From SKYbrary Wiki
| Summary
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| On 2 September 2006, a UK Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod, engaged in operations over Afghanistan experienced a bomb bay fire shortly after completing air-to-air refuelling. The fire spread and the aircraft exploded in flight before the crew were able to land at Kandahar.
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| Event Details
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| When
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September 2006
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| Event Type
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AW, FIRE, LOC
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| Day/Night
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Day
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| Flight Conditions
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VMC
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| Location - Airport
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| Airport vicinity
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Kandahar
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| FIRE
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| Tag(s)
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Fire-Fuel origin
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| LOC
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| Tag(s)
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Airframe Structural Failure
Significant Systems or Systems Control Failure
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| EPR
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| Tag(s)
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MAYDAY declaration
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| AW
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| System(s)
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Fuel
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| Contributor(s)
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Component Fault in service
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| Outcome
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| Damage or injury
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Yes
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| Aircraft damage
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Hull loss
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| Non-aircraft damage
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Yes
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| Injuries
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Nonewarning.png"None" is not in the list of possible values (Few occupants, Many occupants, Most or all occupants) for this property.
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| Fatalities
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Most or all occupants
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| Causal Factor Group(s)
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| Group(s)
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Aircraft Operation
Aircraft Technical
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| Safety Recommendation(s)
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| Group(s)
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Aircraft Operation
Aircraft Airworthiness
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| Investigation Type
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| Type
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Independent
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Description
On 2 September 2006, a UK Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod, engaged in operations over Afghanistan experienced a bomb bay fire shortly after completing air-to-air refuelling. The fire was most probably caused by a fuel leak in an area of the dry bay where fuel and hot air system components were collocated. The fire spread and the aircraft exploded in flight before the crew were able to land at Kandahar.
Investigations
The RAF Board of Inquiry (BoI) identified the probable causes of the fire as:
- "The escape of fuel during AAR, occasioned by an overflow from no. 1 tank, or a leak from the fuel system (fuel coupling or pipe), led to an accumulation of fuel within the No. 7 tank dry bay. Although of lower probability, the fuel tank leak could have been caused by a hot air leak damaging fuel system seals.
- The ignition of that fuel following contact with an exposed element of the aircraft's crossfeed/SCP pipework."
and listed the following contributory factors:
- "The age of the Nimrod MR2's non-structural system components.
- Nimrod MR2 maintenance policy in relation to fuel and hot air systems.
- The lack of a fire detection and suppression system within the No 7 tank dry bay.
- The fact that hazard analysis did not correctly categorize the potential threat to the aircraft caused by the collocation of fuel and hot air system components within the No 7 tank dry bay.
- The formal incorporation of AAR capability within the Nimrod did not identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and associated procedures."
On 28 October 2009, the Nimrod Review, also referred to as the "Haddon-Cave Report", which was set up by the UK Government to take a wider look at the context for the accident following the findings of the BOI and the subsequent civil inquest into the deaths of the service personnel on board the accident aircraft, accused the UK MOD of sacrificing safety to cut costs, and condemned the change of organisational culture within the MoD between 1998 and 2006 which was described as when financial targets came to distract from safety.
Related Articles
Further Reading
Prior to publication, some parts of the full BoI report were redacted (removed) - principally text relating to confidential operational matters or giving the identity of personnel. The Report is published in 11 separate documents available on the MoD website.
