not realise that aircraft HB-VOB had played a part in the way the incident unfolded, given that radiotelephone communications were in French. KLM Cityhopper's Flight Security Department stated that use of standard English phraseology would have helped the crew to understand the overall situation correctly.

At 18:35:01 UTC, the aerodrome controller asked aircraft KLM 57W, with the copilot (F/O) as pilot flying (PF), to reduce its approach speed. He subsequently requested the pilot of aircraft HB-VOB to expedite vacating the runway via taxiway ZULU, informing him that an aircraft was on the runway and another was on short final. At this moment, HB-VOB was passing the taxiway YANKEE exit and still had 900 metres to go before reaching taxiway ZULU.

At 18:35:46 UTC, the aerodrome controller reported to aircraft KLM 57W that a type B737 aircraft was preparing to take off in front of it and that it could continue the approach.

At 18:36:07 UTC, i.e. one minute and 32 seconds after the B737 EZY 2076 received line-up clearance, the controller ordered its crew to take off immediately. Just after the readback by the pilot, which did not mention "immediate", the aerodrome controller insisted on the urgency of carrying out this order: "*I said immediate, I want you to depart right now*". The pilot acknowledged, stating that he was leaving.

At the moment the Easyjet flight received take-off clearance, the KLM flight was approximately 2 NM distant on final and its speed was about 150 kt.

At 18:36:26 UTC, the pilot of aircraft HB-VOB reported that he had vacated the runway at the ZULU intersection.

At 18:36:40 UTC, i.e. twenty seconds after confirming that he was taking off, the crew of flight EZY 2076 receive the order to abort take-off: "*cancel take-off, stop take-off, stop take-off, break ...*" and, without waiting, the controller transmitted the following order: "*... break, KLM five seven Whiskey, go around, I say again, go around, it's too short, I'm sorry.*" to the KLM 57W aircraft, which was at an altitude of 1700 ft on the ILS, i.e. approximately 300 ft/AGL, at a speed of 135 kt.

According to the radar recordings, at the moment the order was given, aircraft EZY 2076 was approximately 400 m from the runway threshold and its speed was 74 kt, i.e. less than the decision speed V1.

As aircraft EZY 2076 continued its take-off, the aerodrome controller 12 seconds later repeated the order to abort take-off: "*Easy two zero seven six, I say again, stop take-off, stop take-off.*" The pilot answered that he could not comply, he was going too fast and he had taken off.

In his statement, the commander of aircraft EZY 2076 stated: "*When we finally got T/O clearance we rolled immediately. At a speed greater than 100 kts we were told*

to stop by ATC. The other a/c was told to go around. I decided to continue as we were rapidly approaching V1 and this would have been near the aircraft's approach speed that was some way behind us."

He added:

"Boeing recommends in the flight crew training manual that prior 80 kts the airplane should be stopped if an event occurs that would be considered undesirable for continued takeoff roll or flight. Boeing also states that the Captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff. Had I been less than 80 kts I would have stopped without question, after 80 kts I do not consider the tower controllers "cancel takeoff" as an order and I do by necessity become very go minded."

The aerodrome controller instructed aircraft KLM 57W to turn left immediately because of the traffic which had taken off in front of it. The pilot reported that he was turning left onto heading 150°; the controller instructed him to adopt a heading of 050° and to climb to 7000 ft. In his statement, the KLM pilot explained that he had initially opted for a heading of 150°, corresponding to the direction of the turn ordered by the controller, into a sector free from obstacles and that it was essential to quickly adopt a route which diverged from that of the traffic which was taking off. The crew of the KLM flight stated that they saw the approach lights at 350 ft/AGL without noticing the aircraft taking off. Only the passenger in the jumpseat, himself a KLM copilot, said that he had observed the Easyjet 737 rolling and approaching the end of the touchdown zone of runway 23.

After the left turn made by aircraft KLM 57W, the routes followed by the two aircraft diverged and both lateral and vertical separation between them increased, thereby eliminating the potential risk of collision.

The minimum distances between the two aircraft, measured on the radar plots, were a lateral separation of 1 NM and an altitude difference of 300 ft.

The aerodrome controller informed the pilot of aircraft EZY 2076 that he would submit an incident report and transferred the aircraft to the Departure radar control frequency.

