H25B, Mykonos Greece, 2017
H25B, Mykonos Greece, 2017
On 26 July 2017, a Hawker Beechcraft 850 left wing sustained extensive damage when it contacted the runway at Mykonos during a 2.7g touchdown after an unstabilised approach in benign weather conditions had been continued. The Investigation found that the aircraft was airworthy prior to a temporary loss of control at touchdown which occurred after stick pusher activation due to the airspeed being more than 20 knots below the applicable reference speed and only three knots above the applicable stall speed. The monitoring of the First Officer’s approach by the Captain was minimal and late with few alert calls given.
On 26 July 2017 a Hawker Beechcraft 850 (TC-MAN) being operated by Genel Havacilik on a non-scheduled international passenger flight from Istanbul Ataturk to Mykonos carried out an unstabilised approach at destination in day VMC and continued this to a landing during which lateral control was briefly lost and the left wing contacted the runway resulting in it sustaining extensive damage. The taxi in was completed and the solitary uninjured passenger was disembarked.
The Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) was informed the same day and commenced an Investigation the next day. Relevant data was obtained from download of both the FDR and CVR. It was noted that the 51 year-old Captain had a total of 9,066 hours flying experience which included 3,770 hours on type and that the 36 year-old First Officer, who was acting as PF for the flight, had a total of 2,763 hours flying experience which included 1,767 hours on type.
It was established that the inbound flight was cleared to route to the ‘LETSO’ VOR descending to 5000 ft on QNH and with CAVOK and light winds prevailing at Mykonos, it was agreed with ATC that runway 16 would be used for landing with the flight being number 2 to an Airbus A320 series ahead. With the Airbus in sight, the aircraft turned onto a visual final approach and was subsequently given a surface wind of 180° at 5 knots and cleared to land. The AP was disconnected and following completion of the Landing Checks with flaps set to 43° and immediately after passing 400 feet agl, the Captain called “Speed, speed vert[ical]”.
Between 200 and 100 feet agl, the Stick Shaker and Stick Pusher were activated simultaneously and above the runway at 30 feet agl, the Captain is recorded twice telling the First Officer to go around. This call was ignored and touchdown occurred with the speed 20 knots below the applicable VREF of 121 KIAS and only 3 knots above the applicable stalling speed with a bank to the left of almost 14°. This resulted in the left wing touching the runway before control was recovered and the landing roll and then taxi in completed. At touchdown the vertical acceleration was recorded as 2.67g and the left bank was accompanied by a recorded rudder deflection to the right of 31.1°.
Why it Happened
The evidence available led to the conclusion that the aircraft had been airworthy and only the handling of it during the approach had led to the accident.
The report submitted by the Captain to the Investigation stated that the wing drop was attributable to the existence of windshear which caused the aircraft to roll to the left. However, the Investigation found absolutely no FDR or other evidence which could support this claim and it was wholly discounted.
It was noted that not only was the approach unstable throughout but that the First Officer as PF was allowed to continue final approach at a speed well below the applicable VREF without any intervention from the Captain except a caution about the vertical speed and a very late instruction to go around. FDR evidence showed that the rudder and aileron controls were in gross opposition at touchdown and that the airspeed was only three knots above the stalling speed for the aircraft ELW and configuration.
The Root Cause of the investigated event was formally documented as “the approach being unstable from 2000 feet until touchdown in particular the airspeed being between 6 and 31 knots below both the appropriate recommended approach speed of 131 knots and the VREF of 121 knots and very close to the applicable stalling speed of 97 knots”.
Three Contributory Factors were also identified as:
- Ineffective CRM between the Captain and the First Officer during the approach and landing.
- The absence of any standard call outs regarding speed management until a go around was called just before touchdown.
- The flight crew’s lack of familiarity with the peculiarities of approach and landing at Mykonos may have contributed to raised anxiety especially on an approach to runway 16.
Two Safety Recommendations were made as a result of the Investigation as follows:
- that Genel Havacilik must, in order to continue operating commercial flights to Mykonos, consider categorising this airport in according with ICAO categorisation criteria and ensure that all flight crews undergo special training taking into account the peculiarities of the terrain environment and weather phenomena associated with the airport and stated in AIP-Greece. [2021/04]
- that Genel Havacilik must enhance the effectiveness of their CRM training programme. [2021/05]
The Final Report of the Investigation was published on 14 January 2021 simultaneously in English and in the definitive Greek version.