Pilot Handling Skills

Pilot Handling Skills


Manual Flying Skills are typically thought of as pure core flying skills, where manoeuvres are flown solely by reference to raw data obtained from the heading, airspeedattitudealtitude and vertical speed instruments, and without the use of technology such as auto-throttles, auto-pilot, flight director or any other flight management system. This might extend as far as requiring manual trim inputs and navigation using basic systems.

Pilot Handling Skills will include all the above manual flying skills, but may also relate to combinations of manual flying, speed and directional control together with combinations of automatic speed and direction control and guidance. Such combinations may occur through pilot preference, operational or procedural requirements, or when some automated systems are no longer functioning.

Whereas commercial airline pilots may once have been assessed wholly on their manual flying (aircraft handling) skills, nowadays pilot assessment is predominantly based on Systems and Crew Management, where management of the automated systems and maintenance of situational awareness replace many of the traditional flying skills.


Pilots require handling skills in a variety of situations including:


There are many arguments suggesting that commercial airline pilot handling (flying) skills have become eroded since the growth in popularity of fly-by-wire, glass-cockpit, fully automated, system-designed aircraft[1]. One could add to this the routine nature of many flight operations, the growth in controlled airspace and widespread availability of Instrument Landing Systems (ILS). Pilots flying with commercial airlines will typically only fly manually for the first and last few minutes of each flight. If a pilot logs 900 hours in a single year, fewer than 5 hours may involve manual flying. Also, more and more pilots flying today have never experienced an Industry where flying manually was, or is, the norm, unlike older pilots where these skills became “hard-wired”. This can further dilute the overall levels of pilot handling skills within an airline.

The majority of fatal, and non-fatal accidents, continue to occur during landing and go-around phases of flight[2], and loss of control (in-flight) continues to be the predominant category of fatal accidents[3]. Other areas of safety concern, for the Industry, include unstabilised approachesrunway excursions, heavy landings, tail-scrapes[4][5]level-busts, and engine and airframe exceedance of parameters. Each of these phases of flight and accident categories (above) would appear to involve pilot handling skills. Whilst it would be wrong to identify lack of manual flying skills as the cause to all of these, especially where loss of situational awareness, system malfunction, environmental factors and poor Crew Resource Management (CRM) were involved, it nonetheless does indicate that effectively applied pilot handling skills may help prevent accidents and reduce the consequences of errors.

Therefore, any arguments suggesting that commercial airline pilot handling (flying) skills have become eroded should be examined seriously.


The increased sophistication and use of automation has improved safety by reducing the workload on pilots, allowing them greater capacity and time to make forward judgements and decisions as well as “manage” better the aircraft systems and crew. Pilots learn to fly (i.e. their core manual flying skills) by correcting aircraft flight parameters based on their predictions to a projected forward goal – i.e. straight and level flight, or touchdown. However, with multiple levels of automation and flight modes it is very difficult for pilots to predict what the consequences of various failures will be in every given situation. Part of the necessary response to automation failures is to apply manual flying (handling) skills[6]. Increased reliance on automation by flight crews has created a risk that crewmembers may no longer have the skills required to react appropriately to either failures in automation[1]. Therefore, operators should ensure that training programmes include means and standards to be met regarding the interaction of human performance and limitations with changes to the normal operation of the automation[7].

Training and Practice

Basic flying training is predominantly focused on manual handling and becoming proficient in core flying skills. By the time a pilot completes professional training the emphasis is on system and crew management. During a pilot’s professional career as a commercial airline pilot he/she will be required to demonstrate regularly proficiency in certain handling skills, and under certain conditions, i.e. conducting a safe take-off with the loss of one engine, or, flying an ILS approach to go-around at decision height, also with one engine inoperative.

It is important for airlines to monitor the skill levels of pilot handling, perhaps through flight data monitoring programmes and line flying and simulator observations; then to use this feedback to adjust training syllabi. It is also important for airlines to integrate automation use and degradation into training to reflect operational conditions involving manual handling skills – automation not just a theoretical subject.