1.2 Meteorological information

Weather: Skyguide Infonet Data

*ATIS Geneva
INFO X-RAY RWY IN USE 23 D 0640 N 1624*

*QAM LSGG 1820Z 29.12.2006
230 DEG 3 KT
VIS 2000 M
MIST
CLOUD OVC 400 FT
-02/-03*

QNH 1030 THREE ZERO
QFE THR 23 980
QFE THR 05 978

TREND BECMG VIS 1500 M

1.3 Additional information

1.3.1 Cancellation of take-off

In its circular AIC 16/2006 (pink 93) 2 February under the heading Cancellation of Take-Off Clearance, paragraph 2.1, the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority states:

"The aircraft commander of the departing aircraft will not necessarily be aware of the reason for the cancellation, as he may not be able to see the collision risk due to low visibility or airfield topography, and may not hear a go-around instruction on another frequency. This should be borne in mind in decision making."

« Having issued a take-off clearance, air traffic controllers have procedures available that allow them to cancel the take-off clearance if it subsequently becomes necessary to do so. These ATC procedures were produced jointly by the CAA and the UK Flight Safety Committee and recently issued in Air Traffic Services Information Notice (ATSIN) 68 (17 August 2005). This Circular provides information to pilots on the procedures to be followed by controllers in the limited circumstances when it becomes necessary to cancel a take-off clearance.

Cancellation of a take-off clearance after an aircraft has commenced its take-off roll is an unusual occurrence and a controller should only take such action in extreme circumstances".

1.3.2 Noise abatement zone

Ref.: ATM GENEVA / APP IFR GENERAL 2-8 and Ordinance on Aviation Infrastructure (OSIA)

This zone, intended to reduce noise around the airport, extends :

- *On a distance from 5.6 NM TD 05 (PAS VOR) to 8 NM TD 23,*
- *On a width of 6 NM on either side of the runway axis,*
- *Vertically from the ground to 6400 ft QNH (5000 ft AAL)*

Allowed within this zone:

- *Flights established on published routes,*
- *Traffic on downwind or being vectored to the downwind*
- *Departures 05 on the alternate route (see APP 3)*

Excluded from this zone:

- *Visual approaches,*
- *Interrupted approaches leaving the approach axis or 360° turns.*

Waivers are permitted exclusively in accordance with art. 27 of the OSIA (RS 748.131.1) :

"The air traffic control service or the aerodrome manager may give instructions for temporary waivers of the agreed operational procedures when particular circumstances, such as the traffic situation or aviation safety, require."

1.3.3 Reduced separation between aircraft on the same runway

(Ref.: ATMM Switzerland Aerodrome Control Section 9 – 4.11)

Applicability

In respect of aircraft categories reduced runway separation may be applied under the following conditions:

- *reduced RWY separation minima shall only be applied during hours of daylight from 1 hour after the beginning of morning local civil twilight to 1 hour before the end of evening local civil twilight;*
- *appropriate wake turbulence minima is applied;*
- *visibility is at least 5 km and the ceiling not less than 1000ft;*
- *the tailwind component does not exceed 5 kt;*
- *suitable landmarks exist to assist controllers in assessing the distances between aircraft;*
- *minimum separation continues to exist between two departing aircraft immediately after take-off of the second aircraft;*
- *traffic information is issued to the flight crew of the succeeding aircraft; and*
- *the braking action is not adversely affected by runway contaminants such as ice, slush, snow, water, etc.*

Reduced runway separation minima shall not apply between a departing aircraft and a preceding landing aircraft.

1.3.4 Missed approach

Procedure (ref. AIP LSGG AD 2.24.10 -1 GENEVA ILS RWY 23)

Climb on R226 GVA. At D9.5 GVA past the station, turn left to intercept R040 CBY. Proceed to SPR. Initial climb 4000 ft. When passing D4.0 GVA past the station (D3.5 ISW past the station), continue climb to 7000 ft. Max IAS 185 kt during turn. For turns below 5000 ft, MNM bank angle 25°.

Autobrake System (ref. BOEING 737 Operations Manual)

The autobrake system uses hydraulic system B pressure to provide maximum deceleration for rejected takeoff and automatic braking at preselected deceleration rates immediately after touchdown. The system operates only when the normal brake system is functioning. Antiskid system protection is provided during autobrake operation.

1.3.5 Rejected Takeoff (RTO)

The RTO mode can be selected only when on the ground. Upon selection, the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminates for one to two seconds and then extinguishes, indicating that an automatic self-test has been successfully accomplished.

To arm the RTO mode prior to takeoff the following conditions must exist:

- *airplane on the ground*
- *antiskid and autobrake systems operational*
- *AUTO BRAKE select switch positioned to RTO*
- *wheel speed less than 60 knots*
- *forward thrust levers positioned to IDLE.*

With RTO selected, if the takeoff is rejected prior to wheel speed reaching 90 knots, the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light does not illuminate, autobraking is not initiated, and the RTO autobrake function remains armed. If the takeoff is rejected after reaching a wheel speed of 90 knots, maximum braking is applied automatically when the forward thrust levers are retarded to IDLE.

