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BOEING 737-700

From SKYbrary Wiki
Name 737-700
Manufacturer BOEING
Body Narrow
Wing Fixed Wing
Position Low wing
Tail Regular tail, mid set
WTC Medium
Type code L2J
RFF Category 6
Engine Jet
Engine count Multi
Position Underwing mounted
Landing gear Tricycle retractable
Mass group 4

Manufacturered as:

BOEING Clipper
BOEING C-40 Clipper
BOEING 737-700
BOEING 737-700 BBJ

BOEING 737-700

BOEING 737-700 BOEING 737-700 3D


Short to medium range airliner. In service since 1997. Standard version of the BOEING 737 next generation. All versions have more powerful and efficient engines, improved wings and tail sections and modernized cockpits. Replaced the BOEING 737-300. BBJ 1 long range corporate version with fuselage of 737-700 and wings of 737-800. With winglets the aircrafts wingspan is 35.79 meters. The B737 is member of the B737 family of aircraft.

For more information, see Boeing's B737 family specifications.

Technical Data

Wing span 34.3 m112.533 ft
Length 33.65 m110.4 ft
Height 12.6 m41.339 ft
Powerplant 2 x CFM56-7 (89 kN) or
2 x CFM56-7HGW (107 kN) turbofans.
Engine model CFM International CFM56

Performance Data

Take-Off Initial Climb
(to 5000 ft)
Initial Climb
(to FL150)
Initial Climb
(to FL240)
MACH Climb Cruise Initial Descent
(to FL240)
(to FL100)
Descent (FL100
& below)
V2 (IAS) 150 kts IAS 165 kts IAS 280 kts IAS 280 kts MACH 0.74 TAS 460 kts MACH 0.76 IAS 290 kts IAS 250 kts Vapp (IAS) 137 kts
Distance 1800 m ROC 3000 ft/min ROC 2500 ft/min ROC 2500 ft/min ROC 1500 ft/min MACH 0.785 ROD 800 ft/min ROD 3500 ft/min MCS 210 kts Distance 1400 m
MTOW 6632066,320 kg
66.32 tonnes
Ceiling FL410 ROD 1500 ft/min APC C
WTC M Range 25002,500 nm
4,630,000 m
4,630 km
15,190,288.725 ft

