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A319, en-route, London UK, 2005 (AW)
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| Summary | |
| On 22 October 2005, an Airbus A319-131, being operated by British Airways from London Heathrow to Budapest in night VMC, experienced a major electrical failure. The subsequent investigation made a number of recommendations but did not establish the cause of the failure. | |
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| Event Details | |
|---|---|
| When | October 2005 |
| Event Type | AW |
| Day/Night | Night |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Flight Details | |
|---|---|
| Aircraft | AIRBUS A-319 |
| Operator | British Airways |
| Domicile | United Kingdom |
| Type of Flight | Public Transport (Passenger) |
| Origin | London Heathrow |
| Intended Destination | Budapest/Ferihegy |
| Flight Phase | Climb |
| ICL / ENR | |
| Location En-Route | |
|---|---|
| Origin | London Heathrow |
| Destination | Budapest/Ferihegy |
| Location | |
|---|---|
| Approx. | near London, UK |
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| EPR | |
|---|---|
| Tag(s) | PAN declaration |
| AW | |
|---|---|
| System(s) | Autoflight Electrical Power Indicating / Recording Systems |
| Contributor(s) | Component Fault in service |
| Outcome | |
|---|---|
| Damage or injury | No |
| Causal Factor Group(s) | |
|---|---|
| Group(s) | Aircraft Technical |
| Safety Recommendation(s) | |
|---|---|
| Group(s) | Aircraft Operation Aircraft Airworthiness |
| Investigation Type | |
|---|---|
| Type | Independent |
Contents |
Description
On 22 October 2005, an Airbus A319-131, being operated by British Airways from London Heathrow to Budapest in night VMC, experienced a major electrical failure. The subsequent investigation made a number of recommendations but did not establish the cause of the failure.
Synopsis
The following is the Synopsis from the UK AAIB report:
"The incident occurred at 1926 hrs on 22 October 2005, to an Airbus A319-131 aircraft which was operating a scheduled passenger flight between London Heathrow and Budapest…
As the aircraft climbed to Flight Level (FL) 200 in night Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) with autopilot and autothrust engaged, there was a major electrical failure. This resulted in the loss or degradation of a number of important aircraft systems. The crew reported that both the commander’s and co-pilot’s Primary Flight Displays (PFD) and Navigation Displays (ND) went blank, as did the upper ECAM display. The autopilot and autothrust systems disconnected, the VHF radio and intercom were inoperative and most of the cockpit lighting went off. There were several other more minor concurrent failures. Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring system - this comprises two centrally mounted electronic display units, which present the flight crew with aircraft systems information, warning and memo messages and actions to be taken in response to systems failures.
The commander maintained control of the aircraft, flying by reference to the visible night horizon and the standby instruments, which were difficult to see in the poor light. The co‑pilot carried out the abnormal checklist actions which appeared on the lower ECAM display; the only available electronic flight display. Most of the affected systems were restored after approximately 90 seconds, when the co-pilot selected the AC Essential Feed switch to Alternate (‘ALTN’). There were no injuries to any of the 76 passengers or 6 crew.
After the event, and following discussions between the crew and the operator’s Maintenance Control, the aircraft continued to Budapest.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) became aware of this incident on 28 October 2005, through the UK Civil Aviation Authority’s Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) scheme. The AAIB investigation team was assisted by an Accredited Representative from the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile (BEA, the French air accident investigation authority) and by the aircraft manufacturer.
Preliminary information on the progress of the investigation was published in AAIB Special Bulletins S2/2005 and S3/2006, in November 2005 and April 2006. Four Safety Recommendations were made in Special Bulletin S3/2006. It was not possible to determine the cause of the incident due to a lack of available evidence, however, nine additional Safety Recommendations are made in this report."
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Further Reading
- For further information, see the Final AAIB Report 2/2008