The RTO mode is automatically disarmed when both air/ground systems indicate the air mode. The AUTO BRAKE DISARM light does not illuminate. The selector switch must be manually positioned to OFF. If a landing is made with RTO selected, no automatic braking action occurs and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminates two seconds after touchdown. To reset, position the selector to OFF.

2 Analysis

2.1 Flight management aspects

HB-VOB

The fact that at no time during the approach by HB-VOB were the crew informed of the exit taxiway to use after landing certainly contributed to the slow execution of this manoeuvre. According to the pilots, these exit taxiways towards the General Aviation Centre are difficult to make out at night and under poor visibility.

As soon as the aircraft had vacated the runway on taxiway ZULU, it was transferred to the ground control frequency GND. As a result, the crew did not witness the subsequent series of events on the TWR control frequency.

EZY2076

The commander of flight EZY 2076 explained that, in general, between the time he received take-off clearance and the time the aircraft began to move, a few seconds elapse, this time being necessary to build up thrust for take-off. In this specific case and according to his statements, application of this sequence of events took place without delay. He added that he could observe on his TCAS the short distance separating his own aircraft from the KLM aircraft on final. He was even surprised that the controller cleared him for take-off.

Twenty seconds after confirming that he was initiating the take-off phase, the crew of flight EZY 2076 received the order to cancel. According to the radar recordings, at the moment the order was given to them the aircraft was approximately 400 m from the threshold of runway 23. Its speed, according to the commander's statements, was approximately 100 kt; according to the radar plots, it was 74 kt and therefore lower than decision speed V1. Consequently, given its speed, it is surprising that the crew of flight EZY 2076 did not cancel its take-off.

As to why the take-off was not cancelled, the commander of flight EZY 2076 gave explanations by referring to the Boeing aircraft manufacturer but did not mention that his decision had been taken for safety reasons.

An aborted take-off may expose the aircraft and its occupants to strong deceleration forces which may have serious consequences.

KLM57W

It should be noted that the go-around order given by ADC control

- with a procedure which differed from the published version,
- at a height less than 300 ft/AGL,
- at night,
- under IMC conditions,

must have involved a heavy workload for the flight crew.

2.2 ATC aspects

The take-off cancellation procedure was used by ADC control as a solution of urgency to the loss of separation between an arriving and a departing aircraft.

Taking in account the unfavourable weather conditions, the serious incident between the two aircraft is attributable to an inappropriate traffic management and in applying reduced separation.

The take-off cancellation order is an emergency measure which shall not be considered as a traffic separation concept.

3 Conclusions

3.1 Findings

- The runway in service was runway 23.
- The aerodrome controller was in possession of an appropriate licence.
- Radio communications on the TWR frequency 118.7 MHz between the pilots of flights EZY 2076, KLM 57W and the aerodrome controller took place in English.
- Radio communications on the TWR frequency 118.7 MHz between the pilots of flight HB-VOB and the aerodrome controller took place in French.
- The conditions for application of reduced separation between aircraft on the same runway were not met. (ref. ATM - M Switzerland/ Aerodrome Control Section 9 – 4.11)
- At 18:36:07, the aerodrome controller cleared aircraft EZY 2076 for immediate take-off from runway 23.
- At 18:36:26 UTC, aircraft HB-VOB reported that it had vacated the runway at taxiway ZULU.
- At 18:36:40 UTC, the aerodrome controller gave the order to aircraft EZY 2076 to cancel its take-off.
- At 18:36:41, according to the radar recordings, aircraft EZY 2076 was approximately 400 m from the threshold of runway 23, at a speed of 74 kt.
- At 18:36:44 UTC, the aerodrome controller gave the order to the pilot of aircraft KLM 57W to go around.
- At 18:36:52 UTC, the aerodrome controller repeated the order to the pilot of aircraft EZY 2076 to cancel his take-off.

- At 18:36:57, the pilot of aircraft EZY 2076 informed aerodrome control that he had taken off.
- The weather conditions did not permit visual separation.
- The aerodrome controller instructed the pilot of aircraft KLM 57W to make a left turn.
- The crew of aircraft KLM 57W turned left, reporting that they were turning onto a heading of 150°.
- The aerodrome controller instructed the crew of aircraft KLM 57W to turn onto a heading of 050°.
- According to the radar recordings, the minimum distances between the two aircraft were a lateral separation of 1 NM and an altitude difference of 300 ft.
- The ICAO considers that an ATC order to abort take-off during the acceleration phase is an emergency procedure.