It may be necessary to provide pilots with additional flight simulator training specifically aimed at addressing pilot handling skills deficiencies.

Accidents & Incidents

Events in the SKYbrary database which include Manual Handling as a contributory factor:

On 11 October 2019, an Embraer ERJ195LR abandoned an initial landing attempt at Warsaw after a hard bounce but the correct go-around procedure was not followed. The rate of climb rapidly increased to over 4000 feet per minute. Concurrently, the required engine thrust was not set and airspeed rapidly diminished to a point where the stick shaker was activated. Stall and Upset Recovery procedures were not correctly followed and the aircraft commander was slow to take control of the situation. Full control was regained at 1,200 feet above ground level and a subsequent approach and landing were without further event.

On 21 October 2020, an Embraer ERJ170 on short final at Paris CDG responded to a Windshear Warning by breaking off the approach and climbing. The Warning soon stopped but when the aircraft drifted sideways in the strong crosswind towards the adjacent parallel runway from which an Airbus A320 had just taken off, an STCA was quickly followed by a TCAS RA event. The Investigation was concerned at the implications of failure to climb straight ahead from parallel runways during unexpected go-arounds. Safety Recommendations were made on risk management of parallel runway operations by both pilots and safety regulators.

On 22 April 2019, a Eurocopter-Kawasaki BK-117C-1 helicopter was being positioned for the aeromedical evacuation the following day of a sick crewman on a fishing vessel when it was unintentionally flown into the sea at night. The three crew members were able to evacuate from the partially submerged aircraft before it sank. The accident was attributed to the single pilot’s loss of situational awareness due to loss of visual depth perception when using Night Vision Goggles. The relevant aircraft operator procedures and the applicable regulatory requirements were both found be inadequate relative to the operational risk which the flight involved.

On 27 January 2020, an MD83 made an unstabilised tailwind non-precision approach to Mahshahr with a consistently excessive rate of descent and corresponding EGPWS Warnings followed by a very late nose-gear-first touchdown. It then overran the runway end, continued through the airport perimeter fence and crossed over a ditch before coming to a stop partly blocking a busy main road. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and was subsequently declared a hull loss but all occupants completed an emergency evacuation uninjured. The accident was attributed entirely to the actions of the Captain which included disregarding multiple standard operating procedures.

On 8 February 2021, an Embraer 500 Phenom 100 (9H-FAM) crew lost control of their aircraft shortly before the intended touchdown when it stalled due to airframe ice contamination. The resulting runway impact collapsed the nose and main gear, the latter causing fuel leak and resultant fire as the aircraft slid along the runway before veering off it. The Investigation found that flight in icing conditions during the approach had not been accompanied by the prescribed use of the airframe de-icing system and that such non compliance appeared to be routine and its dangers unappreciated.

On 21 June 2018, an Airbus 220-300 completed its landing at Riga on the third attempt but after pilot mismanagement of directional control inputs once on the ground, a minor and brief veer off the side of the runway and associated edge lighting damage occurred. The Investigation was hindered by the aircraft operator’s failure to promptly report the occurrence to the State Safety Investigation Agency. This was found to be attributable to a complete absence of any corresponding procedures or recognition of the associated regulatory responsibility at the airline concerned.

On 23 January 2020, a Bombardier CRJ700 making a HUD-supported manual Cat 3a ILS approach to Lyon Saint-Exupéry in freezing fog conditions deviated from the required flight path localiser and reached a minimum of 265 feet agl before a go around was initiated without initially being flown in accordance with standard procedures. The Captain involved was relatively new to type and had not previously flown such an approach in actual low visibility conditions. The Investigation was not able to determine exactly what contributed to the approach and initial go around being misflown but identified a number of possible contributors.

On 31 July 2021, a Boeing 737-800 descending through an area of convective activity which was subject to a current SIGMET encountered some anticipated moderate turbulence whilst visually deviating around storm cells without reducing speed. When it appeared possible that the maximum speed may be exceeded because of turbulence, the autopilot was disconnected and a severe pitch up and then down immediately followed resulting in serious injuries to two of the four cabin crew and a passenger. This disconnection was contrary to the aircraft operator’s procedures and to the explicit training received by the pilot involved who was in command.

