If you wish to contribute or participate in the discussions about articles you are invited to join SKYbrary as a registered user

From SKYbrary Wiki

Article Information
Category:	Runway Excursion
Content source:	SKYbrary
Content control:	EUROCONTROL

RTO

Description

In the event of the recognition of abnormal circumstances, or an ATC instruction to stop the take off during the take off roll, transport aircraft in Performance Category ‘A’ should be able to safely reject the take off if the decision to do so is made at a speed not greater than the applicable decision speed V1 and the response is prompt and in accordance with prescribed procedures. After passing the applicable V1, it should be possible to get safely airborne and then review whether a return to land is necessary. It will certainly be possible to get safely airborne and climb away in the case of a single engine malfunction or failure if the associated crew actions comply with specified procedures.

Rejected Takeoffs and Runway Excursions

The main reasons why runway excursions occur during rejected take offs can be categorised as:

• a decision to reject the take off is made after V1 and there is insufficient runway length left to come to a stop on it.
• the flight crew actions required to achieve a rejected take off are not carried out in a sufficiently prompt and/or comprehensive manner.
• directional control is not maintained during the take off roll
• it is found at VR that it is impossible to achieve rotation.

Solutions

Runway Excursions arising from Rejected take offs can therefore usually be avoided if Operating Procedures for the loading and take off of aircraft are robust and rigorously applied. However, for large aircraft, there is usually a significant gap between V1 and VR so that if, at VR, it is found impossible to physically achieve rotation, there may be no alternative but to reject the take off. It is this scenario, on limiting runway lengths, which accounts for many of the most serious runway excursions arising from rejected take offs. Often, the problem with rotation is attributed to aircraft total weight or Centre of Gravity being different to that understood by the flight crew, due to differences in the distribution of the load and the certified load and trim sheet. A similar circumstance may result from take off using incorrect aircraft performance calculations or ASI speed bug settings, although a viable flight crew emergency response to these cases may be available by means of a prompt increase to maximum available thrust/power.

Aircraft Loading procedures must be properly specified, and there must be checks that the aircraft has been loaded in accordance with the documentation supplied to the flight crew. Particular care in is required where the provision of this service is by a contractor and especially so where such a contractor supplies equivalent services to other operators using the same staff, since the contractual requirements of all operators may not be the same. Where flight crews use EFBs to calculate take off performance, special attention should be given to the applied SOP and to crew training to ensure that both crew fully understand EFB use.

Application of SOPs

All the relevant Flight Crew SOPs must be clearly specified and applied, particularly:

• Cross checking take off performance calculations and the corresponding setting of ASI speed bugs.
• Both flight crew must be fully satisfied that the prevailing runway surface conditions correspond to the assumptions which have been made in their take off performance calculations.
• There must be unambiguous requirements governing crew calls of abnormal conditions during the take off roll and the degree to which the aircraft commander then has the discretion to reject or continue the take off.
• There must be accurate calls of standard speeds during the take off by PNF and a check that both principal ASIs are indicating the same figure at the designated check speed (usually 80 KIAS or 100 KIAS).

Simulator Training

Once robust flight crew SOPS are in place, the most effective way for an Operator to ensure that flight crew are likely to respond to a rejected take off decision and its execution in the expected way is practice. This means ensuring that the specifications for both initial, and recurrent, aircraft type simulator training and assessment include sufficient time for the inclusion of un-expected events, which will invite both stop-go take off decisions and actual rejected take offs. Unexpected events should include RTO events other than engine failure; indeed, evidence from accident and incident reports indicates that inappropriate RTOs both above and below V1 are often because of a single tyre failure or a transient aberration in the operation of a single engine.

Due to the pressure on recurrent simulator time, it may be difficult to include this practice to the extent that it is desirable to give reasonable assurance of optimum response to a real case, which at the more challenging higher speeds is a rare experience. Unexpected noises which may be audible to crew during a take off, especially engine malfunctions and tyre blow outs, should be fully covered in training, since past experience has shown that these events are often the precursors of at least transient indecision and sometimes the un-necessary hazards associated with a high speed rejected tale off..