3.2 Cause

The serious incident is attributable to the following factor:

Critical convergence between an aircraft in the final approach phase and an aircraft taking off, following an inappropriate traffic management and the non-compliance with an order to abort take-off given by aerodrome control.

Berne, 9 April 2008

Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

This report contains the AAIB's conclusions on the circumstances and causes of the accident/serious incident which is the subject of the investigation.

In accordance with Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944 and article 24 of the Federal Air Navigation Law, the sole purpose of the investigation of an aircraft accident or serious incident is to prevent future accidents or serious incidents. It is therefore not the purpose of this investigation to determine blame or clarify questions of liability. The legal assessment of accident/incident causes and circumstances is no concern of the incident investigation (art. 24 of the Air Navigation Law).

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**TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONY
OR RADIOTELEPHONY COMMUNICATION TAPE-RECORDINGS**

Investigation into the **incident** that occurred on **29.12.2006**

- Subject of transcript: **EZY2076 / KLM57W**
- Centre concerned: Swiss Radar Area West
- Designation of unit: Terminal Control Geneva, Aerodrome Control
- Frequency / Channel: 118.70 MHz
- Date and period (UTC) covered by attached extract: 29.12.2006
18:31 - 18:38 UTC
- Date of transcript: 7th March 2007
- Name of official in charge of transcription:

- Certificate by official in charge of transcription:

I hereby certify:

- That the accompanying transcript of the telephony or radiotelephony communication tape-recordings, retained at the present time in the premises of the Analysis Department, has been made, examined and checked by me.
- That no changes have been made to the entries in columns 2, 3 and 4, which contain only clearly understood indications in their original form.

Geneva, 7th March 2007

Abbreviations

Sector Designation of sector

ADC - Swiss Radar Area West, Terminal Control Geneva, Aerodrome Control

<u>Aircraft</u>	-	<u>Call sign</u>	<u>Type of aircraft</u>	<u>Flight rules</u>	<u>ADEP</u>	-	<u>ADES</u>
2076	-	Easy 2076	B737	IFR	LSGG	-	EGGW
57W	-	KLM 57W	F100	IFR	EHAM	-	LSGG
HOB	-	HBVOB	H25B	IFR	LIRN	-	LSGG

7th March 2007

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: EZY2076 / KLM57W of 29.12.2006



To Col.1	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
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Frequency: 118.70 MHz, Geneva Tower (HB-VOB, EZY2076 & KLM57W only)

ADC	HOB	18:30:02	La Tour, bonsoir, Hotel Bravo Victor Oscar Bravo.	
HOB	TWR	06	Hotel Bravo Victor Oscar Bravo, bonsoir, continuez l'approche.	
TWR	HOB	10	Continue l'approche, Victor Oscar Bravo.	
				Sector in contact with: - RAM930E - DLH5PH
ADC	2076	18:31:51	Geneva Tower, good evening, Easy two zero seven six, taxiing holding point runway two three.	
2076	ADC	57	Easy two zero seven six, good evening, report ready.	<i>Change of controller</i>
ADC	2076	18:32:00	Wilco.	
				Sector in contact with: - RAM930E (x2)
HOB	TWR	18:32:56	Hotel Oscar Bravo, le vent, deux cent nonante degrés, trois nœuds, piste vingt-trois, autorisé atterrissage.	No reply
TWR	ZZZZ	18:33:05	XXXXXX	Noise
HOB	TWR	07	Hotel Oscar Bravo, vous pouvez atterrir vingt-trois, le vent deux cent nonante degrés, trois nœuds.	
TWR	HOB	11	Atterrissage vingt-trois, Victor Oscar Bravo.	
				Sector in contact with: - DLH9KX
ADC	2076	18:33:41	Easy two zero seven six, ready for departure.	
2076	ADC	45	Roger, departure in one minute.	
ADC	2076	48	XXXXX.	Microphone noise

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: EZY2076 / KLM57W of 29.12.2006



To Col.1	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
ADC	57W	18:33:50	Geneva Tower, good day, KLM five seven Whiskey, established ILS two three, sen, eight miles.	
57W	ADC	55	KLM five seven Whiskey, good evening, number two, report short final.	
ADC	57W	59	Roger.	
				Sector in contact with: - AUA8GP
2076	ADC	18:34:35	Easy two zero seven six, line up runway two three and wait.	
ADC	2076	38	Line up runway two three and wait, Easy two zero seven six.	
				Sector in contact with: - AUA8GP

