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T154 / B752, en-route, Uberlingen Germany, 2002 (LOS HF)
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| Summary | |
| On 1st July 2002, a Russian-operated Tu154 on a passenger flight collided at night with a cargo Boeing 757-200 over Überlingen, Germany with the consequent loss of control of both aircraft and the death of all occupants. The collision occurred after an ATC control lapse had led to a conflict which generated coordinated TCAS RAs which the B757 followed but the TU-154, in the presence of a conflicting ATC instruction, did not. | |
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| Event Details | |
|---|---|
| When | July 2002 |
| Event Type | HF, LOS |
| Day/Night | Night |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Flight Details | |
|---|---|
| Aircraft | TUPOLEV Tu-154 |
| Operator | Not Recorded |
| Type of Flight | Public Transport (Passenger) |
| Origin | Moscow/Domodedovo |
| Intended Destination | Barcelona |
| Flight Phase | Cruise |
| ENR | |
| Flight Details | |
|---|---|
| Aircraft | BOEING 757-200 |
| Operator | Not Recorded |
| Type of Flight | Public Transport (Cargo) |
| Origin | Bergamo |
| Intended Destination | Brussels |
| Flight Phase | Cruise |
| ENR | |
| Location | |
|---|---|
| Approx. | Over Uberlingen, Germany at 34,890 feet amsl |
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| General | |
|---|---|
| Tag(s) | Flight Crew Training Aircraft-aircraft collision Safety pilot present Inadequate Aircraft Operator Procedures Inadequate ATC Procedures Ineffective Regulatory Oversight |
| HF | |
|---|---|
| Tag(s) | Procedural non compliance ATC clearance error |
| LOC | |
|---|---|
| Tag(s) | Collision Damage |
| LOS | |
|---|---|
| Tag(s) | TCAS RA Mis Flown Required Separation not maintained ATC Error Mid-Air Collision |
| Safety Net Mitigations | |
|---|---|
| Malfunction of Relevant Safety Net | No |
| TCAS | Available but ineffective |
| Safety Net Mitigations | |
|---|---|
| Malfunction of Relevant Safety Net | No |
| TCAS | Effective |
| STCA | Available but ineffective |
| Outcome | |
|---|---|
| Damage or injury | Yes |
| Aircraft damage | Hull loss |
| Non-aircraft damage | Yes |
| Fatalities | Most or all occupants |
| Causal Factor Group(s) | |
|---|---|
| Group(s) | Aircraft Operation Air Traffic Management |
| Safety Recommendation(s) | |
|---|---|
| Group(s) | Aircraft Operation Air Traffic Management |
| Investigation Type | |
|---|---|
| Type | Independent |
Contents |
Description
On 1st July 2002, a Tu-154 collided with a B757 over Überlingen, Germany, following an ATC control lapse and failure of the TU154 to follow the coordinated TCAS RA guidance.
Synopsis
This is an extract of the synopsis from the official report into the incident published by the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU):
"…On 1 July 2002 at 21:35:32 hrs a collision between a Tupolev TU154M, which was on a flight from Moscow/Russia to Barcelona/Spain, and a Boeing B757-200, on a flight from Bergamo/Italy to Brussels/Belgium, occurred north of the city of Überlingen…Both aircraft flew according to IFR…and were under the control of ACC Zurich. After the collision both aircraft crashed into an area north of Überlingen. There were a total of 71 people on board of the two airplanes, none of which survived the crash.
The following immediate causes have been identified:
- The imminent separation infringement was not noticed by ATC at the time. The instruction for the TU154M to descend was given at a time when the prescribed separation to the B757-200 could not be ensured anymore.
- The TU154M crew followed the ATC instruction to descend and continued to do so even after TCAS advised them to climb. This manoeuvre was performed contrary to the generated TCAS RA.
The following systemic causes have been identified:
- The integration of ACAS/TCAS II into system aviation was insufficient and did not correspond in all points with the system philosophy. The regulations concerning ACAS/TCAS published by ICAO and as a result the regulations of national aviation authorities, operations and procedural instructions of the TCAS manufacturer and the operators were not standardised, incomplete and partially contradictory.
- Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company did not ensure that during the night all open workstations were continuously staffed by controllers.
- Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company tolerated for years that during times of low traffic flow at night only one controller worked and the other retired to rest.
The Report's lengthy conclusions, beginning on page 107, detail the institutional and organisational failings which contributed to the accident (see Further Reading).
Related Articles
Further Reading
For further information, see the full BFU Accident Report and the Appendices to that report which include the CVR transcripts, FDR traces, and reconstruction of the event.