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ATR ALENIA ATR-72
Image source: IANS
Turboprop regional airliner. In service since 1989. Stretched larger capacity version of ATR-42. Some versions with different performance. Latest model AT-72-500 (redesignated 210) with six bladed propellers since 1997.
|Aircraft name||ALENIA ATR-72|
|ICAO code/WTC||AT72 / M|
|Type code/APC||L2T / B|
|Wing span||27.1 m88.911 ft|
|Length||27.2 m89.239 ft|
|Height||7.7 m25.262 ft|
|Powerplant||200: 2 x 2.160 SHP PWC PW124B turboprops with 4 blade propellers.
210: 2 x 2.500 SHP PWC PW127E turboprops with 6 blade propellers.
|Engine model||Pratt & Whitney Canada PW100|
For further details consult EUROCONTROL Aircraft Performance Database:
Accidents & Serious Incidents involving AT72
- AT72 / B732, vicinity Queenstown New Zealand, 1999 (AI LOS AGC HF) (On 26 July 1999, an ATR 72-200 being operated by Mount Cook Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Christchurch to Queenstown entered the destination CTR without the required ATC clearance after earlier cancelling IFR and in marginal day VMC due to snow showers, separation was then lost against a Boeing 737-200 being operated IFR by Air New Zealand on a scheduled passenger flight from Auckland to Queenstown which was manoeuvring visually (circling) after making an offset VOR/DME approach in accordance with a valid ATC clearance.)
- AT72 / JS32, En Route, north east of Jonkoping Sweden, 2012 (LOS HF) (On 20 June 2012, an ATR72 level at FL140 and a climbing opposite direction Jetstream 32 received and correctly responded to co-ordinated TCAS RAs after ATC error. The controller had not noticed visual MTCD and STCA alerts and had attempted to continue active controlling after a TCAS RA declaration. The Investigation observed that the ineffectiveness of visual conflict alerts had previously featured in a similar event at the same ACC and that the ANSP had advised then that its addition was planned. TCAS RA response controller training was considered to be in need of improvement to make it more effective.)
- AT72, Dresden Germany, 2002 (RE HF) (On 5 March 2002, following the departure from runway 22 at Dresden in good visibility and light winds at night of an Aerospatiale ATR 72-200 being operated by an unrecorded airline on a domestic scheduled passenger fight from Dresden to Stuttgart, the airport operator found a number of damaged runway edge lights. Inspection of the aircraft after the flight disclosed damage to both nose landing gear tyres, one of which was deflated, and also found evidence of glass fragment impact with the fuselage and propellers, glass splinters in all landing gear bays and noted that the lower anti-collision light had been destroyed. There was no reported awareness of an incident on the part of the 27 passengers and two cabin crew.)
- AT72, Helsinki Finland, 2012 (RE HF AW) (On 19 August 2012, the crew of a Flybe Finland ATR 72 approaching Helsinki failed to respond appropriately to a fault which limited rudder travel and were then unable to maintain directional control after touchdown with a veer off the runway then following. It was concluded that as well as prioritising a continued approach over properly dealing with the annunciated caution, crew technical knowledge in respect of the fault encountered had been poor and related training inadequate. Deficiencies found in relevant aircraft manufacturer operating documentation were considered to have been a significant factor and Safety Recommendations were made accordingly.)
- AT72, Mumbai India, 2009 (RE HF) (On 10 November 2010, a Kingfisher Airlines ATR 72 made an excessively steep and unstabilised tailwind approach in light rain to runway 27 at Mumbai in visual daylight conditions. After touching down late, the aircraft was steered off the side of the runway when it became obvious that an overrun would otherwise occur. The Investigation found that ATC had failed to advise of water patches on the runway and aquaplaning had occurred. It also found that without aquaplaning, the available distance from the actual touchdown point would have been sufficient to stop the aircraft in.)
- … further results