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving B737

  • A319 / B737, Zurich Switzerland, 2002 (On 23 November 2002, an A319, landing on Rwy16 at Zurich Switzerland, narrowly missed collision with a B737 cleared for take off on an intersecting runway.)
  • B190 / B737, Calgary Canada, 2014 (On 29 March 2014, a Beech 1900D being taxied by maintenance personnel at Calgary entered the active runway without clearance in good visibility at night as a Boeing 737-700 was taking off. The 737 passed safely overhead. The Investigation found that the taxiing aircraft had taken a route completely contrary to the accepted clearance and that the engineer on control of the aircraft had not received any relevant training. Although the airport had ASDE in operation, a transponder code was not issued to the taxiing aircraft as required and stop bar crossing detection was not enabled at the time.)
  • B737 / A320, Los Angeles CA USA, 2007 (On 16 August 2007, a Westjet Boeing 737-700 which had just landed began to cross a runway in normal daylight visibility from which an Airbus A320 was taking off because the crew had received a clearance to do so after an ambiguous position report given following a non-instructed frequency change. When the other aircraft was seen, the 737 was stopped partly on the runway and the A320 passed close by at high speed with an 11 metre clearance. The AMASS activated, but not until it was too late to inform a useful controller response.)
  • B737 / F100, vicinity Geneva Switzerland, 2006 (On 29 December 2006, Geneva ATC saw the potential for runway 23 conflict between a departing 737 and an inbound F100 and instructed them to respectively reject take off and go around respectively. Although still at a relatively slow speed, the 737 continued its take off and subsequently lost separation in night IMC against the F100. The Investigation noted that take off clearance for the 737 had been delayed by a slow post-landing runway clearance by a business jet and that the 737 had not begun take off after clearance to do so until instructed to do so immediately.)
  • B737 en-route, Glen Innes NSW Australia, 2007 (On 17 November 2007 a Boeing 737-700 made an emergency descent after the air conditioning and pressurisation system failed in the climb out of Coolangatta at FL318 due to loss of all bleed air. A diversion to Brisbane followed. The Investigation found that the first bleed supply had failed at low speed on take off but that continued take off had been continued contrary to SOP. It was also found that the actions taken by the crew in response to the fault after completing the take off had also been also contrary to those prescribed.)
  • B737, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2003 (n 22 December 2003, a Boeing 737-700 being operated by UK Operator Easyjet on a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to London Gatwick was taxiing for departure at night in normal visibility and took a different route to that instructed by ATC. The alternative route was, unknown to the flight crew, covered with ice and as a consequence, an attempt to maintain directional control during a turn was unsuccessful and the aircraft left wing collided with a lamp-post. The collision seriously damaged the aircraft and the lamp post. One passenger sustained slight injuries because of the impact. The diagram below taken from the official investigation report shows the area where the collision occurred.)
  • B737, Chicago Midway IL, USA 2011 (On 26 April 2011 a Southwest Boeing 737-700 was assessed as likely not to stop before the end of landing runway 13C at alternate Chicago Midway in daylight and was intentionally steered to the grass to the left of the runway near the end, despite the presence of a EMAS. The subsequent investigation determined that the poor deceleration was a direct consequence of a delay in the deployment of both speed brakes and thrust reverser. It was noted that the crew had failed to execute the ‘Before Landing’ Checklist which includes verification of speed brake arming.)
  • B737, Chicago Midway USA, 2005 (On 8 December 2005, a delay in deploying the thrust reversers after a Boeing 737-700 touchdown at night on the slippery surface of the 1176 metre-long runway at Chicago Midway with a significant tailwind component led to it running off the end, subsequently departing the airport perimeter and hitting a car before coming to a stop. The Investigation concluded that pilots’ lack of familiarity with the autobrake system on the new 737 variant had distracted them from promptly deploying the reversers and that inadequate pilot training provision and the ATC failure to provide adequate braking action information had contributed.)
  • B737, Fort Nelson BC Canada, 2012 (On 9 January 2012, an Enerjet Boeing 737-700 overran the landing runway 03 at Fort Nelson by approximately 70 metres after the newly promoted Captain continued an unstabilised approach to a mis-managed late-touchdown landing. The subsequent Investigation attributed the accident to poor crew performance in the presence of a fatigued aircraft commander.)
  • B737, Gran Canaria Spain, 2016 (On 7 January 2016, a Boeing 737-700 was inadvertently cleared by ATC to take off on a closed runway. The take-off was commenced with a vehicle visible ahead at the runway edge. When ATC realised the situation, a 'stop' instruction was issued and the aircraft did so after travelling approximately 740 metres. Investigation attributed the controller error to "lost situational awareness". It also noted prior pilot and controller awareness that the runway used was closed and that the pilots had, on the basis of the take-off clearance crossed a lit red stop bar to enter the runway without explicit permission.)
  • B737, New York La Guardia USA, 2013 (On 22 July 2013 the Captain of a Boeing 737 failed to go around when the aircraft was not stabilised on final approach at La Guardia and then took control from the First Officer three seconds before touchdown and made a very hard nose first touchdown which substantially damaged the aircraft. The Investigation concluded that the accident had been a consequence of the continued approach and the attempt to recover with a very late transfer of control instead of a go around as prescribed by the Operator. The aircraft was "substantially damaged".)
  • B737, Southend UK, 2010 (On 21 Nov 2010, a Boeing 737-700 being operated by Arik Air on a non revenue positioning flight from Southend to Lagos with only the two pilots on board carried out a successful take off in daylight and normal ground visibility from runway 06 but became airborne only just before the end of the runway.)
  • B737, vicinity Branson MO USA, 2014 (On 12 January 2014, a Boeing 737-700 making a night visual approach to Branson advised 'field in sight' approximately 20 miles out and was transferred to TWR and given landing clearance at approximately 6,000 feet. However, the crew had misidentified the airport and subsequently landed on a similarly-orientated runway at a different airport. The Investigation found that required flight crew procedures for such an approach had not been followed and also that applicable ATC procedures for approval of visual approaches by IFR flights were conducive to pilot error in the event that airports were located in close proximity.)
  • B737/C212 en-route/manoeuvring, near Richmond NSW Australia, 2011 (On 5 November 2011, ATC cleared a Virgin Australia Boeing 737-700 to climb without speed restriction through an active parachute Drop Zone contrary to prevailing ATC procedures. As a result, prescribed separation from the drop zone was not maintained, but an avoiding action turn initiated by the 737 crew in VMC upon recognising the conflict eliminated any actual risk of collision with either the drop aircraft or its already-departed free-fall parachutists. The incident was attributed to a combination of inadequate controller training and inadequate ATC operational procedures.)
  • B737/LJ45, Chicago Midway, USA 2011 (On 1 December 2011 a Southwest Boeing 737-700 was cleared to taxi in after landing on a route which included crossing another active runway before contacting GND and the controller who had issued that clearance then inadvertently issued a take off clearance to a Gama Charters Learjet 45 for the runway to be crossed. One of the 737 pilots saw the approaching Learjet and warned the PF to stop as the runway crossing was about to begin. The departing aircraft then overflew the stationary 737 by 62 feet after rotating shortly before the crossing point without seeing it.)
  • DH8D / B737, Winnipeg Canada, 2014 (On 4 August 2014, the crew of a DHC8-400 departing Winnipeg continued beyond the holding point to which they had been cleared to taxi as a B737 was about to land. ATC observed the daylight incursion visually and instructed the approaching aircraft to go around as the DHC8 stopped within the runway protected area but clear of the actual runway. The Investigation found that the surface marking of the holding point which had been crossed was "significantly degraded" and noted the daily airport inspections had failed to identify this.)
  • Vehicles / B737, Toronto Canada, 2008 (On 29 July 2008, a Boeing 737-700 taking off from Toronto in accordance with its TWR clearance was about a third of the way down the runway when three vehicles, which had previously been cleared to enter the same runway by a GND controller were seen. The aircraft became airborne approximately 760 metres from the vehicles.)