FAA Takeoff Safety Training Aid (1993)

In 1989, in reaction to a number of takeoff accidents resulting from improper rejected takeoff decisions and procedures, a joint FAA/industry taskforce studied what actions might be taken to increase takeoff safety. The taskforce produced nine recommendations including the development of training practices, operational guidelines, and improvement of simulator fidelity. From this, Boeing led an industry wide effort to develop a training aid. The result was a publication entitled Takeoff Safety Training Aid, released in 1993, which included:

• Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety (Section 2 of the training aid updated in 2004), and
• Rejected Takeoff and the Go/No Go Decision] - a flight crew briefing video.

Rejected Takeoff and the Go/No Go Decision Rejected Takeoff and the Go/No Go Decision - a flight crew briefing video.

This material gave information on operational procedures and crew qualification programs regarding rejected takeoffs. The goal of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid was to minimise the probability of RTO-related accidents.

Related Articles

Accidents and serious incidents which include Runway Excursion (Overrun on Take Off) as an outcome:

• A343, Singapore Changi, Singapore, 2007 (RE) (On 30 May 2007, at about 0555 hours local time, the crew of an Airbus A340-300 had to apply (Take-off Go Around) power and rotate abruptly at a high rate to become airborne while taking off from Runway 20C at Singapore Changi Airport, when they noticed the centreline lights were indicating the impending end of the available runway. The crew had calculated the take-off performance based on the full TORA (Take-off Run Available) of 4,000 m because they were unaware of the temporary shortening of Runway 20C to 2,500 m due to resurfacing works.)
• B703, Sydney Australia, 1969 (BS RE) (On 1 December 1969, a Boeing 707-320 being operated by Pan Am and making a daylight take off from Sydney, Australia ran into a flock of gulls just after V1 and prior to rotation and after a compressor stall and observed partial loss of thrust on engine 2 (only), the aircraft commander elected to reject the take off. Despite rapid action to initiate maximum braking and the achievement of full reverse thrust on all engines including No 2, this resulted in an overrun of the end of the runway by 170m and substantial aircraft damage. A full emergency evacuation was carried out with no injuries to any of the occupants. There was no fire.)
• B732, Sultan Syarif Kasim II Airport Indonesia, 2002 (HF RE) (On 14 January 2002, a Boeing 737-200, operated by Lion Air, attempted to complete a daylight take off from Sultan Syarif Kasim II airport, Indonesia without flaps set after a failure to complete the before take off checks. The rejected take off was not initiated promptly and the aircraft overran the runway. The take off configuration warning failed to sound because the associated circuit breaker was so worn that it had previously auto-tripped and this had not been noticed.)
• B742, Brussels Belgium, 2008 (RE BS HF) (On 25 May 2008 a Kalitta Air B747-200F, which was departing Brussels on a cargo flight to Bahrain, overran Runway 20 at Brussels Airport, Belgium during a rejected take-off. The aircraft came to a stop 300m beyond the end of runway 20 and broke into three parts. The crew of four and one passenger safely evacuated from the aircraft and suffered only minor injuries.)
• CL60, Teterboro USA, 2005 (GND RE) (On 2 February 2005, a Challenger, belonging to Platinum Jet Management, crashed after taking off from Teterboro, New Jersey, USA. The aircraft's center of gravity was well forward of the forward takeoff limit.)
• … further results

Further Reading

Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Notes

• “Revisiting the stop or go decision”
• “Understanding take off speeds”

Flight Safety Foundation

• Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions - Report of the Runway Safety Initiative
• Runway Excursion Risk Assessment Tool
• Rejected Takeoff (OGHFA SE)
• Takeoff Weight Entry Error and Fatigue (OGHFA SE)
• ALAR Briefing Note 8.4 — Braking Devices
• ALAR Briefing Note 8.5 Wet or Contaminated Runways

Ohio State University

• Ohio State University Rejected Take Offs – Causes, Problems and Consequences

NLR

• Rejecting Takeoff after v1...Why does it (still) happen?