Frequency: 118.70 MHz, Geneva Tower (all traffic)

57W	ADC	18:35:01	KLM five seven Whiskey, reduce to final approach speed.
ADC	57W	05	Reducing to final approach speed, KLM five seven Whiskey.
HOB	ADC	09	Hotel Oscar Bravo, rapidement prochaine à droite s'il vous plaît.
ADC	HOB	12	Donc... par Zulu, vous confirmez, Oscar Bravo?
HOB	ADC	16	Heu oui, vous êtes attendu au nord, je crois.
ADC	HOB	19	Bon, okay, alors next à droite, Oscar Bravo.
HOB	ADC	35	Hotel Oscar Bravo, expédiez je vous prie, un avion sur la piste, un autre en courte.
ADC	HOB	39	Ouais, on expédie, Oscar Bravo.

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: EZY2076 / KLM57W of 29.12.2006



To Col.1	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
57W	ADC	18:35:46	<i>KLM five seven Whiskey, continue approach, seven three seven will depart ahead of you.</i>	
ADC	57W	51	<i>Roger, KLM five seven Whiskey.</i>	
2076	ADC	18:36:07	Easy two zero seven six, wind two niner zero degrees, three knots, runway two three, cleared immediate take-off.	
ADC	2076	14	Cleared take-off, Easy two zero seven six.	
2076	ADC	17	I said immediate, I want you to depart right now.	
ADC	2076	20	Ah, we are going now, Easy two zero seven six.	
ADC	HOB	26	Oscar Bravo, évacué par Zulu.	
HOB	ADC	29	Hotel Oscar Bravo, le sol, cent vingt et un six sept cinq, au revoir.	
ADC	HOB	32	Cent vingt et un six sept cinq, Oscar Bravo, merci, au revoir.	
2076	ADC	40	Easy two zero seven six, cancel take-off, stop take-off, stop take-off, break ...	
57W	ADC	44	<i>... break, KLM five seven Whiskey, go around, I say again, go around, it's too short, I'm sorry.</i>	
ADC	57W	50	<i>Go around, KLM five seven Whiskey.</i>	
2076	ADC	52	Easy two zero seven six, I say again, stop take-off, stop take-off.	
ADC	2076	57	Ah, Easy two zero seven six, sorry, too fast, we're airborne.	
57W	ADC	18:37:01	<i>KLM five seven Whiskey, turn left immediately, left immediately during your go around, traffic is... departing ahead.</i>	
ADC	57W	09	<i>Left immediately, turning left heading one five zero, KLM five seven Whiskey.</i>	
57W	ADC	13	<i>KLM five seven Whiskey, fly heading zero five zero by the left.</i>	
ADC	57W	16	<i>Heading zero five zero, KLM five seven Whiskey, roger.</i>	

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: EZY2076 / KLM57W of 29.12.2006




To <u>Col.1</u>	From <u>Col.2</u>	Time <u>Col.3</u>	Communications <u>Col.4</u>	Observations <u>Col.5</u>
57W	ADC	18:37:37	<i>KLM five seven Whiskey, thank you, continue climb to seven thousand feet on QNH one zero three zero.</i>	
ADC	57W	43	<i>Continue climb on seven thousand feet, QNH one zero three zero, KLM five seven Whiskey.</i>	
57W	ADC	49	<i>KLM five seven Whiskey, correct, fly heading zero five zero again for downwind and... contact Arrival on one three six decimal ... three, sorry, one three six two five zero.</i>	
ADC	57W	18:38:02	<i>The heading zero five zero for downwind, one three six two five zero, climbing seven thousand feet, KLM five seven Whiskey.</i>	
57W	ADC	10	<i>Correct.</i>	
2076	ADC	13	<i>Easy two zero seven six, for information, I will have to file a report for the situation, contact Departure now on one one nine five two five, bye.</i>	
ADC	2076	22	<i>Ah, one one nine five two five, Easy two zero seven six, that's now problem, thanks, bye.</i>	
			-end-	




RVR Information
++++ +++++ +++++

120: KLM57W 8
60:
30:
15:



Wind Information
Wind: 23 290 /4
CENTER 310 /3
05 290 /1

QNH
1030



EZY2076
B737 M P4A



DLH5PH 208
AT72 084

AUA6GP 151
CRJ2 *059

KLM57W 156
F100 *031

Playback Info
Selected CWP: CWP-2
CWP data: Available
Role: TOWER
Speed: Pause
Mode: Interactive



RVR Information
 +++++ +++++ +++++

120: KLM57W 8
 60:
 30:
 15:

