Ground Collision
Ground Collision
Definition
Ground Collision (GCOL) - a collision that occurs while an aircraft is taxiing to or from a runway in use.
Source: ICAO
Note: The definition includes collisions with an aircraft, person, ground vehicle, obstacle, building, structure, etc., but excludes ground collisions resulting from events categorized under Runway Excursion (RE), Wildlife Strike, or Ground Handling (RAMP). RAMP events are defined as occurrences during, or as a result of, ground handling operations.
Description
ICAO references GCOL an Occurrence Category, which are categories used to classify occurrences (i.e. accidents and incidents) at a high level to permit analysis of the data in support of safety solutions. It is important to note that ICAO categorizes pushback/powerback/towing events as RAMP events. Collisions that occur while an aircraft is moving under its own power in the gate, ramp or tiedown area (other than powerbacks) are coded as GCOL.
The GCOL occurrence category is one of several categories – the others being abnormal runway contact (ARC), Bird Strike (BIRD), Runway Excursion (RE), Runway Incursion (RI), loss of control on the ground (LOC-G), collisions with obstacles (CTOL), and undershoot/overshoot (USOS) – that ICAO classifies as runway safety-related. Runway safety events have been identified by ICAO as one of three high-risk accident categories. The other high-risk categories are Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I) and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).
EUROCONTROL’s Safety Improvement Sub-Group (SISG), in its “Operational Safety Study: Controller Detection of Potential Runway and Manoeuvring Area Conflicts,” defines ground collision as a distinct safety event in which an aircraft impacts (or is struck by) another aircraft, vehicle or object in the aerodrome’s manoeuvring area.
Scenarios
The SISG analysed 20 ground safety events comprising both RIs and ground collisions. Some events were accidents, some were incidents, and some yielded “lessons learned” relevant to mitigating the risks of both RIs and GCOLs. Below are are some examples of the areas and risk issues reviewed.
GCOL-relevant research about departing/landing on a taxiway (not a runway) explored these risk issues:
- Landing/departing on a taxiway after a non-conformance with ATC clearance due to spatial/positional confusion; and,
- Landing/departing on a taxiway after non-conformance with ATC clearance due to a misinterpretation [of clearance] or [misheard] clearance.”
GCOL–relevant research about incorrect aircraft movement on the aerodrome manoeuvring area explored these risk issues (any issues involving pushback/powerback would be considered RAMP):
- Aircraft takes taxi route with potential conflict after an incorrect ATC clearance;
- Aircraft enters on to manoeuvring area with potential conflict after an incorrect ATC clearance;
- Aircraft takes incorrect taxi route after a non-conformance with ATC clearance due to spatial/positional confusion;
- Aircraft incorrectly enters onto manoeuvring area after a non-conformance with ATC clearance due to spatial/positional confusion;
- Aircraft takes incorrect taxi route after non-conformance with ATC clearance due to a misinterpretation [of clearance] or [misheard] clearance
- Aircraft incorrectly enters onto manoeuvring area after non-conformance with ATC clearance due to a misinterpretation [of clearance] or [misheard] clearance;
- Aircraft takes incorrect taxi route due to poor [ crew resource management (CRM) ] or [forgotten] planned action; and,
- Aircraft incorrectly enters onto manoeuvring area runways without ATC clearance due to poor CRM or [forgotten] planned action.
Contributory Factors
The following are factors that may contribute to GCOL events:
- Failure of stakeholders to proactively ensure that aircraft are not involved in collisions with other aircraft when moving on the manoeuvring area, and that the jet engine exhaust gases from large aircraft do not create a threat for small aircraft;
- Failure to ensure safe parking and docking of aircraft;
- Failure to proactively mitigate the risk of impact damage to parked aircraft or to ensuring that a maintenance inspection — even for apparently minor impact — is conducted prior to any further flight operations;
- Failure to provide adequate signage, markings and lighting that enable aircraft flight crews to comply with taxy clearances; and,
- Failure to train — at a level of quality consistent with aviation professionals — the various types of unlicensed contractors and subcontractors who conduct and supervise aircraft ground-handling tasks on the manoeuvring area and/or in the vicinity of an aircraft parking stand or gate.
Defences and Solutions
The following ATC safety barriers — when deployed and employed correctly — are effective in “alerting ATC to a runway incursion or a ground safety event in sufficient time for ATC to act in order to prevent a ground collision" (SISG):
- Direct visual detection of conflict on the manoeuvring area,
- Indirect detection using remote camera displays,
- Detection following a pilot/vehicle driver report,
- Detection using basic surface-movement radar,
- Detection using an advanced surface movement guidance and control system (A-SMGCS Level 1) or based on an alert from A-SMGCS Level 2; and,
- Detection after an alert from an Integrated Tower Working Position (ITWP) or from aerodrome infrastructure that detects aircraft entry onto the runway (e.g., magnetic loops or lasers);
The SISG credited three safety barriers as those most often stopping a developing ground collision: conflict resolution by an air traffic controller alerted by a pilot or vehicle driver (especially when vehicles display high-visibility flashing/strobing lights in all visibility conditions), the controller’s own “belated (last-minute)” visual detection of a conflict, and the pilot’s “belated (last-minute)” visual detection of a conflict. Effective risk mitigation during taxi operations depends on aircraft commanders exercising their full responsibility for safety during this phase of flight.
Assuming that ATC maintains situational awareness and issues a correct taxi clearance — and the aircraft flight crew complies with clearances or standard routings — the highest risk of wing tip collision occurs when multiple aircraft are holding or taxiing in the manoeuvring area (e.g., near a runway entry point, changing the queuing order (especially at night) or moving without benefit of visible taxiway centrelines; Flight crews of swept-wing aircraft must stay alert to the physical clearance during a turn in which the wing tip describes an arc greater than the normal wingspan due to the geometry of the aircraft and the arrangement of the landing gear.
Air traffic controllers should be attentive and proactive in providing progressive taxi instructions if flight crews seem unfamiliar with the aerodrome manoeuvring area or have difficulty because of a particularly unintuitive procedure or a temporarily complex layout (e.g., taxiways closed due to construction work or recently changed taxiway diagram or signage).
Accidents & Incidents
Aircraft–Aircraft
On 13 February 2019, a Boeing 787 departing Amsterdam was given a non-standard long pushback by ATC in order to facilitate the use of its stand by an incoming flight and when a Boeing 747 was subsequently given a normal pushback by a single tug driver working alone who was unaware of the abnormal position of the 787 and could not see it before or during his pushback, a collision followed. The Investigation concluded that the relevant airport safety management systems were systemically deficient and noted that this had only been partially rectified in the three years since the accident.
On 3 February 2019, two aircraft which had just landed on adjacent parallel runways almost collided during their taxi in after one failed to give way to the other at an intersection as instructed, causing the other to perform an emergency stop which was achieved just in time to avoid a collision. Whilst not attributing direct cause to other than the crew of the aircraft which continued high speed taxiing as the intersection was approached, having noted that all taxiway lighting at Amsterdam is permanently lit at night, a range of factors were identified which had facilitated the error made.
On 13 January 1982, an Air Florida Boeing 737-200 took off in daylight from runway 36 at Washington National in moderate snow but then stalled before hitting a bridge and vehicles and continuing into the river below after just one minute of flight killing most of the occupants and some people on the ground. The accident was attributed entirely to a combination of the actions and inactions of the crew in relation to the prevailing adverse weather conditions and, crucially, to the failure to select engine anti ice on which led to over reading of actual engine thrust.
On 5 February 2011, an Airbus A319-100 being operated by Air Berlin on a passenger flight departing Stockholm inadvertently proceeded beyond the given clearance limit for runway 19R and although it subsequently stopped before runway entry had occurred, it was by then closer to high speed departing traffic than it should have been. There was no abrupt stop and none of the 103 occupants were injured.
On 14 April 2011, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 failed to leave sufficient clearance when taxiing behind a stationary Boeing 767-300 at Barcelona and the 737 wingtip was in collision with the horizontal stabiliser of the 767, damaging both. The 767 crew were completely unaware of any impact but the 737 crew realised the close proximity but dismissed a cabin crew report that a passenger had observed a collision. Both aircraft completed their intended flights without incident after which the damage was discovered, that to the 767 requiring that the aircraft be repaired before further flight.
On 18 June 2010 a Sun Express Boeing 737-800 taxiing for a full length daylight departure from runway 06 at Prague was in collision with an Airbus 321 which was waiting on a link taxiway leading to an intermediate take off position on the same runway. The aircraft sustained damage to their right winglet and left horizontal stabiliser respectively and both needed subsequent repair before being released to service.
On 30 March 2017, a Boeing 787 taxiing for departure at night at Singapore was involved in a minor collision with a stationary Airbus A380 which had just been pushed back from its gate and was also due to depart. The Investigation found that the conflict occurred because of poor GND controlling by a supervised trainee and had occurred because the 787 crew had exercised insufficient prudence when faced with a potential conflict with the A380. Safety Recommendations made were predominantly related to ATC procedures where it was considered that there was room for improvement in risk management.
On 5 January 2018, an out of service Boeing 737-800 was pushed back at night into collision with an in-service Boeing 737-800 waiting on the taxiway for a marshaller to arrive and direct it onto the adjacent terminal gate. The first aircraft s tail collided with the second aircraft s right wing and a fire started. The evacuation of the second aircraft was delayed by non-availability of cabin emergency lighting. The Investigation attributed the collision to failure of the apron controller and pushback crew to follow documented procedures or take reasonable care to ensure that it was safe to begin the pushback.
On 8 August 2017, a Boeing 767-300 departing Delhi was pushed back into a stationary and out of service Airbus A320 on the adjacent gate rendering both aircraft unfit for flight. The Investigation found that the A320 had been instructed to park on a stand that was supposed to be blocked, a procedural requirement if the adjacent stand is to be used by a wide body aircraft and although this error had been detected by the stand allocation system, the alert was not noticed, in part due to inappropriate configuration. It was also found that the pushback was commenced without wing walkers.
On 24 November 2016, a Dassault Falcon 7X being marshalled into an unmarked parking position after arriving at London City Airport was inadvertently directed into a collision with another crewed but stationary aircraft which sustained significant damage. The Investigation found that the apron involved had been congested and that the aircraft was being marshalled in accordance with airport procedures with wing walker assistance but a sharp corrective turn which created a 'wing growth' effect created a collision risk that was signalled at the last minute and incorrectly so by the wing walker involved and was also not seen by the marshaller.
Aircraft–Object/Vehicle
On 16 June 2021, a Boeing 737-400 was taxiing for departure at night after push back from stand when the ground crew who completed the push back arrived back at their base in the tug and realised that the tow bar they had used was not attached to it. The aircraft was prevented from taking off and it was then found that it had taxied over the unseen towbar and sustained damage to both nose gear tyres such that replacement was necessary. The Investigation concluded neither ground crew had checked that the area immediately ahead of the aircraft was clear.
On 19 July 2020, a Boeing 737-800 was instructed to reject its night takeoff on runway 24R at Palma after the driver of an airport vehicle already on the same runway in accordance with its own clearance heard the takeoff clearance being issued to the 737 and advised the controller of his position. The Investigation found that the TWR controller involved had not adhered to relevant procedures set out in the applicable Operating Manual and the provisions of the Air Traffic Regulation in regard to the use of phraseology, active listening and surveillance of the airport manoeuvring area.
On 8 September 2020, an airport maintenance team driving at night on the centreline of the active runway at Birmingham were unaware that an inadequately secured 2 metre-long ladder had fallen from their pickup truck. Three aircraft then landed in the following half hour narrowly missing the ladder before it was discovered and the runway closed. The Investigation found that a more suitable alternative vehicle was available and that the completely inadequate method used to secure the ladder in their vehicle had failed to restrain it when the vehicle accelerated after passing the aiming point markings in the touchdown zone.
On 18 December 2018, a Boeing 787-9 was instructed to taxi to a specified remote de-icing platform for de-icing prior to takeoff from Oslo. The aircraft collided with a lighting mast on the de-icing platform causing significant damage to both aircraft and mast. The Investigation found that in the absence of any published information about restricted aircraft use of particular de-icing platforms and any markings, lights, signage or other technical barriers to indicate to the crew that they had been assigned an incorrect platform, they had visually assessed the clearance as adequate. Relevant Safety Recommendations were made.
On 10 May 2019, a Bombardier DHC8-300 taxiing in at Toronto at night was hit by a fuel tanker travelling at “approximately 25 mph” which failed to give way where a designated roadway crossed a taxiway causing direct crew and indirect passenger injuries and substantial damage. The Investigation attributed the collision to the vehicle driver’s limited field of vision in the direction of the aircraft coming and lack of action to compensate for this, noting the need for more effective driver vigilance with respect to aircraft right of way rules when crossing taxiways. The aircraft was declared beyond economic repair.
On 24 April 2005, an Airbus A340-200 landed short of the temporarily displaced runway threshold at Perth in good daylight visibility despite their prior awareness that there was such a displacement. The Investigation concluded that the crew had failed to correctly identify the applicable threshold markings because the markings provided were insufficiently clear to them and probably also because of the inappropriately low intensity setting of the temporary PAPI. No other Serious Incidents were reported during the same period of runway works.
On 1 June 2010, an Airport RFFS bird scaring vehicle entered the active runway at Jersey in LVP without clearance and remained there for approximately three minutes until ATC became aware. The subsequent Investigation found that the incursion had fortuitously occurred just after an ERJ 190 had landed and had been terminated just as another aircraft had commenced a go around after failure to acquire the prescribed visual reference required to continue to a landing. The context for the failure of the vehicle driver to follow existing procedures was found to be their inadequacy and appropriate changes were implemented.
On 20 April 2010, the left wing of an Antonov Design Bureau An124-100 which was taxiing in to park after a night landing at Zaragoza under marshalling guidance was in collision with two successive lighting towers on the apron. Both towers and the left wingtip of the aircraft were damaged. The subsequent investigation attributed the collision to allocation of an unsuitable stand and lack of appropriate guidance markings.
On 29 June 2012, a Piper PA31 taking off from runway 05 on a passenger charter flight just missed hitting an inspection vehicle which had entered the take off runway from an intersecting one contrary to ATC clearance. The overflying aircraft was estimated to have cleared the vehicle by approximately 20 feet and the pilot was unaware it had entered the active runway. The driver had been taking a mobile telephone call at the time and attributed the incursion to distraction. The breached clearance had been given and correctly read back approximately two minutes prior to the conflict occurring.
On 23 March 2019, the crew of a fully-loaded Airbus A320 about to depart Bristol detected an abnormal noise from the nose landing gear as a towbarless tug was being attached. Inspection found that the aircraft nose gear had been impact-damaged rendering the aircraft no longer airworthy and the passengers were disembarked. The Investigation noted that tug driver training had been in progress and that the tug had not been correctly aligned with the nose wheels, possibly due to a momentary lapse in concentration causing the tug being aligned with the nose leg rather than the nose wheels.
Related Articles
- Ground Operations
- Occurrence Category Taxonomy
- Wing Tip Clearance Hazard
- Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS)
- Surface Movement Radar
- Controller Detection of Manoeuvring Area Conflicts
- Controller Detection of Manoeuvring Area Conflicts – Safety Barriers
- Controller Detection of Manoeuvring Area Conflicts – Guidance for Controllers
Further Reading
- Operational Safety Study: Controller Detection of Potential Runway and Manoeuvring Area Conflicts Edition 1.0, by EUROCONTROL Safety Improvement Sub-Group, 1 December 2015.
- Runway Safety Program - Global Runway Safety Action Plan, by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), First Edition, November 2017
- Ground Accident Prevention (GAP) Program by Flight Safety Foundation, 2003.
- Airside Safety Handbook by Airports Council International, 4th edition, 2010.
- Aircraft Ground Handling and Human Factors: A Comparative Study of the Perceptions by Ramp Staff and Management by NLR Air Transport Safety Institute, NLR-CR-2010-125, 2010.
- Ground Vehicle Operations to Include Taxiing or Towing an Aircraft on Airports, Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5210-20A, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 1 September 2015.
- Operational Safety on Airports During Construction, AC 150/5370-2G, by FAA, 13 December 2017.
- ISAGO Standards Manual, 7th Edition, by International Air Transport Association (IATA), IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operators (ISAGO), February 2018.
- "What’s on Your Runway? — NOTAMs enhanced with airport diagrams help pilots mitigate risks during U.S. runway/taxiway construction." by Wayne Rosenkrans, Flight Safety Foundation AeroSafety World, July 2012.
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