On 23 October 2020, a Bombardier DHC8-400 was mishandled during the final stages of landing in slightly turbulent conditions when the Captain responded to a momentary increase in the rate of descent in the flare by increasing the pitch attitude instead of adding power which resulted in a tailstrike as the maximum pitch attitude without this happening was exceeded and structural damage resulted. The pilot involved had very considerable flying experience on other types but relatively little on the accident type and although the First Officer had more type experience he was less than half the age of the Captain.

On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-500 positioning visually for an approach to Pokhara was observed to suddenly depart normal flight and impact terrain a few seconds later. All 72 occupants were killed and the aircraft destroyed by impact. A Preliminary Report published by the Accident Investigation Commission has indicated that a stall warning and subsequent loss of control was preceded by an apparently unintentional and subsequently undetected selection of both propellers to feather in response to a call for Flaps 30. The Training Captain in command was supervising the Captain flying during familiarisation training for the new Pokhara airport.

On 2 January 2022, an Airbus A350-1000 floated during the landing flare at London Heathrow and when a go-around was commenced, a tail strike accompanied main landing gear runway contact. A subsequent further approach during which the Captain took over as handling pilot was completed uneventfully. The Investigation attributed the tailstrike to a full pitch up input made simultaneously with the selection of maximum thrust when very close to the runway surface, noting that although the initial touchdown had been just beyond the touchdown zone, 2,760 metres of runway remained ahead when the go around decision was made.

On 29 November 2017, a Boeing 737-900 on an ILS approach at Atlanta became unstable after the autothrottle and autopilot were both disconnected and was erroneously aligned with an occupied taxiway parallel to the intended landing runway. A go-around was not commenced until the aircraft was 50 feet above the ground after which it passed low over another aircraft on the taxiway. The Investigation found that the Captain had not called for a go around until well below the Decision Altitude and had then failed to promptly take control when the First Officer was slow to begin climbing the aircraft.

On 1 January 2020, an Airbus A350-900 made an unstabilised night ILS approach to Frankfurt in good visual conditions, descending prematurely and coming within 668 feet of terrain when 6nm from the intended landing runway before climbing to position for another approach. A loss of situational awareness was attributed to a combination of waypoint input errors, inappropriate autoflight management and communication and cooperation deficiencies amongst the operating and augmenting flight crew on the flight deck.

On 10 September 2017, the First Officer of a Gulfstream G550 making an offset non-precision approach to Paris Le Bourget failed to make a correct visual transition and after both crew were initially slow to recognise the error, an unsuccessful attempt at a low-level corrective realignment followed. This had not been completed when the auto throttle set the thrust to idle at 50 feet whilst a turn was being made over the runway ahead of the displaced threshold and one wing was in collision with runway edge lighting. The landing attempt was rejected and the Captain took over the go-around.

On 19 January 2021, a Boeing 737-400SF on an ILS approach to Exeter became unstabilised below 500 feet but despite multiple EGPWS ‘SINK RATE’ Alerts, a go-around was not initiated. The subsequent touchdown recorded 3.8g and caused such extensive damage that the aircraft was declared a hull loss. The Investigation found that the First Officer, who had more hours flying experience than the 15,000 hour Captain, had failed to adequately control the flight path below 500 feet and noted that whilst the Captain had commented on the excessive rate of descent, he had not called for a go around.

Related Articles

Further Reading


  1. a b Flight Safety Foundation Increased Reliance on Automation May Weaken Pilots’ Skills for Managing System Failures.
  2. ^ Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents 1959 – 2012
  3. ^ EASA Annual Safety Review 2012
  4. ^ Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note: Preventing Tailstrike at Landing.
  5. ^ Airbus Flight Operations briefing Note: Preventing Tailstrike at Takeoff.
  6. ^ A332, en-route, Atlantic Ocean, 2009
  7. ^ EASA Automation Policy: Bridging Design and Training Principles. Version of 14 January 2013.

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